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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the special protection afforded religion in United 
Kingdom (UK) anti-discrimination law. Initial discussions centre on the historical 
and normative bases for religious liberty in the UK. These debates assess the 
evolution of domestic legal protection of religion and critique prevailing principles 
(in particular, the idea of human dignity) underpinning the variety of that protection. 
Attention is then focused on religious exceptions in UK anti-discrimination law and 
the practical extent to which they assist religious interests. It is clear that such special 
measures are aimed at religion as a collective; they do not enhance protection at the 
individual level. This deficit becomes more acute when considering the limiting 
effects of recent UK jurisprudence, specifically claims involving religion and 
discrimination across employment and the provision of goods and services. A 
particularly problematic trend exhibited in the case law is the courts’ approach to 
determining justification and proportionality in indirect discrimination.  
 
Accordingly, an argument is made for additional special protection. A duty of 
reasonable accommodation is proposed as a separate claim route in UK anti-
discrimination law for religious individuals wishing to be excused from a rule. This 
is advocated in the field employment, it being noted that the field of goods and 
services poses challenges for the introduction of such a duty. Comparative analyses 
with Canada and the United States (US) expose two different models of reasonable 
accommodation. These are applied to high-profile UK cases featuring religion and 
indirect discrimination in employment, revealing how reasonable accommodation 
might have assessed those claims differently. It is submitted that the Canadian model 
provides a more sophisticated proportionality analysis than its US counterpart. This 
approach affords a more factually nuanced analysis in balancing the religious claim 
with a competing legitimate aim. It is contended that such a duty also coheres with 
both the theory of human dignity and the notion of equality as it features in the 
conceptual framework of anti-discrimination law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
This thesis focuses on the special protection afforded religion in United Kingdom 
(UK) anti-discrimination law. Particular attention is paid to the practical utility of 
religious exceptions and, beyond this, whether a case can be made for further special 
protection. A UK model of reasonable accommodation is duly proposed for 
religiously-based claims as an alternative legal mechanism to indirect discrimination 
in employment and the provision of goods and services. 
 
This research is undertaken against a backdrop of burgeoning jurisprudence on law 
and religion in domestic anti-discrimination law. Its prime concern is with the idea 
that there can be special legal protection of religion over and above core guarantees 
such as the prohibition on religious discrimination. This special protection is initially 
contextualised by locating it in the historical tradition of law and religion in the UK,
1
 
with emphasis also on the normative network of support for legal protection of 
religion
2
 – in particular the idea of human dignity. Subsequently, the thesis embarks 
upon a case-study of religious exceptions in anti-discrimination law, considering 
briefly their philosophical roots
3
 before progressing to a more practically-orientated 
analysis.
4
 Emphasis is on the tangible practical benefits such exceptions facilitate in 
the name of religious liberty. This assessment leads to an acceptance of the general 
prognosis that such exceptions occur only in highly specific circumstances and that 
they are – necessarily – restrictively drafted for the benefit of religion as a collective. 
This exposes gaps in anti-discrimination protection of religious interests at the level 
of the individual believer. Recent case law
5
  reveals not only how common situations 
have fallen outside those covered by the exceptions, but also that the courts have 
restrictively applied discrimination law rules to those disputes, especially in relation 
to indirect religious discrimination and the linked issues of justification and 
proportionality. Consequently, it is asked whether, and if so how, religion should 
                                                     
1
 See chapter 1. 
2
 See chapter 2. 
3
 See chapter 3, section 3.1. 
4
 See chapters 4 and 5. 
5
 Surveyed in chapter 6, section 2.1.  
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enjoy further special protection in the more familiar settings in which religious 
individuals seek protection.  
 
As a result, it is submitted that reasonable accommodation needs exploring as a 
substitute mechanism to indirect discrimination.
6
 The theoretical and conceptual 
implications of introducing the doctrine are critically assessed: there is an emphasis 
on the key parts played by human dignity and equality, respectively, in the 
framework of anti-discrimination law and how these cohere with reasonable 
accommodation.
7
 The doctrine is then critiqued as it exists in Canada
8
 and the United 
States (US),
9
 these jurisdictions providing two prominent and famous comparative 
models of reasonable accommodation. These two models are then applied to well-
known UK cases concerning religion and discrimination.
10
 This reveals how the 
more attuned, nuanced and intricate approaches to proportionality inherent in those 
models (albeit considerably more so under the Canadian system) would have 
required judges to engage in a more sophisticated balancing of a religious 
individual’s need for rule adjustment as against another’s competing legitimate aim. 
Ultimately, it is argued that there is a more innovative and schematic approach to 
proportionality inherent in Canadian reasonable accommodation; this recommends 
that model over its US counterpart as a useful alternative claim route to indirect 
discrimination for religion in the UK. Significantly, the process demonstrates how 
some UK cases might have been decided differently, highlighting how the doctrine 
could add value to the adjudication of religious disputes. The proposal for a domestic 
test of reasonable accommodation for religion also chimes with recent institutional 
and stakeholder enthusiasm for the doctrine.  
 
RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LITERATURE  
 
The genesis of this idea certainly lies in the deficiencies of the indirect discrimination 
case law. However, it also springs from related academic discussion by figures 
whose work fits into a variety of different areas. The research question takes its 
                                                     
6
 See chapter 6, section 3. 
7
 See chapter 6, section 3.3. 
8
 Chapter 7.  
9
 Chapter 8. 
10
 See chapters 9 – 11.  
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normative cue from the findings of individuals such as Lucy Vickers
11
 and 
Christopher McCrudden
12
 on religion and human dignity; meanwhile, philosophical 
bases for legal exceptions are drawn from the research of (amongst others) Rex 
Ahdar and Ian Leigh,
13
 together with Brian Barry.
14
 Coverage of the religious 
exceptions themselves in anti-discrimination law is influenced by the observations of 
Russell Sandberg.
15
 When introducing reasonable accommodation, conceptual issues 
concerning its link with existing perspectives on equality and anti-discrimination law 
are addressed in the light of arguments advanced by commentators such as Lisa 
Waddington and  Aart Hendriks
16
 and Dagmar Schiek et al.
17
 Practical matters 
addressing indirect discrimination and the deficiencies of the justification analysis 
particularly refer to work by both Vickers
18
 and Sandberg,
19
 but also more generally 
that of Erica Howard
20
 and Dominic McGoldrick.
21
 Meanwhile, the work of Julian 
Rivers
22
 is instructive in framing a contrast between the rights of religious groups 
and religious individuals, critical to the concluding proposal for the introduction of 
reasonable accommodation of religion in the UK.
23
 
 
                                                     
11
 L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 
pp. 36 – 41.  
12
 C. McCrudden, ‘Religion, Human Rights and Equality in the Public Sphere (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical 
Law Journal 26, pp. 34 – 35. McCrudden also writes more generally about human dignity as the basis 
for human rights: ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European 
Journal of International Law 655. 
13
 R. Ahdar and I. Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), pp. 309 – 311. 
14
 B. Barry, Culture and Equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism (Oxford: Polity Press, 
2001), pp. 40 – 54.  
15
 R. Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 117 - 128, and 
R. Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157, pp. 173 – 180.  
16
 L. Waddington and A. Hendriks, ‘The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: from direct and indirect discrimination to reasonable accommodation discrimination’ (2002) 
18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 403, pp. 406 – 415.  
17
 D. Schiek, L. Waddington and M. Bell, Cases, Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and 
International Non-Discrimination Law (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 631 – 632 and p. 744 – 754.  
18
 Above n. 11: pp. 54 – 81, pp. 126 – 135, pp. 158 – 172, and pp. 219 – 234.  See also L. Vickers, 
‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: an emerging hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 280, pp. 298 – 299. 
19
 Above n. 15, Law and Religion, pp. 108 – 117. 
20
 E. Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the wearing of religious 
symbols in education (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 120 – 121, pp. 133 – 134 and pp. 139 – 144.  
21
 D. McGoldrick, ‘Accommodating Muslims in Europe: from adopting Sharia law to religiously 
based opt outs from generally applicable laws’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 603, pp. 625 – 
627.  
22
 J. Rivers, The Law of Organised Religions: between establishment and secularism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 318 – 322.  
23
 See chapter 12, sections 1 and 2. 
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Given the breadth and depth of this existing research it is necessary to distinguish it 
from the instant project. This thesis makes an original contribution to domestic 
scholarship on law and religion in three key ways: i) in identifying limits to religious 
exceptions it links this with the need to address the growing imperative for clearer 
adjudication of individuals’ religious needs. Reasonable accommodation is proposed 
as a way of addressing this gap. This necessitates a close comparative and critical 
analysis of reasonable accommodation, developing work by Howard
24
 and 
Emmanuelle Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim and Isabelle Rorive
25
 which has summarised 
but not extensively critiqued the reasonable accommodation systems in Canada and 
the US; ii) this analysis includes a methodical application of these models to 
religious disputes in the domestic anti-discrimination case law. It significantly 
extends the research of those such as Howard
26
 and Vickers
27
 by revealing at a 
practical level how reasonable accommodation may admit of a more rigorous 
balancing of competing interests. The systematic application of reasonable 
accommodation models to the facts of domestic cases is novel and unique. It also 
addresses recent calls by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) for 
research into the possible effects of any domestic introduction of reasonable 
accommodation for religion;
28
 iii) finally, the thesis completes the case for the 
domestic introduction of reasonable accommodation by exploring relevant 
theoretical, conceptual and policy perspectives. The ability to draw together these 
different strands of research on reasonable accommodation presents a hitherto 
unexplored opportunity to compose a specific case for a reasonable accommodation 
duty to be incorporated into domestic anti-discrimination law in relation to religion.  
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
Part I of the thesis begins by establishing a framework in which to place the analysis 
on religious exceptions and reasonable accommodation. This exercise exposes the 
                                                     
24
 Above n. 20, pp. 129 – 134.  
25
 E. Bribosia, J. Ringelheim and I. Rorive, ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Minorities: a 
promising concept for European antidiscrimination law?’ (2010) 17 (2) Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 137, pp. 139 – 150. 
26
 See above n. 24.  
27
 Above n. 11, pp. 180 – 206.  
28
 See EHRC news release in July 2011on reasonable accommodation: 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/news/2011/july/commission-proposes-reasonable-
accommodation-for-religion-or-belief-is-needed/>, accessed 12
th
 September 2012.  
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historical, normative and legal context of religious liberty development in the UK 
across chapters one, two and three, respectively.  Chapter one charts the evolution of 
religious liberty in the UK through strict establishment to modern freedoms; chapter 
two discusses popular normative perspectives on the protection of religion by law. 
Chief amongst these theories is the emergence of human dignity and the inter-
connected notions of autonomy and equality which are threaded throughout later 
discussions on the introduction of religious exceptions and duties of reasonable 
accommodation. Chapter three concludes Part I by tracking the range of domestic 
legal protection for religion before considering the phenomenon of religious 
exceptions, their philosophical roots and why the law might seek to advance extra-
special protection for religion.  
 
Part II investigates the substantive religious exception in anti-discrimination law and, 
in particular, how they may inform a modern conceptualisation of domestic religious 
liberty. This takes place in chapters four and five across both employment and the 
provision of goods and services, respectively, so as to give a broad view as to the 
practical use of the religious exceptions themselves. It is argued that, whilst the 
limiting of religious exceptions is understandable, they can only be currently enjoyed 
by religions as collective bodies. Consequently, Part III places focus on religious 
individuals in anti-discrimination law. Chapter six investigates whether further 
special protection could be introduced and, if so, the extent to which this would make 
any difference to the pursuit of individual religious interests. The imperative for this 
as dictated by recent case law in indirect discrimination is outlined and a duty of 
reasonable accommodation is proposed.  
 
This duty is then explored from two comparative angles in the remainder of Part III. 
Chapters seven and eight provide an analysis of how those tests are applied in the 
relevant jurisdictions in question, namely Canada and the US respectively. This 
offers a fuller understanding of their advantages and disadvantages. It also provides a 
more detailed and informed platform from which to critically apply the models to 
selected domestic cases in employment in Part IV. Chapter twelve concludes by 
uniting the arguments advanced across Parts II to IV into a coherent case for the 
introduction of a domestic reasonable accommodation duty for religion. 
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A final note should be made about terminology. Given the focus in this thesis on 
religion in anti-discrimination law, the labels ‘freedom of religion’ or ‘religious 
freedom’, traditionally associated with human rights claims, seem inapposite. As a 
result, the umbrella terms ‘religions liberty’ and ‘religious interests’ are used 
interchangeably for purposes of expediency and convenience. 
 
The law is stated as it stood on 30
th
 August 2012. 
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CHAPTER 1: A HISTORY OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The legal framework of religious liberty protection in the United Kingdom (UK) is 
extensive. This contemporary network of domestic law supporting religion should 
initially be set in historical context, reflecting the approach of Sandberg: ‘[i]n order 
to know where you are going, you need to know where you have come from’.1 The 
aim of this chapter is to map the general contours of religion’s place in the UK. 
Discussion will shed light on the gestation of religious interests in the UK, from early 
and protracted piecemeal developments through to an abrupt shift towards ‘the active 
promotion of religious liberty’.2 Chapters two and three, respectively, will then 
outline normative perspectives on law and religion and the modern-day substantive 
UK legal protection of religion. 
 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT 
 
2.1. The rise of Anglicanism 
 
As highlighted by Knights, religious liberty in the UK can be traced back to ‘[t]he 
Roman invasion from circa 43 BC … [which] had a major impact on the spread of 
Christianity’.3 There later followed the establishment of Christian churches to protect 
particular strands of Christianity in the UK, specifically the Anglican Church of 
England
4
 which was also established in Wales during the mid-sixteenth century
5
 and 
later formally in Ireland,
6
 and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.
7
 This afforded 
                                                     
1
 R. Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 17.  
2
 M. Hill, ‘Church and State in the United Kingdom: anachronism or microcosm?’ in S. Ferrari and R. 
Cristofori (eds.) Law and Religion in the 21
st
 Century (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 199.  
3
 S. Knights, Freedom of Religion, Minorities and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
p. 2. 
4
 Established as the official state church through the First and Second Acts of Supremacy 1534 and 
1559, respectively.  
5
 J. Lucas and R. Morris, ‘Disestablishment in Ireland and Wales’, in R. Morris (ed.) Church and State 
in 21
st
 Century Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 111.  
6
 By the Act of Union 1800 which united the hitherto independent Church of Ireland and that of 
England and Wales.  
7
 The Church of Scotland is regulated by the Church of Scotland Act 1921.  
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official state support for forms of Christianity throughout the UK, privileging their 
position and status at the expense of either other strands of Christianity or other 
religions – Abrahamic or otherwise. In England, it is noted that ‘the Church ... 
always occupied – and continues to do so – a position of political privilege through 
its connections with the Crown and Parliament’.8 However, as Bradney explains, 
‘there is no Establishment Act that establishes the link between the Church of 
England and the state. Instead, establishment is the result of an historical process of 
the passage of statutes and the making of precedents that has bound together the 
Church of England and the state’.9 This is supported by Smith who contends that, 
‘[t]he Establishment of the Church of England is as scattered, and as profoundly 
historical and pragmatic, as any other part of the constitution, and it has been 
developed and adapted to change much in the same way’.10  
 
The benefits reaped by the established churches were highly significant. Morris has 
noted that in England during the nineteenth century: 
 
Parliament was a wholly Protestant body and predominately Anglican. 
Anglican archbishops and bishops – all appointed by the state – were ex 
officio members of the House of Lords … The financial support of the clergy 
and the fabric of the churches themselves depended on a system of local 
hypothecated taxation … underpinned by the state. All citizens, whatever 
their faith, were liable to pay these taxes. The only two universities in 
England were open to members of the Church of England alone.
11
  
 
The establishment of the Church of England in Wales and Ireland also elevated the 
influence of Anglicanism in those provinces. Notably, ‘there were financial benefits 
which included rights to tithe and church tax regardless of parishioners’ confessions, 
and the right to membership of the relevant legislature, conferring a degree of 
political power’.12 This was particularly difficult to accept for other denominations in 
Ireland given that the 1861 census revealed that Anglicans comprised only 11.9 per 
                                                     
8
 A. Lynch, ‘The Constitutional Significance of the Church of England’, in P. Radan, D. Meyerson 
and R. Croucher (eds.), Law and Religion: God, the state and the common law (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2005), p. 168. 
9
 A. Bradney, Law and Faith in a Sceptical Age (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 56 – 57. 
10
 C. Smith, ‘A Very English Affair: establishment and human rights in an organic constitution’, in P. 
Cane, C. Evans and Z. Robinson (eds.), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 161. 
11
 R. Morris, ‘Establishment in England: main developments since 1800’, in Morris, above n. 5, pp. 18 
– 19.  
12
 Lucas and Morris, in Morris, above n. 5, p. 111. 
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cent of the population. Roman Catholics constituted 77.6 per cent and Presbyterians 
9 per cent: ‘[t]he[se] results illustrated the absurd position of the Established 
Church’,13 which was able to exert influence over other religions and enjoy 
considerable advantages from a minority position.  
 
2.2 Presbyterianism  
 
Establishment of the Church of Scotland gifted Presbyterianism a similarly 
privileged and special status north of the border. Its evolution ‘ebbed and flowed and 
changed ...  throughout the period from the 1690s to the 1920s’.14 One constant 
factor was the Church of Scotland’s independence from Parliament to the extent that 
‘the state and Church were conceived as inhabiting simultaneous but separate 
spheres’.15 A particular manifestation of this was the creation of the General 
Assembly as the Church of Scotland’s supreme decision-making body whose mixed 
functions incorporated a legislature, a court and an executive. The continued 
separation today of Church and state in Scotland is partly reflected in the 
maintenance of the General Assembly’s existence. Its continued lack of state 
subordination signifies an important contrast in the modes of establishment in 
Scotland and England which have subsequently affected the autonomy and influence 
that Christianity has enjoyed in these regions. In contrast to the Church of England, 
‘the Church of Scotland is established, in the sense of being recognized and protected 
in statute, but it is nevertheless, jealous of its own independence. The sovereign 
swears an oath to protect the Church of Scotland but (unlike the Church of England) 
she does not make ecclesiastical appointments’.16 The result is the granting of an 
even wider degree of religious liberty to Presbyterianism than has been achieved for 
Anglicanism in England.  
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 Ibid., p. 112.  
14
 M. MacLean, F. Cranmer, and S. Peterson, ‘Recent Developments in Church/State Relations in 
Scotland’ in Morris, above n. 5, p. 92.  
15
 R. Morris, ‘Establishment in Scotland’, in Morris , above n. 5, p. 78. 
16
 R. Ahdar and I. Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), p. 82. 
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2.3 Consequences of early establishment  
 
Bradney has argued that creation of the Churches in England and Scotland is 
indicative of the fact that ‘at a very basic level, the Christian God, and more than that 
the particular Christian God of two churches, is written into the constitution of Great 
Britain ... it is clear that establishment means that there is a close formal link between 
the Church of England and the Church of Scotland and the State, and thus between 
religion and the State’.17 Establishment emphatically privileges the authority, liberty, 
power and status of a particular religion. In the UK, at least prior to the modern era, 
this significantly elevated the position of the Christian God at the expense of other 
faiths.  
 
3. THE MODERN ESTABLISHED CHURCHES 
 
3.1 Disestablishment in Ireland and Wales 
 
Religious establishment has now ceased in some provinces of the UK. The Church of 
Ireland was disestablished by the Irish Church Disestablishment Act 1869 which 
formally completed this process on 1st January 1871. The Church of England in 
Wales was disestablished early in the next century by the Welsh Church Act 1914, 
with the Church in Wales (Temporalities) Act 1919 setting the date for 
disestablishment as 31st March 1920. Establishment today in England and Scotland 
continues in the form of their respective Churches. 
 
3.2 Establishment in England 
 
One continuing and anachronistic feature of the Church of England’s privileged 
status is the requirement that successors to the throne be Protestant.
18
 The same 
requirement also precludes the sovereign or heir to the throne from marrying a 
Roman Catholic; significantly, it does not prevent marriage to a person of no or any 
other non-Anglican religion. It is remarkable that such, albeit highly confined, anti-
Catholic discrimination is allowed to exist in a modern liberal democracy given its 
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 Bradney, above n. 9, p. 56. 
18
 Act of Settlement 1700, s. 2.  
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‘controversial’19 status; indeed, this serves to show how the Church of England still 
enjoys advantages over other denominations within the Christian faith and other 
religions.  
 
A further advantage relates to the power to pass legislative acts known as ‘Measures’ 
under the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919: these relate directly to 
the Church’s operation. Whilst such Measures enjoy the invulnerability of Acts of 
Parliament,
20
 this ‘is somewhat lessened by the fact that they must receive the 
approval of the Queen to be lawful’.21 Nevertheless, ‘[i]n practice neither Parliament 
nor the monarchy generally challenge the Measure passing through’,22 suggesting a 
degree of deference: ‘[t]he importance of Measures as a symbol of the autonomy of 
the Church of England is not to be underestimated’.23 The Church of England 
Assembly was replaced by the General Synod of the Church of England under the 
Synodical Government Measure 1969, with the power to pass Measures retained. 
Additionally, it was given the ability to legislate by Canon, such provisions forming 
part of the domestic legal system ‘granting greater freedom for the church and an 
increasing divergence from the norm of integration of church and state in central 
government and administration’.24  These practical advantages have receded with the 
advent of steps taken to reduce religious privilege: notably, the abolition of the 
common law criminal offence of blasphemous libel which protected the Church of 
England from denouncements of contempt.
 25
 This removed one of the significant, if 
rarely used, legal protections of the established denomination which had become 
‘highly controversial in such a pluralistic society as the United Kingdom’.26  
 
                                                     
19
 J. Oliva, ‘Church, State and Establishment in the United Kingdom in the 21st Century: anachronism 
or idiosyncrasy?’ [2010] Public Law 482, p. 487. 
20
 M. Hill, Ecclesiastical Law (Oxford: 2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 14 – 15. This has 
been confirmed elsewhere: see R v. Archbishop of Canterbury, ex parte Williamson, per Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR, unreported, The Times (9
th
 March 1994). 
21
 Bradney, above n. 9, p. 60. 
22
 Knights, above n. 3, p. 75. 
23
 Oliva, above n. 19, p. 490. 
24
 Smith, in Cane, Evans and Robinson, above n. 10, p. 162. 
25
 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 79(1). However, this has been replaced by the 
enactment of new criminal law offences committed against religion: see discussion in chapter 3, 
section 2.1. 
26
 J. Oliva, ‘The Legal Protection of Believers and Beliefs in the United Kingdom’ (2007) 9 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 66, p. 71.  
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Whilst a move away from state control might align the Church of England with the 
Church of Scotland in terms of autonomy, the Church of England nevertheless 
remains under the ultimate control of the state – although there may have been a 
‘gradual loosening of the ties between the Church and the State [in England]’.27 
However, this does not affect the undeniable benefits of establishment which the 
Church continues to enjoy: ‘[t]he privileges of the Church of England are various ... 
[they] include the less tangible benefits of access to places of political power as well 
as direct advantages in, for example, the way in which property is held’.28 
Unsurprisingly, in a time of religious liberty awareness, ‘increasingly questions are 
being asked about the role of religion in the public sphere’.29  
 
3.3 Establishment in Scotland 
 
The Church of Scotland also continues to enjoy special privileges. Chief amongst 
these is Article IV of the Schedule containing the Articles Declaratory to the Church 
of Scotland Act 1921, which gives the Church the right and power (subject to no 
authority) to legislate and adjudicate in any matters of doctrine, worship, 
government, and discipline in the Church. This renders it firmly independent of 
Parliament, Ahdar and Leigh submitting that this ‘affirm[s] the Church’s long-
standing claim to self-government ... which the Scottish courts have used as a reason 
for non-intervention in the church’s affairs’.30  This demonstrates a more 
comprehensive possession of power than that afforded the Church of England. It also 
outlines how the degree of establishment in Scotland exists in a weaker form than 
that in England, although ‘[t]he Church of Scotland continues to hold itself out as 
being ‘the national Church in Scotland’’.31 In times of commitment to greater 
religious liberty, the fact that Presbyterianism is afforded a legislative right, together 
with an ability to self-govern free from parliamentary control, remains ‘a 
conundrum’32.  
 
 
                                                     
27
 Bradney, above n. 9, p. 71. 
28
 Ibid., p. 62.  
29
 Knights, above n. 3, pp. 15 – 16.  
30
 Ahdar and Leigh, above n. 16, p. 82. 
31
 Bradney, above n. 9, p. 55. 
32
 Ahdar and Leigh, above n. 16, p. 82. 
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4. THE EFFECTS OF ESTABLISHMENT: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION  
 
Degrees of religious persecution and discrimination in the UK have been the 
concomitant results of establishment. This places the religious liberty enjoyed today 
in sobering context. 
 
4.1 Inter- and intra-faith challenges 
 
Incidents of religious persecution in the past support the view that ‘overall, religious 
freedom has a precarious history in England’.33 This is reinforced by Christian 
attitudes towards not only other religions but also denominations within Christianity 
itself. These attitudes arguably continue to this day: ‘within the [Christian] 
groupings, some would not classify the others as truly Christian denominations. 
Thus, the potential exists for discrimination between religions and within them’.34 
This basis for intolerance, persecution and suppression was lamented in R v 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p Williamson (Williamson)
35
 by 
Lord Walker who remarked that, ‘not only has the last two thousand years of the 
Christian Church been marred by the torture and killing of apostates, heretics and 
witches, as interpreted on the permission of the Bible, but also by the division and 
hostility between its own different churches and sects’.36 Specific examples of 
discrimination include the prohibition of freedom to worship in licensed premises in 
England, which was relaxed for non-conformists under the Act of Toleration 1689
37
 
but not extended to Catholics, Jews or atheists. The latter would have to ‘wait much 
longer before suppression of their freedom of individual belief ... [was] eventually 
lifted’.38 Roman Catholics were further discriminated against by the Test Acts of 
1673 and 1678 which excluded them from Parliament, holding public office, voting, 
                                                     
33
 Knights, above n. 3, pp. 2 – 3. The precarious history of religious freedom is also found in other 
jurisdictions, particular the US which, whilst respecting religious freedom under Amendment 1 of the 
US Constitution 1787, engaged in religious persecution before and after establishment of the 
constitution. See K. Boyle and J. Sheen (eds.), Freedom of Religion and Belief: a world report 
(London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 153 – 164.   
34
 L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 
p. 4. 
35
 [2005] UKHL 15. 
36
 At para. 56.  
37
 The Bill of Rights the year before did not grant any further extensions of religious liberty.  
38
 Lynch, in Radan, Meyerson and Croucher, above n. 8, p. 179. 
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inheriting land, joining the army and owning property.
39
 In Ireland, the majority 
Roman Catholic population was oppressed by additional penal laws, although these 
were relaxed towards the end of the eighteenth century in civic and economic areas.
40
 
As a result, ‘[h]istorically non-Anglicans were under various legislative 
disadvantages, including the inability to attend university or to occupy public offices. 
In practice, the main groups disadvantaged were non-conformist Christians (such as 
Quakers, Baptists, and Methodists), Roman Catholics and Jews’.41 These forms of 
discrimination were redolent in the UK’s regions until the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.  
 
5. TOWARDS GREATER RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
 
5.1 Religious emancipation  
 
Ahdar and Leigh contend that ‘[t]he criticism that establishment equates to religious 
discrimination is plainly informed by modern notions of religious pluralism’.42 This 
is understandable given the relatively recent legal conceptualisation of discrimination 
and the spread of non-Christian religions around the world. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to show that elements of religious liberty emerged prior to the twentieth 
century, suggesting that some ‘discriminatory’ effects of religious establishment 
were being recognized earlier. Disestablishment in Ireland and Wales removed some 
privileges for their respective members. For example, all Irish bishops lost their 
places in the House of Lords and Crown patronage, appointments and lay patronage 
also ceased. After disestablishment ‘[t]he Church of Ireland declined into the 
twentieth century, especially in southern Ireland, although it remained unified after 
the creation of the Irish Republic in 1922’.43 This removal of state support for 
Anglicanism was mirrored in Wales where the effects of disestablishment were 
similar. For example, all Welsh bishops were removed from the House of Lords, and 
patronage was abolished. For religious liberty purposes disestablishment is symbolic: 
it demonstrated an attempt by the state to reduce the influence of a hitherto dominant 
                                                     
39
 F. Alicino, ‘Constitutionalism as a Peaceful “Site” of Religious Struggles’ (2010) 10 (1) Global 
Jurist 1, pp. 19 – 20.  
40
 Lucas and Morris, in Morris, above n. 5, p. 113. 
41
 Ahdar and Leigh, above n. 16, p. 303. 
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 Ibid., p. 131. 
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 Lucas and Morris, in Morris, above n. 5, p. 116. 
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faith in certain parts of the UK. Such developments reveal shifts in the religious 
power possessed by groups in these provinces.  
 
Despite continued church establishment in England and Scotland, there was a 
removal of various discriminatory effects felt by other faiths which significantly 
enhanced their liberty. Of particular importance was the 1828 repeal of the Test Act 
1673 which afforded civil rights to Catholics, Nonconformists, and non-Christians. 
Even more notable were legislative attempts to extend religious liberty to other even 
more oppressed groups. The Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829 provided long-awaited 
emancipation for Catholics in society: it facilitated greater toleration and reversed 
most of the discriminatory laws affecting them.
44
 However, such emancipation was 
not immediately extended universally to other groups.
45
 Indeed, significant religious 
liberty for Jews did not occur until the passing of the Jewish Disabilities Act 1845 
and the Jewish Relief Act 1858 which, amongst other matters, removed some of the 
religious obstacles to office and employment that had existed due to requirements to 
take Christian oaths. The Reform Act 1832 altered the religious composition of the 
House of Commons, ‘making it a both a less Anglican institution and one more open 
to the arguments of non-Anglicans’.46 The progression of religious liberty continued 
in subsequent statutes such as the Marriage and Registration Acts of 1836, whereby 
the state was permitted to conduct civil marriage and registration – formerly both 
functions of the Churches.
47
 Other notable statutes included the Religious Disabilities 
Act 1846,
48
 the Burial Act 1880,
49
 the Oaths Act 1888,
50
 and the Local Government 
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 Morris, above n. 11, in Morris, above n. 5, p. 21. 
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 Ibid., p. 20.  
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 Excepting Quakers and Jews.  
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the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) in R (on the application of Rudewicz) v. 
Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWCA Civ 499 and Re: St Andrew [2011] 2010/48 Ely Cons Ct. 
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(No. 39511/98) where the applicant’s claim that to take the prescribed oath of allegiance to the British 
monarchy would have offended his Northern Irish republican beliefs under Article 10 was found to be 
manifestly ill-founded by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Contrast this with Buscarini 
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Acts of 1888 and 1894.
51
 The result of this legislative activity was that ‘[f]rom the 
middle years of the nineteenth century the experience of the Church of England was 
often of an increasing alienation from the nation and from the state apparatus through 
which many of its affairs were administered’.52 The cumulative effect of these 
statutory provisions was a loosening of Anglicanism’s tight grip on religious 
dominance in the UK leading to ‘considerable liberty for all religious groups’53 as the 
twentieth century beckoned. 
 
6. FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
6.1 The church-state relationship 
 
Recent ecclesiastical jurisprudence has further diluted the conception of 
establishment. For example, the House of Lords was required to distinguish the 
Church of England from the state in Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley 
Parochial Church Council v. Wallbank (Aston Cantlow).
54
 It was decided that a 
parochial church council (PCC) was not a public authority; rather, it was a private 
religious organisation enforcing private acts. Lord Rodger stated that in the twenty-
first century: 
 
the Church of England has important links with the state. Those links, which 
do not include any funding of the Church by the government, give the Church 
a unique position but they do not mean that it is a department of state ... [T]he 
PCC's general function is to carry out the religious mission of the Church in 
the parish, rather than to exercise any governmental power. Moreover, the 
PCC is not in any sense under the supervision of the state ... I consider that 
the PCC is not a core public authority ... .
55
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
v. San Marino (Buscarini) (1999) 30 EHRR 208 where the applicants had been elected to the 
Parliament of the Republic of San Marino and subsequently required to take the relevant religious 
oath. The ECtHR found Article 9 had been violated as it included the freedom not to hold religious 
beliefs or practise a religion.  
51
 These provisions weakened the Church of England’s presence in civic life: the first introduced 
elected county councils and the second abolished vestry parochial administration and substituted 
secular elected parish councils. 
52
 Smith, in Cane, Evans and Robinson, above n. 10, pp. 172 – 173. 
53
 J. Rivers, The Law of Organised Religions: between establishment and secularism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 19. 
54
 [2004] 1 AC 546. 
55
 At paras. 156 and 166.  
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This might beg the question whether, ultimately, ‘all forms of establishment involve 
restrictions on religious liberty’.56 Aston Cantlow highlights that ‘we may be seeing a 
gradual change in the way that the judiciary perceives the Church of England and the 
Church of Scotland’,57 leading to: 
 
deeper implications for the Church’s status in English law as a church - ... 
does that bring the Church’s constitutional status into question more 
generally? ... does that have any implications for the Church of Scotland? Or 
does the Church of Scotland possess a particular legal status arising from the 
1921 Act and the Articles Declaratory that the Church of England does not 
have?
58
  
 
The decision in Aston Cantlow has led some to ask ‘whether we believe that there is 
a continuing justification and rationale for the public provision of the services of 
religion as provided for by Establishment. The attitudes of the majority of the House 
of Lords in Aston Cantlow would seem to indicate a withdrawal of support from such 
provision’.59 Indeed, ‘[i]t is undeniable that the time is now more ripe for a 
fundamental reassessment and remodelling of the relationship between the church 
and the state’,60 suggesting a move away from traditional notions of religious 
protection towards better facilitation of religious pluralism through a review of how 
religions and the state should best co-exist. 
 
6.2 The limits of self-governance 
 
In Scotland, the ability of the Church to self-govern is now restricted where claims 
invoke the jurisdiction of the civil courts. This was confirmed in Percy v. Board of 
National Mission of the Church of Scotland (Percy)
61
 where the House of Lords 
decided that the appellant’s sex discrimination case was indeed a matter of civil law. 
The majority
62
 concluded that an employment contract for services between the 
appellant and the Church took ‘the relationship outside the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the ecclesiastical courts so that the provisions of the Church of Scotland Act 1921 no 
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 Ahdar and Leigh, above n. 16, p. 138. 
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 MacLean, Cranmer, and Peterson, in Morris, above n. 5, p. 101. 
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longer appl[ied]’.63 Dissenting, Lord Hoffmann preferred to view the appellant as an 
‘office-holder’ and not as an employee of the Church, although a point on which all 
of their Lordships agreed was that ‘in matters of discrimination law the constitutional 
status of the Church of Scotland offers it no special protection’.64 This demonstrates 
that ‘both Church and State are trying to decide where to draw the boundary of 
Article IV’.65 In future, it seems the courts may be willing to intervene in Church of 
England and Church of Scotland matters (alongside those of other religious bodies) 
where there is a sufficient distinction between internal religious issues on which the 
court is unable to rule, and religious issues arising from disputes which domestic law 
governs. Hill believes this is particularly likely in relation to the established churches 
given their ‘unique’ status and the judiciary’s preparedness to enter into their 
affairs.
66
 Religious affairs of faiths outside the established churches were considered 
in New Testament of God v. The Rev. S. Stewart
67
 where the UK-based appellant was 
a member of a religion with headquarters located in the United States (US). The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal followed the majority in Percy demonstrating a 
willingness to intervene in legal matters affecting the operation of non-established 
religious bodies too. This begins to demonstrate equivalence between established and 
other religions, albeit in a limited area. It also highlights that, where internal church 
issues extend beyond the ‘manifestation of private or collective spiritual beliefs 
which are not amenable to adjudication by the state’,68 the law is prepared to 
intervene whatever the religion.  
 
6.3 The role of the courts in religious liberty claims 
 
In the regulation of religious legal disputes, the domestic courts have indicated they 
will not necessarily shirk from pronouncing on the content of religion. Sandberg 
argues this is evidence of an increasing ‘juridification of religion’.69 In R (on the 
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 MacLean, Cranmer, and Peterson, in Morris, above n. 5, p. 97. 
64
 Ibid., p. 98. 
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 Ibid., pp. 105 – 106.  
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Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 419. 
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application of E) v. JFS Governing Body (JFS),
70
 which concerned the potential 
discriminatory effect of a Jewish school’s admissions policy, the issue of judicial 
approaches to intra-faith matters was addressed. Lord Hope contended that whilst ‘it 
is not the business of the courts to intervene in matters of religion ... the divide is 
crossed when the parties to the dispute have deliberately left the sphere of matters 
spiritual over which the religious body has exclusive jurisdiction and engaged in 
matters that are regulated by the civil courts’.71 Therefore on some occasions it will 
be unavoidable for the courts to interpose themselves in matters of substantive 
religion even thought they may not relish having to consider religious doctrinal 
matters alongside the legal question in issue
72
 given the reluctance of the courts ‘to 
adjudicate doctrinal disputes’73 despite Parliamentary guidance.74  There is also the 
danger of judicial ‘majoritarianism’ as a court’s own experience of religion may 
impoverish analysis of legal determinations of issues such as religious manifestation 
or justification of interference with religious interests. In Western jurisdictions this 
may have implications for the liberty of minority faiths.
75
  
 
The willingness of courts to intervene in purely religious matters in legal disputes 
clearly creates tension. It is argued that the courts ‘should not enter into matters of 
religious doctrine at all’76 and that ‘where issues of a religious or doctrinal nature 
permeat[e] the pleadings in [a] case ... [the] matters raised [are] properly categorised 
as non-justiciable’.77 For example, in His Holiness Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj 
v. Eastern Media Group Limited and Singh,
78
 Eady J. reinforced the fact that 
‘doctrinal issues’, ‘regulation or governance or religious groups’, and ‘religious 
issues’, ‘do not readily lend themselves to the sort of resolution which is the normal 
function of a judicial tribunal. They may involve questions of faith or doctrinal 
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opinion which cannot be finally determined by the methodology regularly brought to 
bear on conflicts of factual and expert evidence’.79  Nevertheless, uncertainty as to 
where the boundary lies between non-justiciable internal religious doctrine, as 
contrasted with religious issues invoking the law, is likely to continue because either 
‘judges feel more qualified adjudicating on issues concerning religions that they 
consider they are familiar with ... [o]r [because of] ... religious agnosticism becoming 
more apparent among the judiciary itself than was probably the case in the past’.80 
 
A final matter involving the courts and religion concerns the legality of 
establishment itself. Religious neutrality was professed by Laws LJ in McFarlane v. 
Relate Avon Ltd
81
 when he commented that, ‘the conferment of any legal protection 
or preference upon a particular substantive moral position on the ground only that it 
is espoused by the adherents of a particular faith, however long its tradition, however 
rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled’.82 Nevertheless, the validity of establishment 
remains accepted within limits. It will not automatically be considered a breach of 
any ECHR rights:
83‘[t]he argument that establishment amounts to a form of 
impermissible state preference of one religion over others or none does not gain 
much support from the Convention’.84 Indeed, ‘the existence or lack of an 
established church in a state is not of itself a violation of the ECHR’.85 Indeed, the 
ECtHR has found that various features of establishment do not contravene Article 9, 
including state funding of both religions
86
 and education,
87
 often due to the fact that 
the ECHR’s own discrimination provision in Article 14 does not cover such 
arrangements,
88
 it being limited to anti-discrimination concerning the rights 
enshrined in the ECHR itself. However, the ECtHR has also been keen to outline that 
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there are limits on establishment.
89
 This will be the case particularly with religious 
pluralism and the adoption of alternative legal systems for religious groups,
90
 
indicative of the fact that ‘establishment of a religion must not have a profound effect 
on the political and legal system of a country’.91  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
In the 2001 UK Census,
92
 although the number of people who identified themselves 
as Christian constituted 72 per cent of the population,
93
 significant minorities 
identified themselves with other faiths. Islam, although still evidently a minority UK 
religion,
94
 is the next largest religious group in the country. The expansion of both 
Islam and other minority faiths is indicative of a diversified religiosity in the UK. 
Indeed, hundreds of thousands of respondents in the 2001 Census identified 
themselves as belonging to either Hinduism,
95
 Sikhism,
96
 Judaism
97
 or Buddhism
98
 
Other religious groups with which 159 thousand UK respondents identified included 
Spiritualists,
99
 Pagans,
100
 Jain,
101
 Wicca,
102
 Rastafarians,
103
 Bahà’ì104 and 
Zoastrians.
105
 However, those who identified themselves as having no religion, 
which was interpreted as to include atheists and agnostics, constituted 16 per cent of 
the UK.
106
 This group became the next most popular after Christians. Donald 
observes that ‘certain trends are apparent: a decline in the numbers affiliated to 
historic churches, a rise in those stating that they have no religion and (especially in 
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England) an increase in faiths carried by post-war and post-colonial immigration’.107 
The rich religious and non-religious landscape of the UK has encouraged others to 
consider the best mode of religious integration in the UK. Echoing the efforts made 
to accommodate Muslim religious practices, Poulter has commented that the post-
1960s attempts to afford cultural pluralism (inclusive of religious difference) within 
limits
108
 now represent ‘current British policy’.109 However, at the same time Poulter 
stresses that such limits assume necessary minimum standards and shared values.
110
 
Such research outlines the changing mode of UK integrationist policies over the 
latter half of the twentieth century. This reflects the fact that there exists a changing 
vision of religious liberty in the UK today, one that takes cognisance of ‘significant 
changes in the nature of religious life in Britain, in the characteristic forms of 
religion, in civil religion and in religion’s influence in different social arenas’.111  
 
These developments have occurred against a backdrop of concern regarding 
establishment and the place of religion in the modern state.  Debates on the 
established Churches’ future embody a growing awkwardness with the nexus that 
establishment produces between the state and strands of Christianity. After centuries 
of establishment, the influence and spread of the two remaining established Churches 
is diminishing amongst an ever-more diverse collection of faiths: ‘the time is now 
more than ripe for a fundamental reassessment and remodelling of the relationship 
between the church and state’.112 Nevertheless, Oliva highlights that some minority 
religions are of the view that as long as the established faiths preside over a multi-
faith society with sensitivity, tolerance, respect and non-interference, there should be 
no resentment of its special relationship with the British state.
113
 Following on from 
this historical account of domestic religious liberty development, chapter two will 
trace some of the key normative theories supporting the creation of legal rules 
protecting religion.     
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CHAPTER 2: NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND 
RELIGION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Having traced the historical origins of religious liberty in the United Kingdom (UK), 
the theoretical approaches underpinning modern legal protection of religion can now 
be explored. This will also include brief discussion of the legal definition(s) of 
religion;
1
 detailed consideration of the ways in which the UK protects religion is 
reserved for chapter three. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to ground contemporary law and religion in popular 
normative theories
2
 of religious liberty. This is a preliminary exercise: full treatment 
of such contested theories is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, an overview of 
the relevant debates is offered. This enables the analysis which follows later to be 
located in the wide-ranging field of theoretical enquiry which asks: why legally 
protect religious interests in the first place?
3
  
 
2. HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
The concept of dignity is a popular justification for the protection of religious liberty 
and one that forms a cornerstone of liberal theory. Evans has submitted that this is 
linked to the view that religious truth should not be suppressed – as advocated at one 
stage by J. S. Mill.
4
 It assumes, firstly, that religion intrinsically forms part of both 
the essence and nature of being human (an ontological claim) and, secondly, that it is 
appropriate, if not necessary, to affirm and recognise this on the basis of autonomy. 
In relation to the former, religion is ‘closely related to an individual’s concept of 
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identity and self-respect, and the cost to the individual of renouncing religious 
affiliation should not be underestimated’.5 In relation to the latter, religion is 
‘protected because it is a key aspect of personality and autonomy, based on personal 
choices about conceptions of the good’.6 This amounts to a ‘guarantee of diversity 
within liberal society according to which individuals and groups are free to pursue 
their own conceptions of the good, including religious ones’.7  
 
As a theory of religious protection, human dignity has its ideological roots in human 
rights principles. Indeed, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 (UDHR) declares that ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights’.8 Even more forcefully, ‘[t]he normative foundation of the entire edifice 
of modern human rights is the public doctrine of inherent dignity’.9 Nevertheless, 
beyond this definition of human dignity there is little consensus on how best to arrive 
at a more robust conception of what dignity means.
10
 In any case, reliance on human 
dignity does not mean that all interests stemming from ‘conscience’ are protectable: 
it is only those matters ‘which feed into an individual’s ability to make sense of the 
world, and through which they develop a sense of the good, that require protection. 
Thus a person’s interest in being allowed to participate in, for example, country 
dancing because of its importance to them as a form of artistic expression will not 
require the same level of protection as a belief relating to the existence of a supreme 
being’.11 This is the case particularly where dignity may be cited by two parties on 
either side of a clash, an inherent weakness indicative of the fact that ‘dignity is often 
accused of being deployable by both sides to an argument’.12 However, the concept 
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of dignity does feed into the legal determination of what a religion is.
13
 Vickers 
summarises this as: 
 
includ[ing] a belief that reality extends beyond that which is capable of 
perception by the senses. To be “religious” the belief system must also have 
some relation to man’s nature and place in the universe and his relation to 
things supernatural: it must have something to say to adherents about their 
place and function in the world. Religious beliefs should require or encourage 
adherents to observe particular behavioural standards or codes of conduct, 
and may include specific practices having supernatural significance, such as 
rites of worship.
14
  
 
Within the debate about affirmation of human dignity on the basis of autonomy, 
there is a realisation that equality also has a part to play. Whilst this may appear 
conceptually blurred it has been said that ‘it situates it as part of a broader moral and 
political philosophy’.15 Moreover, regarding the roles of autonomy and equality in 
contributing to an understanding of human dignity, ‘[e]ven if there is no agreement 
as to which is the foundational concept, they are deeply interlinked, and there is 
agreement that a commitment to providing protection for human rights can be based 
on the concepts of equality, dignity and autonomy’.16 In relation to religion, the idea 
of equality connotes the view that all religions and religious individuals should be 
treated equally but also that they should be treated differently from other non-
religious groups precisely because they are different. This difference between formal 
and substantive equality, respectively, means that ‘a focus on dignity as part of our 
understanding of equality should lead to a broader concept of equality than one based 
purely on formal equality’.17 However, the theory of human dignity and the linked 
themes of autonomy and equality do not presume that religion will transcend other 
interests; indeed, Vickers notes that they ‘merely … demonstrate that religious 
interests are valid interests that need consideration alongside other interests that flow 
equally from a concern for human dignity and equality’.18 It is perfectly conceivable 
that sometimes individuals’ autonomy in reifying the self will lead to a clash between 
the dignity rights of religion as against those of another particular group or religion, 
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meaning that ways around such problems must be found. It might be said that this 
presents a problem for human dignity as an explanation for affirming various 
interests, including those of religion. Lewis contends that this problem is reflected in 
religious liberty jurisprudence where there exists an ‘inability to pin down quite why 
religious [liberty] is valued [and] the absence of a clearly defined and universally 
accepted rationale’.19 There is not space here for a detailed excursus into the various 
ways religion could be defined as a basis for deriving a more sound normative 
approach to the issue of human dignity. Suffice it to say that it is a factor the courts 
still must grapple with at a legal level
20
 bearing in mind, as Evans notes, that 
religious liberty ‘is one important aspect of autonomy or individual dignity, but there 
are other important aspects of autonomy that sometimes conflict with religious 
[interests]’.21 On this balance, McCrudden signals that ‘many recent legislative 
interventions adopt ideas of proportionality when rights of interests conflict’.22 
Proportionality is revisited in detail when considering the utility of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ as a form of religious ‘exception’ later in the thesis.23  
 
3. TOLERATION 
 
This presents a further important justification for protecting religion, as classically 
expounded by Locke.
24
 Ironically, given the history of religious persecution by 
Christianity, Locke was at ‘pains to emphasise the peculiarly Christian nature of 
toleration,’25 this exposing for tolerant Christians ‘an evident and embarrassing 
inconsistency between the content of their theory and their practice in propagating 
it’.26 Nevertheless, whilst many interpretations of toleration have been suggested, 
particularly of the types suggested by figures such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke and 
J.S. Mill, it may be said – at risk of generalisation – that the concept simply permits 
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the realisation of religious liberty, although disagreements exist as to the nature of 
that liberty.  
 
When conduct is tolerated is it merely disapproved of or is it viewed as immoral? 
Assuming toleration must connote moral rejection, given that it ‘presupposes that 
what one is tolerating is to some extent undesirable, improper, misguided, or 
wrong’,27 this raises the additional question, ‘why should one accept that which one 
disapproves of if one has the power to stop it; more particularly, how can one 
morally justify permitting or even facilitating that which one morally disapproves of? 
One might tolerate something one simply found distasteful, but moral judgements are 
of a different order to things of matter and taste’.28 Evidently, whilst this may 
indicate a moral inconsistency in tolerating, for example, religious interests where 
they are deemed immoral, to ignore religious interests on this basis would be equally 
problematic. For example, Locke’s argument for toleration was influenced by his 
view that ‘a false belief, even if it is objectively and demonstrably false, cannot be 
changed by a mere act of will on the part of its believer ... it is therefore irrational to 
threaten penalties against the believer no matter how convinced we are of the falsity 
of his beliefs’.29 However, the fact that toleration in this form does not necessarily 
have to imply approval of religions or affirm their validity does indicate conceptual 
problems in its basis for protecting religious liberty. It follows that any form of 
toleration which stems from scepticism is conceptually weak; as a result some have 
argued for the state to affirm the intrinsic value of religions so that mainstream and 
minority groups can be better integrated into society. This has been called for by 
those who have submitted that ‘[a]ny coherent conception of [religious freedom] ... 
depends upon the premise that religious belief has special value and deserves special 
protection’.30  
 
Of course, this presents a particular problem for secular states who ‘could affirm the 
value of religions for their own sake, only at the expense of a schizophrenic disregard 
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for the nature of its own foundation’.31 In any event, affirmation of various religions 
by either a secular state or one with an established faith poses the problem of 
‘accommodating mutual respect across fundamental normative divides’,32 something 
which ‘remains a live issue that needs to be candidly addressed’.33 Even if it may be 
satisfactorily addressed, such a plurality of sets of incompatible premises, ‘each of 
which may constitute internally well-grounded support for freedom of religion or 
belief, appears as a whole to be incoherent and hence not a reasonable public 
grounding’.34  
 
These rather intractable problems aside, toleration may be a ‘pragmatic’35 
justification for religious liberty although it lacks the ability of dignity and equality 
to better validate the intrinsic value of religion in people’s lives. It also assumes a 
position of conflict and minority suppression before religion can be protected – when 
circumstances are such that religious adherents are not under threat of alienation 
from society this is too limited a basis for religious liberty. Moreover, Lewis suggests 
that a position of toleration does not automatically follow merely because something 
is disapproved of: rather, suppression could be the answer,
36
 particularly if more 
pragmatic.  These challenges underline some of the weaknesses of toleration. 
 
4. NEUTRALITY  
 
Another basis for explaining the importance of protecting religious interests is the 
concept of ‘neutrality’ which ‘may be invoked in order to prevent the state from 
interfering in the internal affairs of religious communities’.37 In further support of 
this Vickers argues: 
 
[g]iven the increasingly multi-cultural nature of modern Britain, it is strongly 
arguable that the state should remain neutral on religious issues. This remains 
the case, notwithstanding the fact that England has an established Church, 
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and can be seen in the commitment of the Government to promote multi-faith 
dialogue, to introduce legislation to prohibit religious discrimination, and in 
its commitment to international human rights standards which protect 
religious freedom and freedom from religious discrimination.
38
 
 
 
A state’s claim to neutrality is ‘reflective of a broad liberal proposition that the State 
should make no choices in terms of what should be the good in its citizen’s lives, 
instead leaving that choice to the individuals concerned’.39 In relation to religion, ‘it 
should be neutral ‘in the sense of not identifying itself with one particular religion or 
belief’’.40  
 
However, objections to a neutrality-based justification for religious liberty protection 
are strong, predominately because ‘neutrality is an ambiguous term’41 and ‘a rather 
elusive notion’.42 This ambiguity relates to the fact that a liberal democracy’s 
commitment to neutrality in the guaranteeing of religious liberty alongside other 
rights must itself be founded upon a non-neutral assumption where ‘the role of the 
state is to place restrictions and limitations upon what the scope of individual 
freedom is in the interests of the broader community’.43 This has resulted in the 
concern that ‘what liberalism sees as the necessity to be “reasonable” is not always 
seen by others as being an objective or value-free matter’.44 Indeed, this view of 
neutrality is likely to be particularly supported by religious adherents as ‘[f]aith not 
reason is typically the language of religion’.45 Neutrality is thus potentially an 
inherently problematic concept as the basis for the protection of religious interests – 
a problem which possibly exists whether viewed from either secular or religious 
perspectives. Moreover, the use of neutrality in justifying protection of religious 
liberty necessarily precludes the affirmation of any specific religion’s value or worth 
– a factor which appears difficult to reconcile with the special status accorded some 
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religions through the process of establishment or the granting of legal protection to 
certain mainstream or minority faiths. This involves saying there is something about 
religion that justifies treating it differently to other interests. Such differences in 
preferential treatment are problematic on neutrality grounds.  
 
Further problems arise from ‘[t]he inability of political theory, and of liberal states, 
to remain neutral with regard to either conceptions of the good or to culture has been 
pointed out over and over again ... Neutrality suggests the possibility of a hands-off 
policy to culture, which is impossible’.46 However, proponents of neutrality have 
forcefully argued that the existence of laws favouring or disfavouring particular 
religions and their practices does not prevent governments claiming neutrality as 
their founding principle: ‘laws and policies must be justified in terms of public 
reasons. But public reasons are not supposed to be value free or apolitical reasons. 
On the contrary, the defenders of neutrality claim that public reasons represent moral 
values, albeit of a special kind, namely shared moral values’.47 Indeed, neutrality as a 
concept is versatile enough for it to be relied upon in different ways by national and 
regional courts in developing separate strands of jurisprudence on religious 
interests.
48
 Seemingly, this may mean that ‘[n]eutrality might, in some societies, 
result in enhancing religious affiliation and commitment and, in others, in reducing 
them’.49 Nevertheless, others have taken a non-neutral perspective when arguing for 
the protection of religious rights
50
 and many have offered completely alternative 
justifications for protecting freedom of religion as a human right.
51
 Ultimately, the 
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problem with neutrality may be viewed as one of utopianism: ‘it will always remain 
a “work in progress” within an unfinished societal learning process’.52 On this basis 
it is argued by some that this limitation should simply be accepted; at the same time, 
because it is accepted it will be necessary that: 
 
members of minorities should have the possibility to demand, to a certain 
degree, personal adjustments when general legal provisions collide with their 
conscientious convictions. Such measures of ‘reasonable accommodation’, 
which often have been criticized as allegedly privileging minorities, in fact 
should be seen as an attempt to rectify situations of indirect discrimination … 
even in liberal democracies that are devoted to the principle of neutrality in 
questions of religion.
53
  
 
This has implications for neutrality as a theoretical idea underscoring religious 
liberty. It may be argued that it weakens it conceptually, undermining the goal 
neutrality seeks to achieve. However, at the same time it may be better understood as 
an argument for simply helping to realize the idealistic and utopian objectives of 
neutrality at a pragmatic level.  In any event, it provides a useful perspective on 
neutrality as a basis for protecting religious interests in the context of permitting 
reasonable accommodation – a form of religious protection analysed in detail later in 
the thesis.
54
  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Plurality of justifications 
 
The development of normative perspectives on the protection of religious liberty has 
been extensive. Whilst it is clear that such thinking has resulted in arguments for 
guaranteeing religious interests being based, not on religious views themselves of 
rights protection, but in more secular logic where the case is ‘better made using 
reasoning which is not dependent on religious belief’,55 it is also clear that no 
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particular theory or philosophy of religious liberty protection dominates normative 
discourse.  
 
At the domestic level there is increasing evidence of an ‘obligation to be tolerant – 
almost, one could say, neutral – as between different Christian confessions, and more 
generally toward the other Abrahamic religious [sic] and toward religious groups at 
large’.56 Given the competing popularity of the human dignity view this means that 
problems are likely to persist in identifying a coherent and subjectively appropriate 
philosophical rationale for the right to religious liberty.
57
 Moreover, theoretical 
secular justifications have ‘developed pragmatically, not programmatically, though 
they coincide generally with those justifications implicit in instruments of 
international law’.58 This pragmatism evidently finds itself utilised in the academic 
literature; meanwhile, various judicial decisions at the domestic level indicate that 
‘there are at least some clear statements about the importance of pluralism, tolerance 
and fair treatment of minorities as fundamental applicable principles in a democratic 
nation’.59 These include comments by Silber J. that tolerance is important as to the 
religious rites and beliefs of other races and other religions
60
 and remarks by Arden 
LJ to the effect that ‘[p]luralism involves the recognition that different groups in 
society may have different traditions, practices and attitudes and from that value 
tolerance must inevitably flow. Tolerance involves respect for the different 
traditions, practices and attitudes of different groups. In turn, the court must pay 
appropriate regard to these differences’.61 Knights has highlighted that such judicial 
attitudes have also been outlined at Strasbourg – it is necessary to recognize ‘the 
special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and 
lifestyle, not only for the purposes of safeguarding the interests of minorities 
themselves but to preserve a cultural diversity of value to the whole community’.62 
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Such attempts at justification demonstrate how thoughts and attitudes have 
progressed during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, leading to greater legal 
acknowledgement of such protection.  
 
5.2 Application of justifications across law and religion 
 
The justifications explored above affirm a range of bases on which religious interests 
could be protected; this chapter’s aim has to been to signpost some of the more 
prominent theoretical underpinnings of protecting religious liberty. Whilst these 
normative principles are perhaps most closely linked with protecting religion at the 
human rights level they are increasingly viewed as appropriate reasons for protecting 
religion via other legal means. For example, in relation to human dignity’s 
relationship with law and religion, Vickers has remarked that ‘[f]ull and meaningful 
enjoyment of autonomy, equality and dignity … requires protection for both freedom 
from religious discrimination and freedom of religion’,63 signifying how dignity as a 
guiding concept is of relevance to arguments for protecting law in different ways. 
She affirms this elsewhere stating that ‘both [religious discrimination and freedom of 
religion are] said to be based fundamentally on the same concepts, a respect for 
individual’s essential autonomy, dignity and equality’.64 Moon also notes the 
increasing dignity discourse present in discrimination law.
65
 Related to this, equality 
can be seen as a critical basis for prohibiting forms of discrimination on the grounds 
of specific protected characteristics. This has been a relatively recent development in 
the latter half of the twentieth century
66
 after the emergence of philosophical and 
theoretical arguments for recognizing religious human rights freedoms. Equality as a 
founding principle of discrimination law may be said to have developed at common 
law,
67
 although ‘it is not regarded as so embedded in our social and political norms 
as to yet require the law’s unwavering support’.68 In sum, the various explanations in 
this chapter place modern religious liberty in useful theoretical and normative 
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context for the purposes of the rest of the thesis, with human dignity (and the linked 
themes of equality and autonomy) emerging as a popular normative paradigm. This 
will be recalled as this thesis contemplates protection of religion in the next chapter 
and through parts III and V. 
29 
 
CHAPTER 3: LEGAL PROTECTION OF RELIGION AND THE 
USE OF RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The normative perspectives surveyed in chapter two provide a useful basis from 
which to investigate the range of United Kingdom (UK) legal provisions protecting 
religious liberty in the twenty-first century. This body of ‘religion law’1 guarantees 
religious interests and is so called because ‘of the emergence of religion law as a 
legal sub-discipline. An argument can now be made that these laws and their 
respective case laws are best seen as part of something called religion law’.2  
 
Such modern religious liberty protection is afforded by legal mechanisms through 
which the religious claims of individuals may be filtered: these claims are 
predominately channelled through criminal, human rights and anti-discrimination 
laws. Whilst ‘religion law’ has been understood to comprise both human rights and 
anti-discrimination laws as its two ‘pillars,’3 criminal law is also included in the 
discussion which follows to acknowledge recent attempts to criminalise certain 
conduct capable of harming religion. The first half of this chapter will detail these 
three mechanisms, focusing chiefly on anti-discrimination law given its relevance to 
the central theme of this thesis: investigation of legal mechanisms which provide 
enhanced special protection for religion. The second half of this chapter introduces 
and critiques the concept of the legal exception, the first example of special 
protection for religion which this thesis investigates in Part II. 
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2. THE MAIN PILLARS OF DOMESTIC RELIGION LAW  
 
2.1 Criminal law 
 
The criminal law has been used to provide some limited protection to religion.
4
 Such 
attempts have been made successfully via the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997.
5
 More specific examples are the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 which 
has amended the Public Order Act 1986 so that various acts intended to provoke 
religious hatred are prohibited.
6
 This aligns religious hatred protection with that for 
race (although this already
7
 covered Sikhs and Jews).
8
 Similarly, other relatively new 
statutory crimes protecting religion exist in the form of religiously aggravated 
offences under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. This amends
9
 the 
relevant part of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998
10
 so as to include these types of 
offences alongside racially aggravated provisions.  
 
2.2 Human rights law 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) incorporates
11
 the European Convention on 
Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) and its body of rights into domestic law across the UK. 
                                                     
4
 However, recall from chapter 1 n. 25, that the crime of blasphemy protecting Christian beliefs has 
been repealed. 
5
 For example, see Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Price [2004] EWHC Admin 325 and Singh v. Bhaker 
[2006] Fam Law 1026 where injunctions were awarded against, respectively, an individual who 
continually harassed members of the Mormon Church and a Sikh mother-in-law for mistreating her 
daughter-in-law subsequent to an arranged marriage.  
6
 The main offences are contained in Part 3A, ss. 29B – G. These are acts intended to stir up religious 
hatred relating to the use of words or behaviour or display of written material (s. 29B), publishing or 
distributing written material (s. 29C), public performance of a play (s. 29D), distributing, showing or 
playing a recording (s. 29E) or broadcasting or including a programme in a programme service (s. 
29F). Possessing inflammatory material is also proscribed (s. 29G). Notably, s. 29J states that nothing 
in Part 3A shall restrict the protection of freedom of expression.  
7
 See Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 where Lord Fraser set out criteria for determining a 
racial group: p. 562. See also R (on the application of E) v. JFS Governing Body [2009] UKSC 15 at 
para. 41, per Lord Phillips. 
8
 This extension of hatred laws to include religion was not without controversy: for discussion and 
suggestions for wider reading see Sandberg, above n. 1, pp. 141 – 144.  
9
 S. 39.  
10
 S. 28. 
11
 The ECHR rights are technically not justiciable in domestic courts. However, at the vertical level 
(as between private litigants and public authorities) such authorities being defined in ss. 6(3) and (5) 
of the HRA, public authorities must not act in a way which is incompatible with an ECHR right as 
outlined in s. 6(1) of the HRA. Moreover, at the horizontal level (as between two parties of private 
litigants) UK legislation in on-going proceedings must be interpreted consistently with the ECHR 
rights as provided for in s. 3 of the HRA. 
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These rights include the free-standing guarantee under Article 9
12
 of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, along with an anti-discrimination provision in 
Article 14,
13
 which must be claimed in conjunction with an ECHR right. Moreover, 
included as a result of ‘religious lobbying’14 and indicative of Parliament’s 
willingness ‘to give preferential treatment to religious groups’,15 s. 13(1) of the HRA 
provides that ‘[i]f a court’s determination of any question arising under this Act 
might affect the exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members 
collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
it must have particular regard to the importance of that right’.  
 
To trigger Article 9 there must initially be evidence of a religion or belief. Regarding 
the former, ‘[t]he definition of religion is rarely used as a filtering device’16; indeed, 
others have said that ‘at times cases have been disposed of on other grounds, without 
addressing in depth whether the belief system in question was “religious”’.17 On this 
basis, a range of claims to have been considered in Strasbourg include scientology,
18
 
pacifism
19
 and druidism.
20
 ‘Belief’ is defined to mean something which ‘denotes 
views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’,21 
and this relates to religious and non-religious beliefs.
22
 Thus, because Strasbourg has 
‘given little consideration to creating a formal definition of religion or belief, beyond 
                                                     
12
 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, and to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
13
 The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
14
 R. Sandberg and N. Doe, ‘Religious Exemptions in Discrimination Law’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law 
Journal 302, p. 303. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Sandberg, above n. 1, p. 47.  
17
 L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 
p. 14. 
18
 X and Church of Scientology v. Sweden (1978) 16 DR 68.  
19
 Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom (1978) 19 D&R 5.  
20
 Chappell v. United Kingdom (1987) 53 DR 241. 
21
 Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293 at para. 36.  
22
 It was said by Lord Nicholls at para. 24 in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex 
p Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 that non-religious beliefs ‘must relate to an aspect of human life or 
behaviour of comparable importance to that normally found with religious belief’. 
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the requirement of some vaguely-defined notion of coherence’,23 there is a generous 
approach to these initial definitional matters in Article 9 cases. This allows claims to 
be filtered through the other tests contained across Article 9(1) and (2): specifically 
manifestation of, and interference with, religion under the former, and justification 
for interference (proportionality) under the latter.
24
 
  
2.3 Anti-discrimination law 
 
Discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is now also proscribed in the UK.
25
 
This will be discussed in detail
26
 prior to the focus on extra-special protection of 
religion in anti-discrimination law which take place across Parts II to V. Discussion 
will be centred on the range of anti-discrimination law existing in Great Britain due 
to its immediate relevance and wider area of application.
27
 As Vickers notes, ‘the 
protection in Northern Ireland is very similar’28 although ‘the historical and political 
context of the [anti-discrimination] protection is peculiar to Northern Ireland, and so 
this experience is not always of direct relevance to the rest of the UK’.29 
 
2.3.1 Initial efforts to prohibit religious discrimination 
 
Until recently
30
 there existed separate provisions dealing with religious 
discrimination in, amongst other areas, employment
31
 and the provision of goods, 
                                                     
23
 C. Evans, ‘Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: the search for a guiding 
conception’ in M. Janis and C. Evans (eds.), Religion and International Law (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2004), p. 390. 
24
 Detailed debates in the field of Article 9 concerning the distinctions between religion/belief, beliefs 
held/beliefs manifested, individual manifestation/group manifestation, and public 
manifestation/private manifestation, are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
25
 There is separate legislation outlawing discrimination in Northern Ireland on the grounds of 
religious belief or political opinion in, amongst others, the fields of employment and the provision of 
goods, facilities and services. See the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 
(SI 1998/3162) as amended by the Fair Employment and Treatment Order (Amendment) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2003 (SI 2003/520). 
26
 Attention will be directed towards direct and indirect forms of discrimination given their relevance 
to the case study rather than associated forms of discrimination such as victimisation and harassment.  
27
 Vickers, above n. 17, also takes this approach to analysis of UK laws on religious discrimination (p. 
121), as does P. Roberts, ‘Religion and Discrimination: balancing interests within the anti-
discrimination framework’, in N. Doe and R. Sandberg (eds.) Law and Religion: New Horizons 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2010), p. 71.   
28
 Vickers, above n. 17, p. 121. 
29
 Ibid., p. 121, n. 4.  
30
 1
st
 October 2010.  
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facilities and services
32
. Both of these provisions conceptualised discrimination as 
capable of being both direct
33
 and indirect
34
 (the definitions of which are considered 
briefly below in the context of the updated UK anti-discrimination law
35
). These 
measures were necessitated by the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU) 
which requires member states to protect against forms of discrimination including on 
grounds of religion or belief. The relevant EU initiative relies on a legal basis granted 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam and now found in Article 19 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.
36
 This provision affords the EU considerable 
scope to take steps to eliminate discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation and religion or belief. In 2000 this resulted in 
Directive 2000/78/EC
37
 which established a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation relating to religion or belief and accompanying 
protected characteristics – excepting sex38 and racial or ethnic origin39 – which all 
member states were required to implement.  
 
Outside the employment context the EU does not currently require member states to 
provide protection against discrimination on, amongst other grounds (excluding sex 
and race/ethnicity), religion or belief. It has been said this ‘perhaps indicat[es] a lack 
of consensus at EU level about the range of areas where religion ought to be a 
protected category’.40However, a new draft Equal Treatment Directive has been 
proposed which would remedy this deficiency. Whilst this is to be welcomed, the 
protection guarantees currently required by the EU have created an anti-
                                                                                                                                                      
31
 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (RB Regs 2003), (SI 2003/1660) Part 
II. 
32
 Equality Act 2006 (EqA 2006), Part II, ss. 44 – 55.  
33
 RB Regs 2003, Regulation 3(1)(a); EqA 2006, s. 45(1).  
34
 RB Regs 2003, Regulation 3(1)(b); EqA 2006, s. 45(3).  
35
 See below, section 2.3.2.  
36
 Previously Article 13(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon 2007. 
37
 Employment Equality Directive, 27 November 2000, [2000] OJ L303/16.  
38
 See Directive 2002/73/EC of 5
th
 October 2002 [2002] OJ L269, amending Directive 76/207/EEC 
(Equal Treatment Directive) which prohibits sex discrimination in employment and vocational 
training. Also, see Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004, [2000] OJ L373/37, implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access and supply of goods and 
services. 
39
 The anti-discrimination power granted to the EU originally by the Treaty of Amsterdam also 
resulted in Directive 2000/43/EC of 29
th
 June 2000, [2000] OJ L180/22. This implemented the 
principle of equal treatment based on race or ethnicity in relation to employment and training together 
with a wider range of contexts such as access to goods and services.  
40
 P. Shah, ‘Religion in a Super-Diverse Legal Environment: thoughts on the British scene’, in R. 
Mehdi et al (eds.) Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2008), 
p. 74.  
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discrimination imbalance between the higher level of protection accorded to both sex 
and race/ethnicity and the lower level of protection accorded the other identified 
characteristics, including religion and belief. As noted, the UK has already taken 
steps to enact such protection outside employment for religion or belief, in particular 
within the area of goods and services provision.  
 
Express religious exceptions within anti-discrimination law have also developed. 
Once again, until recently these were contained in various separate pieces of 
domestic anti-discrimination legislation.
41
 Additionally, the Equality Act 2006 (EqA 
2006) established the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHCR)
42
 ‘bringing 
together the three existing equalities areas (gender, race and disability) and adding 
responsibilities for religion or belief, sexual orientation and age. The EHRC is also 
tasked with responsibility for ‘good relations’.43  
 
Early domestic attempts to tackle religious discrimination were welcomed. For 
example, ‘there was a perception, particularly amongst the Muslim community, that 
existing discrimination law was unfair because Jews and Sikhs were already 
protected under the Race Relations Act 1976’,44 highlighting the important 
contribution made by new anti-discrimination provisions in advancing protection for 
religious groups and particularly religious minorities. To this extent, ‘the formal and 
substantive position has changed very greatly in recent years’,45 although some have 
lamented the incremental rate at which domestic anti-discrimination provisions for 
religion or belief progressed, there being an impression of ‘a piecemeal 
development’.46 Moreover, the disparity in protection regarding employment as 
compared with goods and services provision between 2003 and 2006 stood in 
contrast to, for example, protection in these areas which existed under the Race 
                                                     
41
 For detailed discussion of these exceptions and provisions, see chapters 4 and 5.  
42
 S. 1.  
43
 L. Woodhead and R. Catto, ‘“Religion or Belief”: identifying issues and priorities’, Equality and 
Human Rights Commission 2009, p. 4. 
44
 N. Addison, Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 27.  
45
 M. Freedland and L. Vickers ‘Religious Expression in the Workplace in the United Kingdom’ 
(2009) 30 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 597, p. 598. 
46
 R. Sandberg, ‘To Equality and Beyond: religious discrimination and the Equality Act 2006’ (2006) 
8 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 470, p. 470.  
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Relations Act 1976
47
, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
48
, and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995.
49
  
 
2.3.2 Religious discrimination and the Equality Act 2010 
 
The myriad discrimination provisions which existed at the domestic level presented 
an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Various commentators criticised this with 
McColgan commenting that ‘[d]omestic provisions on discrimination are complex 
and … lacking in coherence or consistency. Piecemeal reform over the years has 
resulted in a tangle of acts and regulations whose variety owes little to principle and 
much to happenstance’.50 Further, Connolly noted that ‘[t]he bewildering amount of 
legislation and anomalies ... have inevitably led to the call for a single equality act. In 
2000, it was estimated that there were at least 30 relevant Acts, 38 statutory 
instruments, 11 codes of practice, and 12 EC Directives and Recommendations 
directly relevant to discrimination’.51 Ultimately, neither McColgan nor Connolly 
were particularly in favour of a wholly streamlined and straight-jacketed single 
equality act. Indeed, McColgan has subsequently argued against a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to discrimination protection for the various protectable characteristics, 
specifically in relation to religion and belief where there may be arguments proposed 
for ‘attenuating’ the current protection on this ground in some of the various 
discrimination contexts.
52
 Connolly also warned against a single equality act, 
submitting that its existence ‘assumes that equality is the best vehicle to tackle 
particular social ills, which are many and varied ... [T]he symmetrical nature of the 
equality principle makes it an inadequate model in the areas of religion, disability, 
pregnancy, sexual harassment and the historical results of discrimination ... [R]eform 
may be better accomplished with dedicated laws tailored to their respective goals’.53  
 
Nevertheless, as a result of the legislative mire and increasing calls for domestic 
discrimination laws to be simplified, the UK government passed the Equality Act 
                                                     
47
 See ss. 4 and 20, respectively.  
48
 See ss. 6 and 29, respectively.  
49
 See ss. 4 and 19, respectively.  
50
 A. McColgan, Discrimination Law: text, cases and materials (Oxford: Hart, 2005), p. 9.  
51
 M. Connolly, Discrimination Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1
st
 edition, 2006), pp. 35 – 36.  
52
 A. McColgan, ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law 
Journal 1, p. 1. 
53
 Connolly, above n. 51, p. 36.  
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2010 (EqA 2010) which now brings together all strands of anti-discrimination 
guarantees into one single document with the objective, according to the Act’s 
Explanatory Notes, being ‘to harmonise discrimination law and to strengthen the law 
to support progress on equality’.54 
 
Under the EqA 2010 religion and belief join age, disability, gender reassignment, 
marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, sex and sexual 
orientation as a ‘protected characteristic’55 for the purposes of anti-discrimination 
law. Discrimination in relation to religion or belief is conceptualised as being either 
direct
56
 or indirect.
57
 Direct discrimination occurs where A treats B less favourably 
than A treats or would treat others because of B’s religion or belief and such 
discrimination cannot be justified – there is no defence in the EqA 2010. In relation 
to both the RB Regs 2003 and the EqA 2006, Sandberg has noted that ‘the 2010 Act 
replaces the words “on grounds of” with “because of” ... the change in wording may 
have the effect of broadening the definition’.58 Indirect discrimination takes place 
where A applies a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) to B which is discriminatory 
in relation to B’s religion or belief. A PCP will be discriminatory where i) it applies 
to persons with whom B does not share a religion or belief; ii) it puts, or would put, 
persons with whom B shares a religion or belief at a particular disadvantage when 
compared with others; iii) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage; and iv) A 
cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
59
 The need 
for a comparator in anti-discrimination law reveals how these claim routes make ‘it 
easier to accommodate claims based on collective practice than those based on 
individual conscience’.60 The critical difference between direct and indirect 
discrimination is that the latter can be justified even if a disadvantage can be shown: 
the original legitimate aim behind the PCP must be proportionate in achieving its 
objective. This creates a fine balancing act given that ‘in the legal context ... 
                                                     
54
 EqA 2010: Explanatory Notes, p. 3.  
55
 S. 4.  
56
 S. 13.  
57
 S. 19. 
58
 Sandberg, above n. 1, p. 104 – 105.  
59
 The test for indirect discrimination in religious discrimination appears unchanged from those tests 
contained in the RB Regs 2003 and the EqA 2006.  
60
 J. Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 371, 
p. 390. 
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mathematical precision is impossible’.61 This reference to proportionality is of 
significance given that it acts is a filtering device. It is explored in relation to 
domestic cases of indirect religious discrimination in chapters nine to eleven when 
discussing the factors used to determine justification and whether a model of 
reasonable accommodation would afford a wider interpretation of proportionality.  
 
The prohibition on religious discrimination exists in, amongst other areas, 
employment
62
 and the provision of services.
63
 ‘Provision of services’ is defined to 
include provision of goods and facilities.
64
 Within the definition of ‘religion and 
belief’ under s. 10 of the EqA 2010, a reference to religion includes a reference to a 
lack of religion and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief.
 65 
 
‘Belief’ is defined to mean any religious or philosophical belief. Whilst the EqA 
2010’s Explanatory Notes make it clear that the law will treat as a religion those 
faiths which have a ‘clear structure and belief system’66 (applicable also to 
denominations within a religion), ‘philosophical belief’ is defined more fully to be ‘a 
belief genuinely held that is not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of 
information available, that is to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour, that attains a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance, that is worthy of respect in a democratic society, that is compatible with 
human dignity and that does not conflict with the fundamental right of others’.67  
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 Vickers, above n. 17, p. 54. 
62
 S. 39. 
63
 S. 29. 
64
 S. 31(2); EqA 2010: Explanatory Notes, p. 30. 
65
 Other discrimination strands have been also defined symmetrically. For example, sexual orientation 
discrimination protects both homosexual and heterosexual individuals: see English v. Thomas 
Sanderson Blinds Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1421, per Sedley LJ at paras 38 – 39. Disability 
discrimination continues to be non-symmetrical under the EqA 2010 so as to only protect disabled and 
not able-bodied individuals. Within the Act’s definition of disability in s. 6, ‘a reference to a person 
who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a person who has a particular disability’ 
(s. 6(3)(a)).  
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 See EqA 2010: Explanatory Notes, p. 16 
67
 Ibid. This was reproduced from Grainger plc v. Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4 (Grainger), per Burton J. 
at para. 24. The Explanatory Notes also advise that humanism and atheism would be beliefs for the 
purposes of s. 10 whilst adherence to a particular football team would not: p. 16. Much media 
attention has also been paid to ‘Jediism’ which also does not satisfy the definition of religion in the 
EqA 2010: see various reports, for example: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/18/jedis-religious-rights-star-wars>, 
accessed 13
th
 August 2012. ‘Philosophical belief’ was considered to include ‘environmental beliefs’ 
by Burton J. in Grainger: ‘[t]he belief must be of a similar cogency or status to a religious belief’ (at 
para. 26). Burton J. also highlighted the relevance of the ECHR jurisprudence on what counts as a 
‘philosophical belief’: para 27. Grainger may be criticised on the grounds that environmental beliefs 
stem from scientific research (the present state of information available) and not something 
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The EqA 2010 came into force on 1
st
 October 2010
68
 and deals with acts of 
discrimination occurring after this date. Previous domestic laws concerning both 
anti-discrimination on grounds of religion or belief and express religious exceptions 
are now repealed.
69
 Litigation concerning discriminatory acts which occurred wholly 
before 1
st
 October 2010 will proceed under the relevant repealed legislation
70
 whilst 
continuing acts of discrimination occurring before and after 1
st
 October 2010 will be 
litigated under the EqA 2010.
71
  
 
2.4 Cumulative effect of religion law 
 
The existence of the different models of protection confirms that ‘[t]he use of human 
rights law to deal with disputes concerning religion is now being supplemented by 
the use of the new equalities legislation relating to religion’.72 It embodies a 
broadening of the UK’s conceptualisation of religious liberty in the late twentieth 
century and post-2000 era. The extension of religious protection from human rights 
norms to the spheres of criminal and – in particular anti-discrimination laws – 
represents a concerted attempt to enhance the scope of domestic religious liberty 
guarantees. Meanwhile, s. 13 of the HRA indicates recognition of organisational 
rights although this does not affect protection for individuals under the criminal, 
human rights and anti-discrimination provisions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
philosophical in definition. Recent beliefs to have been upheld include a belief in public service 
broadcasting’s capacity to promote cultural interchange and social cohesion – arguably based upon 
social science research (and, thereby, the present state of information available): Maistry v. British 
Broadcasting Corporation [2011] EqLR 549; a belief that foxhunting is wrong: Hashman v. Milton 
Park (Dorset) Ltd [2011] EqLR 426: and a belief in spiritualism, life after death  and psychic powers: 
Greater Manchester Police Authority v. Power [2009] EAT 0434/09/DA. ‘Philosophical belief’ does 
not include political beliefs (Kelly v. Unison (2009) ET 2203854/08), a belief in a global conspiracy 
theory to establish a new world order (Farrell v. South Yorkshire Police Authority [2011] EqLR 934), 
or the belief in wearing a poppy to show respect to servicemen: Lisk v Shield Guardian Co Ltd [2011] 
EqLR 1290.  
68
 Equality Act 2010 (Commencement No.4, Savings, Consequential, Transitional, Transitory and 
Incidental Provisions and Revocation) Order 2010/2317, article 2. 
69
 Ibid., schedule 2. 
70
 Ibid., article 14.  
71
 Ibid., article 7.  
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 Woodhead and Catto, above n. 43, p. iv. 
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3. THE PHENOMENON OF RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS  
 
Alongside the core religion law, recent decades have also witnessed the gradual 
development of religious exceptions. These complement the ‘pillars’ of religion law 
identified above in extending guarantees of religious liberty. Such exceptions are 
expressly granted by the legislature and provide another form of legal 
accommodation for religion: they exist in specific circumstances affording 
exoneration from the operation of a particular rule.  
 
A number of these exceptions exist to both criminal and civil laws.
73
 For example, 
under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA),  s. 139 of which deals with offences of 
possessing articles with blades or points in public places, those who carry a blade or 
point in public will be excepted from criminal law sanctions if such items are carried 
for, amongst other, religious reasons.
74
 School children are granted a similar 
exception if they wish to wear a similar article whilst at school.
75
 Whilst these 
exceptions were drafted with the Sikh practice of carrying the kirpan in mind they 
apply generally to all religions. Other religious exceptions in the criminal law which 
specifically benefit Sikhs include the exception from legislation requiring the 
wearing of motorcycle crash helmets
76
 (so that turbans may be worn); a criminal law 
exception for Rastafarians so that they may be excused from laws prohibiting 
possession of drugs has also been considered.
77
 Outside the criminal law, specific 
exceptions for Sikhs have also been found in the Horses (Protective Headgear for 
Young Riders) Regulations 1992, which provide that Sikh children are not required to 
wear protective headgear when riding horses,
78
 and the Employment Act 1989 where 
there is an exception for Sikhs excusing them from wearing safety helmets on 
construction sites.
79
 Special rules on animal slaughter also exist for Muslims and 
Jews.
80
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 Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 16(2).  
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Law Journal 324, pp. 337 – 344.  
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 SI 1992/1201, Regulation 3(1).  
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 See ss. 11(1) – (2). The legitimacy of this exception is affirmed by the EqA 2010, Schedule 26, 
para. 5. 
80
 See the Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995, (SI 1995/731) Regulation 2.  
40 
 
Whilst these exceptions demonstrate the granting of privileges to individuals of faith, 
the exceptions themselves are haphazard. Sandberg has said that ‘[i]t is difficult to 
say that such exceptions constituted a new phase of religious [liberty]. The 
exceptions were rare, often hard fought for, specific and limited ... They were more 
in the tradition of religious toleration, removing specific legal disabilities’.81 
However, away from these isolated examples a rather more extensive set of religious 
exceptions has developed – notably in domestic anti-discrimination law, particularly 
the spheres of employment and the provision of goods and services: here, exceptions 
for religion ‘are by no means unusual’.82  
 
At the EU level, exceptions for all employers to anti-discrimination on the grounds 
of sex in employment and vocational training are permitted by Directive 
2002/73/EC.
83
 These are general exceptions as opposed to religious exceptions solely 
for religious employers. Additional general exceptions for all employers to anti-
discrimination on the grounds of disability, age, sexual orientation and religion or 
belief in employment and ‘occupation’ are permitted by Directive 2000/78/EC.84 In 
this Directive, exceptions specifically for the benefit of churches and other 
organisations with an ethos based on religion or belief are also permitted,
85
 although 
Article 4(2) only provides for this in relation to discrimination ‘on grounds of 
religion or belief’. As already noted,86 there is currently no EU provision concerning 
discrimination in the context of services, goods and facilities provision apart from on 
grounds of sex or race/ethnicity. A proposed EU equality Directive
87
 has outlined 
that protection on, amongst other grounds, religious discrimination would provide 
member states with discretion to allow religious exemptions in certain contexts for 
churches and other organisations based on religion or belief. Those contexts would 
include access to and supply of goods and services available to the public.
88
 Further 
developments are awaited. 
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3.1 A focus on religious exceptions? 
 
A key premise of this thesis is that religious exceptions afford specialised protection 
for religion and that this merits further exploration to determine what those 
exceptions contribute to religious liberty. A number of commentators have 
considered that it is sound principle to grant legal exceptions from laws so as to 
accommodate religious interests. The fact that such a case can be made has been 
increasingly noted. For example, McGoldrick has argued that this ‘has to be 
premised on the view that there is something special about religion that makes it 
more deserving. The basis of what makes it special can be a combination of insights 
drawn from philosophy, history, politics, traditions, culture, the treatment of 
minorities and a particular view of the contribution of religion to community or 
society’.89 This locates the legitimacy of religious exceptions in the range of ideas 
alluded to in chapter two supporting the evolution of religion law.  
 
Regarding a theoretical basis for religious exceptions, Sandberg has identified that 
their existence in anti-discrimination law suggests something beyond mere toleration 
of religion.
90
 It begins appealing to the need to preserve religious dignity, autonomy 
and equality. In relation to equality, a key basis for anti-discrimination law, 
exceptions feed into ‘the common claim that equality actually requires differential 
treatment of individuals or groups according to their social and cultural backgrounds 
or ethical outlooks (think, for example, of the debates on ... legal exceptions or 
exemptions)’.91 In this way there is the ‘suspension of strict legal equality in the 
name of some other value, such as the preservation of a cultural context for 
autonomous choices; equal opportunities, or equal respect or recognition’.92 In 
particular, religious exceptions represent a claim that religion should be treated 
differently with regard to fundamental legal rights and responsibilities: there is a 
willingness to shield religion from legal censure if it breaks a designated rule. This is 
predicated on the basis that just because a non-religious majority finds a particular 
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religious exception unpalatable ‘is not a sufficient reason to disregard a fundamental 
right’.93 Related to this point, Sandberg has drawn attention to the fact that ‘[o]ne of 
the major concerns implicit in modern religion law is the extent to which religious 
groups are expected to live up to secular standards. This underpins the conflict 
concerning exceptions in discrimination law’.94 
 
Where there is a case for special religious treatment via an exception, there has to be 
a precise balancing of interests between the practicality of accommodating the 
religious interest and the original objective(s) of the law in question. In essence, the 
decision to create a religious exception from a rule must be proportionate, carefully 
weighing matters of policy against the various ways in which an exception could be 
defined. Plainly, ‘[a] religious exception to the law ... will be recognised only if there 
is no substantial cost to the rights of others or to the public interest’.95 Doyle has 
commented that exceptions will seek to pursue ‘a legitimate aim in a proportionate 
manner and ... have been drafted ... to ensure that end’.96 This may result in either a 
loosely or tightly defined exception, the exact definition depending on a number of 
complex assessments including how far religious interests should be able to 
participate in the social, economical and political elements of public life. There is 
clearly a view that a world without religious exceptions would lessen religion’s stake 
in society. Conversely, consideration must equally be taken of the interests and 
dignity of others who may be affected by a religious exception and any other policy 
reasons for curtailing a religious exception linked back to the rule in question. The 
balance requires that ‘religious ... rights are not absolute; they will have to give way 
in the face of competing rights and interests’.97 Once this balancing exercise is 
complete, the frontiers of the exception can be analysed to determine their practical 
import.  
 
Aside from proportionality and practicality, the actual aim of the legal provision 
from which exception is sought needs to be recalled: an exception may well 
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fundamentally compromise that law’s effectiveness in achieving its objective. This 
moves the debate in the direction of political philosophy and its understanding of 
exceptions. Barry has written about this conundrum and others have summarised his 
scepticism: ‘it is hard to steer a path between the position that doing (or avoiding) X 
is so important that all should do it, and the alternative position that people should be 
free to decide for themselves whether to do X’.98 Indeed, Barry himself comments 
that: 
 
[i]t must be important to have a rule generally prohibiting conduct of a certain 
kind because, if this is not so, the way in which to accommodate minorities is 
simply not to have a rule at all. At the same time, though, having a rule must 
not be so important as to preclude allowing exceptions to it. We are left with 
cases in which uniformity is a value but not a great enough one to override 
the case for exemptions.
99
  
 
As such, a position might be taken that exceptions ‘can rarely be justified and should 
normally not be granted’.100 If a law is just then it should be applied without 
exception.  
 
Assuming the law is willing to tolerate such philosophical deficiencies (which 
presumably it is because it creates religious exceptions), and that this is supported by 
some measure of balance in proportionality, religious exceptions may seem broadly 
acceptable. However, even if exceptions are to remain part of the law-making 
process another philosophical predicament lingers: what does the creation of such 
exceptions reveal about religion’s place and role in society? Whilst it may be ‘an 
oversimplification to say that Britain in the twenty-first century is a secular 
society’,101 Sandberg has highlighted that the rise of religion law may ‘actually [be] 
evidence of secularization in that the State is forced to protect religion as a minority 
interest’.102 This idea of religious subordination may well apply to the new 
generation of religious exceptions and what they disclose about how religion is 
viewed and valued. Is the provision of a religious exception to a rule evidence of an 
entrenched imbalance in respect by the state towards religion? Does it signify that the 
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social, cultural, legal, and political playing-field is uneven from the start? Exceptions 
raise questions as to how far they actually reflect the idea that individuals are free to 
be religious – with all this may carry about respect and recognition of value. It may 
be submitted that exceptions signify that religion only possess a mere ‘privilege’103  
in the relevant legal field from which exception is granted. The exception acts solely 
as a concession based on the whim and goodwill of the legislator.
 
There is no wider 
commitment to religion beyond this. Essentially, the point is that religious exceptions 
may be targeted for criticism on the basis that they are indicative of religious 
subjugation and inequality of arms. If this is true, the debate should presumably shift 
back to the original law in question and the value judgement(s) it contains. In turn, 
this brings the focus back to Barry: where a rule is biased against a certain group or 
groups any exception will undermine the aim of that rule because the rule is 
supposed to be of general application. It is axiomatic that rules will infringe some 
liberties for some groups. To this extent, implementation of exceptions should be 
resisted because they merely mask that bias: the rule is retained as the status quo and, 
whilst practical dispensation is made for religion, the underlying and pernicious 
demotion of religious interests persists. At the least, this may have the effect of 
coercing religion; at the most, it may actively suppress it. The granting of exceptions 
from rules may allow such a situation to fester: far from commending religious 
liberty, it may devalue religious interests at a wider and more fundamental level in 
society. 
 
Despite these philosophical anxieties, religious exceptions may still be preferable 
because of the immediate practical benefits they provide. It is on the basis that 
religious exceptions from rules have the potential (depending on the proportionality 
balance) to enhance religious liberty at the level of practice that this thesis proceeds 
in Part II (it is accepted that exceptions themselves may be challenged at a separate 
philosophical level). The idea of proportionality in balancing interests becomes more 
acute in Part III onwards when introducing the concept of reasonable accommodation 
and considering how useful it may be in domestic cases as a new form of ‘exception’ 
for religion in anti-discrimination law. 
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3.2 Issues of terminology 
 
At a basic level of categorisation,
104
 exceptions benefitting religion can exist for i) 
particular religious bodies only; ii) any religious bodies; or iii) both religious and 
non-religious bodies. Whilst the exceptions in each category result in some form of 
preferential treatment for religion, there has been inconsistency concerning the actual 
labelling of ‘religious exceptions’. This stems from the fact that the language of ‘opt-
outs’105 ‘exceptions’106 and ‘exemptions’107 has been used interchangeably108 and 
consequently conflated to describe the same thing: namely, the express removal of 
any obligation for religious reasons to adhere to certain legal rules, be they 
discrimination provisions or other laws of general application.  
 
Usefully, academic debate exists on the scope of the definitions of ‘exception’ and 
‘exemption’. It has been suggested by Ahdar and Leigh that categories (i) and (ii) 
above should be labelled ‘exemptions’ as they ‘[exempt] religious organisations from 
the operation of certain aspects of … law’.109  However, they argue that category (iii) 
may not be so regarded. Instead, it provides an ‘exception’ for ‘particular activities 
(which may or may not be limited to a particular class of defendants)’.110 Both the 
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‘exemption’ and ‘exception’ definitions,111 respectively, are referenced in relation to 
anti-discrimination laws covering either protection for just religion
112
 or general 
occupational requirements
113
 that cover any body (religious or otherwise)
114
. The 
‘exemption’ privileges the position, status and demands of a religious group or 
groups above non-religious groups in society whilst the ‘exception’ privileges any 
type of group which may satisfy the criteria for claiming the exception.
115
 As a 
result, the position, status and demands of such groups whose exception claims are 
successful are elevated together at an equal level. Regarding ‘exceptions’, 
Parliament’s motivation is not religious liberty but the need to create a way round a 
particular legislative requirement where it may operate unfairly on an organisation or 
body, be it religious or not. 
 
Ahdar and Leigh thus indicate that correct use of the ‘exemption’ and ‘exception’ 
labels can be determined by how the relevant legal provision is drafted. However, 
there remains arbitrariness in selection of the ‘exception’ and ‘exemption’ labels. It is 
not obvious why either label should be more appropriate than the other in capturing 
the nuance identified on either side of the legal distinction drawn. Arbitrariness 
concerning these labels is also found in comments by Twining and Miers who 
remark on the ‘distinction between a general exception and an exemption in a 
particular case’.116 They argue that ‘a distinction needs to be drawn between “making 
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an exception” to the rule and “granting an exemption” under it’.117  Whilst an 
exception for them enhances certainty of law as it generally delimits the scope of a 
legal rule in advance – and thus has the force and authority of Parliament to 
commend it – a mere exemption is not so envisaged by lawmakers and may only be 
subsequently applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, this 
explanation flips the meanings ascribed by Ahdar and Leigh to ‘exemption’ and 
‘exception’. In contradistinction to Twining and Miers, they state that where 
religious exemptions are stated ‘clearly in advance, rather than requiring the 
justification for exemption to be considered on a case-by-case basis,’118 a particular 
advantage is that ‘[i]t therefore gives an exempted organization greater certainty’.119 
In contrast, with exceptions ‘the defendant has the onus to establish the necessity of 
an activity being excepted’.120 
 
This uncertainty of terminology is in evidence elsewhere. Regarding category (iii), 
Nehushtan has made reference to an ‘exemption from a legal rule that is decided for 
any reason whatsoever and incorporated into the law itself, i.e. the law determines 
the general rule and its exemptions … These exemptions are widespread and 
normally do not raise any important questions apart from general problems of 
equality’.121 Ultimately, in relation to ‘exemption’ and ‘exception’ ‘[t]here do not 
appear to be any standard distinctions covering this ground’.122 For present purposes, 
the label ‘exception’ is used, particularly as attention from Part II will coalesce 
around the EqA 2010 where the label ‘exception’ has been exclusively adopted to 
cover all types of exception across categories (i) to (iii). This is also the approach of 
Vickers,
123
 Roberts,
124
 McColgan
125
 and Sandberg, the latter commenting in the 
context of anti-discrimination law that ‘[t]here is a debate as to whether the term 
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‘exception ‘or ‘exemption’ should be used’.126 Following from this, Sandberg states 
that he ‘follows the practice of the Equality Act 2010 which refers to 
“exceptions”’.127 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
At a practical level religious exceptions signify the state’s efforts to proactively 
accommodate religion in narrow situations where the law would, otherwise, restrict 
religious practices. This specific style of protection in limited circumstances lends 
legitimacy to such religious practices: in doing so it provides an important degree of 
certainty regarding religious liberty in pre-determined circumstances. The expansion 
of religious exceptions in the domestic law (particularly anti-discrimination law) to 
the extent that they are now ‘common’128 represents a key development in not only 
the general recognition of religious liberty, but also the increase in protection of 
specific religious practices which prima facie conflict with behaviours and actions 
proscribed by the state. Such exceptions grant privileged legal status to certain 
practices of a particular faith.  
 
Given the proliferation of religious exceptions to recent anti-discrimination 
legislation, attention in the case-study which follows in Part II will be centred on 
exceptions in this field. The plethora
129
 of domestic anti-discrimination legislation 
created in the past forty years resulting in a single equality document renders this 
case-study timely, particularly given that ‘the granting of such exceptions and the 
scope of the exceptions has led to some of the greatest controversies surrounding law 
and religion in the United Kingdom in the twenty-first century’.130 The incidence and 
scope of the religious exceptions will be appraised to judge how far they confer 
practical advantages to religion in the UK. In subsequent chapters an alternative type 
of religious ‘exception’ existing in anti-discrimination law – namely ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ – will be suggested to complement the exceptions discussed in Part 
II. The reasons for proposing this will be considered in chapter six and the debate 
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will evaluate comparative models of reasonable accommodation. These models will 
be applied to recent domestic religious discrimination cases which have fallen 
outside the scope of the current exceptions: this will necessitate a closer look at 
proportionality to gauge whether the models would be able to protect religious 
liberty in different situations and, if so, how far that protection would extend at a 
practical level.  
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CHAPTER 4: RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS IN EMPLOYMENT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter three it was observed that religious exceptions predominantly exist in 
domestic anti-discrimination law: these exceptions are narrowly applied to highly 
specific sets of circumstances where the legislature has decided that the religious 
imperative justifies allowing ‘the right to discriminate’.1 Such exceptions act as a 
conciliatory attempt to better accommodate religion in the modern equality 
framework of anti-discrimination law. The process of affording religious exceptions 
from generally applicable legal rules fits the equality spirit of that framework; 
indeed, it shows a concerted and generous attempt to go further in protecting faith 
interests.  
 
In this chapter the religious exceptions which exist in United Kingdom (UK) anti-
discrimination law across employment will be reviewed. The purpose is to scope the 
range of protection available to determine what contribution it makes to 
contemporary religious liberty at a practical level. For that reason, the pre-Equality 
Act 2010 (EqA 2010) exceptions will be included to facilitate a more informed 
perspective on the current legal position. In order to achieve a broad view as to how 
exceptions may guarantee religious interests the focus shall be on exceptions not 
only restricted to religious employers but also capable of use by all employers, 
religious or otherwise. This is simply for completeness: the latter is assessed 
comparatively briefly. Whilst religious exceptions exist to a range of protected 
characteristics,
2
 this chapter will concentrate on those characteristics with which 
academic and judicial discussions of exceptions have primarily concerned 
themselves: namely sex, sexual orientation and religion or belief.  
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2. GENUINE OCCUPATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
2.1 Sex discrimination  
 
In the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) there existed a general exception (not 
limited to religion) to the prohibition on sex discrimination referred to as ‘general 
occupational qualifications’ (GOQs).3 This meant the sex of a post-holder could only 
be restricted where there was an occupational necessity for the individual concerned 
to be of a particular sex. Examples, which formed part of a closed list,
4
 included 
restricting posts to men for reasons of physiology and authenticity in entertainment.
5
  
 
The EqA 2010 maintains a general GOQ across all protected characteristics, albeit 
renamed as a ‘genuine occupational requirement’ (GORs).6 There is explicit 
reference to the need for such requirement to be a ‘proportionate means of achieving 
a legitimate aim’ 7 - perhaps because there no longer exists a closed list of relevant 
factors. The EqA 2010 GOR test requires that the person to whom the requirement is 
applied either does not meet it, or that the employer has reasonable grounds for not 
being satisfied that the person meets the requirement.
8
 However, where the 
requirement is one concerning sex, the ‘reasonable grounds’ test is omitted,9 making 
it more challenging for employers, including religious employers, to successfully 
claim an occupational requirement based on sex.  
 
2.2 Sexual orientation discrimination  
 
There was a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ exception (GDOR) 
in Regulation 7(2) of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
2003 (SO Regs 2003).
10
 This is retained in the EqA 2010 as a GOR
11
 which must be a 
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proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim
12
 applying where a person either 
does not meet the requirement to be of a particular sexual orientation or where there 
are reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that they do.
13
   
 
Two particular comments regarding this GOR shall be made in passing. Firstly, the 
EqA 2010’s excludes the word ‘determining’. In the SO Regs 2003 this word made it 
clear that the exception applied narrowly where there existed a very clear connection 
between the work to be done and the individual’s sexuality. Nevertheless, it is likely 
the firm link between the work done and the characteristic pursued will be vigorously 
enforced post-EqA 2010 given modern equality and anti-discrimination imperatives. 
The need for a strong connection between the characteristic and the work undertaken 
was highlighted in Hubble v. Brooks
14
 where the claimant – a gay man with a long-
term partner – had applied for a job in the defendant’s bar and was told by the 
defendant that there was ‘no way’ he would employ a gay couple because it would be 
disastrous for his business.
15
 The Employment Tribunal (ET) ‘accepted that this was 
a blatant case of direct discrimination. Both the complainant and his partner were 
experienced bar managers and should have been considered for the position’.16  
 
Secondly, even where it has been established that sexual orientation is a genuine 
occupational requirement and it is proportionate to apply that requirement, it must 
still be asked whether the person meets the GOR to the employer’s satisfaction or 
whether they can still be denied the post because the employer believes there are 
reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that the GOR is met. The test of 
‘reasonable grounds’ has proved controversial particularly because the employer is 
‘not bound in all circumstances to accept at face value’17 a person’s claim regarding 
their sexual orientation and, instead, may ask further related questions and form a 
particular view accordingly. This was addressed by Richards J.
 18
 in R (on the 
application of Amicus and others) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
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(Amicus) 
19
 as raising a serious point
20
 given its potential for affording the exception 
on perceived sexual orientation as opposed to actual sexual orientation – which may 
encourage prejudiced assumptions based on social stereotyping.
21
 Further, it was 
contended that requiring an employer to ‘satisfy’ themselves as to a person’s sexual 
orientation would lead to intrusive questioning of that person.
22
 Ultimately, however, 
Richards J. found that the GOR had a sensible rationale,
23
 that the test of 
reasonableness would preclude employers basing assumptions on social 
stereotypes,
24
 and that the phrase ‘satisfied’ indicated that questioning of a person as 
to their sexual orientation would not have to be as intrusive ‘as might be called for if 
it were necessary to gather sufficient evidence by way of proof of sexual orientation 
to meet a potential complaint of unlawful discrimination’.25  
 
2.3 Religion or belief discrimination  
 
Any organisation, religious or otherwise, may take advantage of the GOR previously 
contained in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (RB 
Regs 2003)
26
 and now transferred to the EqA 2010.
27
 The GOR to be of a particular 
religion or belief in the EqA 2010 is drafted identically to that in relation to sexual 
orientation. Whilst the EqA 2010’s GOR only makes reference to an ‘occupational 
requirement’ it is anticipated that this should not expand what is a narrow general 
exception: ‘[t]his means that the need to be of a specific religion or belief must be a 
defining characteristic of the job’.28 Religion or belief must be an essential 
requirement of the post.
29
  
 
As religion or belief must be an ‘occupational requirement’ the GOR is restricted to 
those employed in religious service meaning that it is unlikely to apply to many jobs 
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where people feel there is a specifically religious approach to their work which 
requires particular selection of candidates based on their religion or belief.
30
 This 
signifies that the GOR ‘will not allow discrimination in favour of those who share a 
religion just because people wish to work with like-minded colleagues’.31 In 
Glasgow City Council v. McNab (McNab)
32
 it was confirmed by the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal that pastoral care teaching in a Scottish Roman Catholic faith school 
was not employment which could satisfy this GOR. The EAT noted that non-
Catholics, including previously Mr. McNab, had acted as pastoral care teachers at St. 
Paul’s. Hence being a Catholic could not possibly be an occupational requirement.33 
This reveals that occupational requirements (in relation to any protected 
characteristic) will usually be interpreted as highly restrictive in nature: ‘[t]o invoke 
a GOR requires careful consideration from the inception of the post in question’.34 In 
relation to Scottish faith schools it has subsequently been commented that ‘it will be 
difficult to convince a tribunal that being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement for being a teacher, as it is rare (apart 
from where religious instruction is given) for religion to be a defining element of a 
teacher’s role’.35 However, the position concerning faith schools in England and 
Wales is different and covered by a specific – and not general – religious exception 
in the Schools and Standards Framework Act 1998 as amended by the Education 
Inspections Act 2006. As this is a specific religious exception it is considered 
below.
36
 
 
Finally, the EqA 2010 maintains its stipulation that GORs will operate where a 
candidate does not meet the requirement or where the employer is not satisfied, and 
in all the circumstances it is reasonable for him not to be satisfied, that the person 
meets it.
37
 Whilst it was noted above that the second alternative test may be 
particularly dangerous when dealing with sensitive issues of a candidate’s sexual 
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orientation, it has been argued that the test is more straightforward to apply in 
seeking general exception from religion or belief discrimination: 
 
A person could claim, in good faith, to be of a particular religion (for 
example he could be baptised into the Christian Church, but not be a 
believer). An employer may disagree, based on poor performance in 
interview when questioned about faith matters. Without this additional clause 
it was not clear how an employer could determine whether the person does 
not comply with the requirement set. The additional clause would also help in 
cases where the question of whether the applicant complies with the faith is 
determined by fine theological judgements, on which even the parties do not 
agree. Again, the applicant may be of the view that they comply, but the 
employer may disagree.
38
  
 
However, whilst it may be true that this genuinely helps employers to interrogate the 
religion or belief criterion, religious candidates rejected from a post on the basis of 
this test may perceive the decision to be equally controversial to equivalent decisions 
by religious employers against gay or lesbian candidates on grounds of sexual 
orientation.  
 
3. EXCEPTIONS FOR ORGANISED RELIGION 
 
3.1 Sex discrimination  
 
Whilst GORs are important for some posts they serve very limited religious purposes 
where there is a need for a post-holder to be of a particular sex for religious reasons. 
The same is true in relation to sexual orientation and religion or belief.
39
 
Accordingly, although seemingly without explicit sanction by either Directive 
76/207/EEC or amending Directive 2002/73/EC, the SDA drafted a further limited 
exception for religious groups where employment in a post could be limited to a 
particular sex,
40
 ‘for the purposes of an organised religion’,41 the justification for this 
being where such employment was either ‘so as to comply with the doctrines of the 
religion or  to avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant number of 
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its followers’.42 This was plainly wider in scope than the SDA’s general GOQ, 
enhancing religious liberty in being able to use faith as a special basis on which to 
exclude people of a certain sex from employment. Significantly, it permitted sex 
discrimination because of religion. Given the legislative history behind this religious 
exception (which singlehandedly ‘began the practice under English law to provide 
exceptions for religious groups’43) its genesis will be traced from the SDA through to 
its current incarnation in the EqA 2010. 
 
3.1.1 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
 
The phrase ‘organised religion’ excluded mere ‘religious organisations’ as confirmed 
in Amicus in which Richards J. outlined the Government’s position: ‘[t]here is a clear 
distinction in meaning between the two. A religious organisation could be any 
organisation with an ethos based on religion or belief. However, employment for the 
purposes of an organised religion clearly means a job, such as a minister or religion, 
involving work for a church, synagogue or mosque’.44 The upshot of this was that a 
religious exception in employment when linked to an ‘organised religion’ was only 
likely to be upheld when claimed within the employment context of a specific 
religious body. Vickers has argued that this ‘refers to the appointment of clergy, or 
their equivalent for other religious groups,’45 this being exemplified when Richards J. 
‘gave the example that employment in a faith school is likely to be “for purposes of a 
religious organisation” but not “for purposes of an organised religion”. The logic of 
Amicus is that, whilst an “organised religion” will also be a “religious organisation”, 
it is not the case that a “religious organisation” is always an “organised religion”’.46 
Consequently, organisations which had religious elements or an ethos based on 
religion, but which themselves did not constitute a religious body, were unable to 
rely on religious exceptions for ‘organised religions’. Given the narrowness of the 
term ‘organised religions’ it was viewed as ‘appropriate to ask why certain privileges 
have been afforded only to the narrower category where the beneficiary is an 
                                                     
42
 Ibid.  
43
 Sandberg, above n. 1, p. 160.  
44
 per Richards J., at para. 91.  
45
 Vickers, above n. 28, p. 140. 
46
 R. Sandberg and N. Doe, ‘Religious Exemptions in Discrimination Law’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law 
Journal 302, p. 308 
57 
 
“organised religion”’.47 Such narrowness ‘mark[ed] a substantial shift away from the 
attitude of the government during the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998, when 
it was prepared to allay the fears of churches and religious bodies that their liberties 
might be restricted’.48  
 
Assuming the exception was sought by an ‘organised religion’ there were two 
justificatory bases, the first being ‘so as to comply with the doctrines of religion’. 
However, this only protected faiths ‘which as a matter of doctrine limit ministry to 
one sex’,49 penalising those faiths whose doctrine was ambiguous, evolving or who 
lacked any form of doctrine. Nevertheless, there was a second justificatory basis 
which ignored matters of doctrine, focusing on offence caused to the religious 
susceptibilities of a significant number of followers of a faith. This was capable of 
wide interpretation: quite apart from how the courts were to judge the rather 
subjective notion of ‘offence’, there was ambiguity as to where to draw the line 
concerning a religious susceptibility. Indeed, what counted as a religious 
susceptibility? This second justificatory basis was potentially capable of allowing 
spurious or disingenuous reasons for sex discrimination by members of an organised 
religion to be upheld. The definition of followers as ‘significant’ in number was also 
problematic. This was criticised as: 
 
both imprecise and as providing too broad an exception to the non-
discrimination principle. For example, it is not clear what will amount to ‘a 
significant number of followers’ ... [h]owever, the wording merely reflects 
the need adequately to protect the religious autonomy of religious adherents, 
and the fact that not all members of a religious group will have exactly the 
same views on issues of ... gender.
50
 
 
Nevertheless, the phrase found support in Amicus from Richards J. who contended 
that the expression ‘a significant number’ is ‘an ordinary English expression which 
courts or tribunals should have no difficulty in applying in practice: cf. “considerably 
smaller” in other discrimination legislation, which has proved workable in 
practice’.51 This was expanded upon with the comment that reference to: 
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“a significant number” rather than to all or the majority of a religion’s 
followers not only reflects the desirability of avoiding detailed statistical 
analysis ... but also ensures that proper account is taken of the existence of 
differing bodies of opinion even within an organised religion ... In my view it 
is legitimate to allow for the possibility of applying a relevant requirement 
even if the convictions in question are held only by a significant minority of 
followers.
52
  
 
It remains to be seen how ‘significant number of followers’ will be judicially 
interpreted in the future. It is submitted that the possibility of the phrase ‘significant 
number of followers’ being satisfied by a significant minority of followers dilutes the 
meaning of the requirement ‘significant’ and expands use of the religious exception 
in the SDA to potentially controversial limits. It is not immediately clear what 
proportion of a faith a ‘significant minority’ of followers would constitute.53  
 
3.1.2 Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 
 
This religious exception was subsequently amended by the Employment Equality 
(Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 (SD Regs 2005)
54
 which kept the test 
identical, save for the second alternative justification for the sex discrimination 
which was redefined to read: ‘so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly-held 
religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers’.55 This 
replaced the subjective concept of ‘offence’ with the notion of conflict avoidance 
related to ‘strongly-held religious convictions’. Whilst an element of subjectivity 
remained, such religious convictions had to be ‘strongly held’, implying the need for 
something based in religious doctrine rather than feeling or instinct. The requirement 
that religious convictions be strongly held was an additional requirement compared 
to the previous exception under the SDA. In Amicus it was said that both the first (‘so 
as to comply with the doctrines of religion’) and second alternative justifications 
were to be interpreted objectively.
56
 Sandberg has pointed out that in relation to the 
first justification ‘[d]iffering ideas concerning the interpretation and content of 
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doctrine render this a complicated task’57 meaning the success or otherwise of a 
claimed exception may be based on uncertain reasoning.  
 
Where doctrinal clarity of religion is problematic organised religions may resort to 
relying on the second justification which operates where a ‘significant number’ of a 
religion’s followers ‘hold particular views which do not form part of an accepted 
doctrine’.58 However, this poses further difficulties given that ‘[d]eciding whether a 
significant number of followers may be offended is by no means a straightforward 
task. Indeed, in the case of some faiths it is further complicated by the lack of a 
definition of membership’.59 Sandberg has interpreted this as meaning that ‘reference 
should be made to the national rather than local membership of the religion in 
question’.60 Even if this can be satisfied ‘an employer must show that the nature of 
the employment and the context in which it is performed makes strongly held 
religious convictions a relevant matter to take into account’.61  
 
Notwithstanding these problems with justification, it should be recalled that the 
‘organised religion’ test acted as a filter, signifying that ‘[i]n effect, discrimination 
against women is [only] accepted where its [sic] is part of the belief system that such 
discrimination is necessary’.62 As a result, the exception would ‘apply only to the 
appointment of religious personnel ... This refers to the appointment of clergy, or 
their equivalent for other religious groups’.63 For example, there would be no need to 
have a religious requirement as to sex in employment for posts that were non-
religious, such as an administrator. The narrowness of this exception was also 
highlighted in Percy v. Board of National Ministers of the Church of Scotland,
64
 
where ‘it would not have operated to relieve the Church of responsibility for an 
alleged discriminatory practice in the conditions of employment of a woman. Once a 
religious body has decided to admit women, it must do so on non-discriminatory 
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terms’.65 Interestingly, the EU requirement that religious exceptions contain ‘a 
double test of a justified aim and proportionate means of reaching it’66 was absent (as 
it was from the SDA), although it may be argued that it is implicit as part of the test.
67
 
A test of proportionality is critical in order to set successful claims for exception – 
and the corresponding ability to discriminate for religious purposes – at a level which 
requires sound justification. It has been said that such enquiries will be objectively 
judged by the courts.
68
 
 
3.1.3 Equality Act 2010 
 
The religious exception as contained in the SD Regs 2005 is continued in the EqA 
2010.
69
 Once again, this requires that employment be for the purposes of an 
organised religion, although domestic parliamentary debates on the term ‘organised 
religion’ during the Act’s creation reveal that this may now in fact embrace posts 
considered less religious in nature. The government had attempted to confirm after 
Amicus that employment for purposes of organised religion would indeed be limited 
to fundamentally religious posts within a religious body. In doing so it drafted a 
requirement that employment should only satisfy such a test where it wholly or 
mainly involved leading or assisting in the observance of liturgical or ritualistic 
practices of the religion, or promoting or explaining the doctrine of the religion 
(whether to followers of the religion or to others).
70
 This met with support from 
organisations who believed that the previous test allowed religions too much power 
to police their internal members.
71
 However, it met with significant opposition from 
religious representatives
72
 who argued that this revision took, ‘no account of pastoral 
or representative functions, or of any of the myriad activities carried out to meet the 
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functions of a religious body. Any post where liturgy and doctrinal explanation were 
not the whole or main tasks would have to be open to a person of any sex, marital 
status, transsexual history or sexuality, whatever the beliefs of the religion’.73 The 
government further amended the drafting so that employment will now be for the 
purposes of an organised religion if the employment is as a minister of religion, or 
employment relates to another post that exists to promote or represent the religion or 
to explain the doctrines of the religion.
74
  
 
The insistence on maintaining a test of ‘organised religion’ may mean that the 
definition could fall foul of s. 13(1) of the HRA which had made it clear that 
particular regard was to be given to the rights of ‘religious organisations’.75 On this 
basis, ‘it may be asked why certain privileges have been afforded only to the 
narrower category where the beneficiary is an “organised religion”. This may 
actually infringe not only s. 13, but also Article 9’.76 Further, the EqA 2010’s 
religious exception from sex discrimination does not signpost ‘proportionality’ or 
‘legitimate aim,’ although once again it is likely to be implicit so that exception from 
domestic sex discrimination provisions is only granted in appropriate circumstances. 
The religious exception to sex discrimination in the EqA 2010 maintains the 
supplementary tests of ‘so as to comply with the doctrines or religion’77 or ‘because 
of the nature or context of the employment, the requirement is applied to as to avoid 
conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the 
religion’s followers’.78  
 
3.2 Sexual orientation discrimination  
 
A religious exception in employment on grounds of sexual orientation also existed in 
the SO Regs 2003;
79
 this has now been entirely replicated in the EqA 2010.
80
  It 
covers situations where an employer needs to discriminate on such grounds for 
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purposes of an organised religion
81
 and the requirement is either to comply with the 
doctrines of religion
82
 or because of the nature of the employment and the context in 
which it is carried out, so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious 
conviction of a significant number of the religion’s followers.83 Once again, there is 
no proportionality requirement. Regarding ‘organised religion’, the exception will 
apply, for example, to a requirement that a youth worker who represents the religion 
be celibate
84
 (but not to those who, say, primarily organise sporting activities). 
However, as Sandberg notes,
85
 such church youth workers would have been outside 
the definition of ‘organised religion’ originally suggested by the government given 
its stricter reference to promoting or explaining the doctrine of the religion but not to 
representing it. 
 
Significantly, the religious exception can operate even where the employer is not 
satisfied, and in all the circumstances is it reasonable for him not to be satisfied, that 
the person meets it.
86
 As noted above in relation to the sexual orientation GOR, this 
is a controversial requirement: as applied to organised religions it does not 
necessarily encourage them to approach matters of sexual orientation perception in 
an enlightened or progressive way, particularly regarding image and stereotype. 
However, the exception has been applied strictly indicating that any sorts of 
perceptions regarding sexual orientation will be dealt with carefully and sensibly. For 
example, in Reaney v. Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance
87
 the claimant was 
denied the job of Diocesan Youth Officer in Hereford on account of the fact the 
Bishop expressed concern that the claimant had previously been in a committed 
same-sex relationship. The Bishop refused to accept the claimant’s assurance that he 
would remain celibate and did not offer him the post. The ET refused to permit the 
Bishop to rely on the exception because the claimant ‘did meet the requirement 
imposed and it was not reasonable for the Bishop to conclude otherwise’,88 
                                                     
81
 Schedule 9, Part 1, para 2(1)(a).  
82
 Schedule 9, Part 1, para. 2(5). 
83
 Schedule 9, Part 1, para. 2(6). This leaves open the possibility that mere attitudes towards sexual 
orientation which fall short of doctrinal requirements could satisfy the exception although this may be 
mitigated by ‘strongly held’ and ‘significant number of the religion’s followers’. 
84
 Reaney v. Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance: see below n. 89. 
85
 Sandberg, above n. 57, p. 121. 
86
 Schedule 9, Part 1, para. 2(1)(c).  
87
 Case no: 1602844/2006. 
88
 Sandberg, above n. 57, p. 121.  
63 
 
particularly ‘given the strength of the references in support of the claimant’s good 
character’.89 Clearly, ‘[t]he onus is ... on tribunals to apply the reasonableness test 
narrowly’.90 
 
The fact that an employer may apply ‘a requirement related to sexual orientation’91 
raises the possibility of a homosexual or heterosexual job applicant’s attitudes 
towards sexual orientation also being covered by the religious exception. This is 
highlighted by Vickers who notes that, ‘[f]or example, an Anglican church may wish 
to appoint a priest who does not support the ordination or gay clergy ... such a 
requirement would be covered, even though it does not relate to the sexual 
orientation of the priest himself’.92 This may not be compatible with freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion as to the inviolability of views held. The application 
of a requirement related to sexual orientation considerably expands the scope of the 
exception for organised religions if it is apt to cover situations such as those 
described by Vickers. This requirement shifts focus away from the sexual orientation 
of the job applicant themselves and places it on views and thoughts concerning 
sexual orientation of both the employer and putative employee – difficult personal 
realms which should arguably be beyond the reach of organised religions. Whilst it 
may be possible to hide such private views and thoughts from a prospective 
employer this remains a basis on which an otherwise suitable applicant may be 
rejected. Such an occurrence is likely to arise in practice particularly as, similar to 
the corresponding GOR, the employer may make such a rejection where they are not 
satisfied, and it is reasonable in the circumstances for them not to be satisfied, that 
the person meets such requirements. This state of affairs was accepted in Amicus, 
Richards J. being of the view that inclusion of the phrase ‘related to’ under the 
previous version of this exception
93
 appropriately met ‘the representations made by 
some Churches to the effect that they were not concerned with sexual orientation per 
se but with sexual behaviour that was related to sexual orientation’.94 As a result, the 
potential breadth of this requirement illustrates the width afforded organised 
religions when applying this exception. Richards J. further commented that: 
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[a] broader point ... is that in the case of employment for purposes of an 
organised religion, regulation 7(3) itself makes clear where the balance is 
struck rather than leaving this extraordinarily difficult area for determination 
by tribunals on a case by case basis (with the burden of deciding e.g. whether 
the doctrines of a particular organised religion can themselves be said to be 
justified). To this extent the legislature has recognised that a requirement 
meeting the conditions of regulation 7(3) is necessarily a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement and has struck the balance in a manner 
that is submitted to be proportionate.
95
  
 
It is particularly noteworthy that one justification in support of this religious 
exception, including the ‘related to’ requirement, is the clarity and guidance which it 
brings to what would otherwise be an impossible areas of clash upon which judges 
would be required to rule. This affirms the balance struck in this particular religious 
exception even if it does appear to afford a benevolent degree of religious liberty.  
 
4. EXCEPTIONS FOR EMPLOYERS WITH AN ETHOS BASED ON RELIGION 
OR BELIEF 
 
4.1 Religion or belief discrimination 
 
Under the RB Regs 2003
96
 this exception applied where an employer had an ethos 
based on religion or belief and made a decision as to an individual’s employment 
with regard to that ethos and to the nature of the employment or the context in which 
it was carried out. The provision has now been transferred unchanged to the EqA 
2010.
97
  
 
This religious exception is different from those others found in sex and sexual 
orientation anti-discrimination laws: it is remarkably wider in scope. Freedland and 
Vickers have stated that ‘[i]n effect, a less rigorous approach is applied in deciding 
whether the particular job requires a particular characteristic where the employer has 
a religious ethos, or an ethos based on a particular belief’.98 Indeed, there is no 
requirement that employment be for the purposes of an organised religion, rather the 
                                                     
95
 Ibid. 
96
 Regulation 7(3). 
97
 Schedule 9, Part 1, para. 3.  
98
 M. Freedland and L. Vickers, ‘Religious Expression in the Workplace in the United Kingdom’ 
(2009) 30 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 597, p. 605. 
65 
 
exception will apply to ‘all employers who have an ethos based on religion or 
belief’99 provided religion or belief is an occupational requirement.100 To this extent, 
‘the exception and the basis on which it is exercised are simply extensions of the 
normal occupational requirement. It is therefore not really an exception for religious 
groups’.101 Nevertheless, it will only be permitted where the requirement as to 
religion or belief is linked to the job role. Moreover, the genuine and occupational 
requirement as to religion or belief, necessitated by the nature of the employment or 
the context in which is it carried out, must be a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim.
102
 The employer may still reject an applicant where they are not 
satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable for them not to be satisfied, that 
the candidate meets the religion or belief requirement.
103
  
 
There is certainly a less stringent approach to this exception. This can be 
demonstrated in relation to employers who require staff to be of the employer’s 
religion:
104
 ‘[t]his type of employer does currently exist, for example, religious 
bookshops, and religious medical practices ... The imposition of a requirement to be 
of a particular religion would not meet the demands of [the EqA 2010’s GOR] as 
having a shared religion is not a determining characteristic of these jobs, but it may 
meet the requirements of [Schedule 9, Part 1, para. 3]’.105 This shows that in the 
sphere of religion and belief in employment there is significant potential for 
permitted discrimination in securing religious liberty. Indeed, the scope outlined 
above ‘allows greater latitude to employers to create discrimination on much wider 
grounds’.106 The fact that the test of ‘organised religion’ is omitted enhances this 
provision’s breadth of scope, contributing to a wider conceptualisation of religious 
liberty where religious employers need to discriminate on the basis of religion itself. 
 
Notwithstanding the generous scope of this exception it should be noted that such 
flexibility is not completely unchecked. In particular, a requirement as to religion or 
belief still has to be occupational. This may present challenges for employers who 
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wish all their staff to have a shared religion as the genuine and occupational 
requirement must be linked to the job itself, meaning that the ‘imposition of a 
religious requirement must be genuinely necessary for the purposes of preserving the 
religious ethos of the organisation’.107 Here, the focus may be on the nature and 
strength of the organisation’s religious ethos in determining how occupational a 
requirement is when linked to the job in question. It will be a careful balancing 
exercise, taking into account assessment of the organisation’s religious ethos and the 
types of responsibilities and tasks involved with undertaking the post. This will not 
be a simple test to surmount as evidently there must be evidence that organisation is 
inherently religious in some way: for example, it was said in McNab that whilst 
Glasgow City Council facilitated Catholic education it ‘could not claim to have a 
religious ethos of its own, even in part of its operations’.108 The EHRC’s 
Employment Statutory Code of Practice explains that evidence of, for example, an 
organisation’s founding constitution109 will be useful in establishing an ‘ethos based 
on religion or belief’. It also highlights that ‘[a]n “ethos” is the important character or 
spirit of the religion or belief. It may also be the underlying sentiment that informs 
the customs, practice or attitudes of the religion or belief’.110  Of course, the linked 
tests of proportionality and legitimate aim still must be satisfied.  
 
5. EXCEPTIONS FOR FAITH SCHOOLS 
 
5.1 Religion or belief discrimination 
 
There exist other significant religious exceptions to domestic religion or belief 
discrimination provisions, although these exist in the Schools and Standards 
Framework Act 1998 (SSFA)
111
 and independently of the EqA 2010. In particular, 
faith schools in England and Wales may impose religion or belief requirements when 
recruiting teaching staff: this means that ‘schools with a religious character ... are 
allowed to discriminate in favour of staff who share the religious ethos of the 
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school’.112 In voluntary controlled and foundation schools the religion of a candidate 
for the post of head teacher may be considered in the appointing  process and regard 
may also be had to their ‘ability and fitness to preserve and develop the religious 
character of the school’.113 Alongside this, in the same types of schools, a fifth of 
teaching staff can be ‘reserved’ to give religious education that accords with the 
religious tenets of the school and these appointments may be ‘selected for their 
fitness and competence’.114 This is a particularly generous religious exception as 
‘[t]he SSFA has no proportionality requirement. As a result, the ethos of the 
organisation, and the question of whether the requirement is really necessary, or 
could be achieved through less discriminatory means is not addressed’.115 
Consequently, the conceptualisation of religious liberty in the context of employment 
in faith schools across England and Wales is much greater than it is in other parts of 
the employment sphere where religious exceptions operate. Remarkably, this wider 
conceptualisation is not extended to other parts of the United Kingdom.
116
 The 
exception for faith schools in England and Wales is even broader in relation to 
voluntary aided schools where religious requirements can be imposed on all staff, not 
merely the head teacher or ‘reserved’ teachers of religious education. Indeed, this 
‘seems to go well beyond what might be lawful ... [W]ith regard to teaching subjects 
other than religion, it is hard to see that being of a particular religion or belief would 
be a genuine occupational requirement of the job. It is also difficult to see how such 
requirements are proportionate’.117 The inconsistency between the religious 
exceptions afforded for faith schools as compared to other religious organisations is 
stark. Such schools are subjected to far less restriction which in turn may be open to 
abuse.  
 
The EqA 2010 covers educational appointments in relation to head teachers and 
principals of schools where there is a requirement that that person be a member of a 
particular religious order.
118
 However, it is not apparent that the Act replaces or 
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impacts upon the specific faith schools provisions addressed above for such schools 
in England, Scotland and Wales.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The exceptions which benefit religion in employment are multifarious. There exist 
not only genuine occupational requirements for all organisations but also specific 
exceptions that are targeted at organised religions. Collectively, these apply so as to 
permit discrimination on grounds of sex, sexual orientation and religion or belief by 
religious bodies: they aim to enhance religious liberty at more of an ‘institutional’ 
level than an individual level. They have evolved into the EqA 2010 versions that 
exist today, these being ‘generally similar to those found in the old law’,119 although 
some key variations between the old and new law have been emphasised. However, 
this range of exceptions is of very limited practical use in employment given the 
highly restricted circumstances to which they may be applied, their narrow 
definitional ambit and the strict ways they have been interpreted by courts and 
academics commentators. This may be viewed as unsurprising. However, their utility 
is further circumscribed by the vagueness inherent in some of the concepts and tests 
employed by the legislature.  
 
It is noticeable that the exceptions to religion or belief discrimination are wider than 
those in sex and sexual orientation discrimination. This permits the relevant 
organisations greater latitude in the pursuit of selection of workers based on religion 
or belief. Moreover, the religious exceptions, as opposed to the general occupational 
requirements, ‘indicate that special treatment is being afforded to organised 
religions’.120 This highlights the precious nature of those religious exceptions: whilst 
they may be limited, they permit an ‘organic’ approach to employment whereby: 
 
the employee is expected to participate in the mission of the organisation as a 
whole, and is expected to join the whole community, the whole body, in a 
way that transcends any narrowly defined job description. Under the organic 
approach as applied to religious organizations, the workplace itself 
constitutes a community of believers where relationships are as important, if 
not more so, than narrowly defined role tasks. To a degree, the religious 
                                                     
119
 Sandberg, above n. 57, p. 118.  
120
 Roberts in Doe and Sandberg, above n. 58, p. 83.  
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workplace is church where people worship together, not just at work, but 
through work.
121
  
 
Esau reinforces further the special privilege of such religious exceptions by 
contending that they authorise so-called ‘islands of exclusivity’: organisations may 
run their internal affairs regarding appointment of personnel how they like. This 
entails ‘giving to them a zone of liberty to at least hire their own members and 
enforce their own lifestyle norms that are otherwise discriminatory’.122 Whilst the 
exceptions may be narrow, the fact they exist at all (and the corresponding benefits 
they bring) is still an important validation of extra-special religious liberty.  
 
                                                     
121
 A. Esau, ‘“Islands of Exclusivity”: religious organizations and employment discrimination’ (2000) 
33 University of British Columbia Law Review 719, p. 734 (original emphases). 
122
 Ibid., p. 827.  
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CHAPTER 5: RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS IN THE PROVISION 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The religious exceptions in the provision of goods and services will now be assessed. 
As with chapter four, exceptions both specifically for religion and those benefitting 
religious and non-religious groups will be discussed to survey their practical 
operation, although the latter will only be footnoted given their minor status and 
recent genesis in the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). The exceptions in the pre-EqA 
2010 law will be considered once more to provide an informed view of the current 
crop of exceptions, whilst the focus again will be on those exceptions to sex, sexual 
orientation and religion or belief discrimination.  
 
2. SEX DISCRIMINATION 
 
Under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) the provision of goods and services 
could be restricted to men. This was permitted where the place providing those goods 
or services was occupied or used (permanently or temporarily) for the purposes of an 
organised religion and the restriction to men was so as to comply with the doctrines 
of that religion or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant 
number of its followers.
 1
 It will be recalled that these tests were the same as those 
contained in the SDA’s exception for organised religions in employment and are 
consequently affected by the same problems.
2
  
 
The same exception has subsequently been incorporated into the EqA 2010.
3
 The 
provision of goods and services must still be made for the purposes of an organised 
religion.
4
 It is now a requirement that the goods and services be provided at a place 
which is (‘permanently or for the time being’) occupied or used for the purposes of 
                                                     
1
 S. 35(1)(b).  
2
 See chapter 4, section 3.1.1.  
3
 Schedule 3, Part 7, para. 29. The EqA 2010 also introduces some general exceptions to sex 
discrimination. In limited circumstances it allows the provision of both separate services for the sexes 
(Schedule 26) and single-sex services (Schedule 27).  
4
 Schedule 3, Part 7, para 29(1)(a).   
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organised religion.
5
 Moreover, the limited provision of the goods and services must 
be necessary in order to comply with the doctrines of the religion or be for the 
purpose of avoiding conflict with the strongly held religious convictions of a 
significant number of the religion’s followers.6 This is the same updated test as that 
which now operates in relation in employment in relation to exceptions for organised 
religion.  
 
Significantly, the EqA 2010 provides that only a ‘minister’ may take advantage of the 
religious exception relating to goods and services
7
 as opposed to a ‘person’ under the 
corresponding SDA provision, highlighting a possible narrowing of this exception. 
However, ‘minister’ is defined rather broadly to include any person who ‘performs 
functions in connection with the religion, and holds an office or appointment in, or is 
accredited, approved or recognised for purposes of, a relevant organisation in relation 
to the religion’.8 Intriguingly, the EqA 2010 attempts to define ‘organised religion’ 
for the purposes of this religions exception on the text of the Act
9
 – something which 
is markedly absent from the religious exception it provides in the context of 
employment. According to the EqA 2010’s definition, the organised religion test will 
be satisfied if an organisation’s purpose is to practise the religion, advance the 
religion, teach the practice or principles of the religion, enable persons of the religion 
to receive benefits, or to engage in activities, within the framework of that religion, 
or to foster or maintain good relations between persons of different religions.
10
 An 
organisation is not an organised religion if its sole or main purpose is commercial.
11
  
 
Whilst not falling within the ambit of sex discrimination, it is relevant to note that a 
new exception exists for Anglican clergy in England and Wales to refuse to 
solemnize the marriage of a person in their parish that they would otherwise be 
obliged to conduct under the Marriage Act 1949 where they reasonably believe that 
one of the parties’ gender is acquired under the Gender Recognition Act 2004. This 
exception also applies to those of other faiths in England and Wales whose consent is 
                                                     
5
 Ibid., para 29(1)(b).  
6
 Ibid., para 29(1)(c).  
7
 Schedule 3, Part 7, para 29(1).  
8
 Ibid., para 29(2).  
9
 Ibid., para. 29(3). 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Schedule 3, Part 7, para. 29(4).  
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required to conduct marriages in religious premises registered under the Marriage 
Act 1949. This is a religious exception to the prohibition of gender reassignment 
discrimination contained in the EqA 2010. 
12
 Of course, the test of ‘reasonable belief’ 
is liable to the same interpretative issues as that used in employment.  
 
3. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
 
There exist a range of religious exceptions from guarantees against sexual orientation 
discrimination in the provision of goods and services. Until recently, these were 
found in the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007
13
 (SO Regs 2007), 
Regulation 14 of which provided that ‘organisations relating to religion or belief’ 
could restrict the provision of goods and services where their sole or main purpose 
was not commercial,
14
 where they were not educational establishments or (local) 
education authorities
15
 and where this was necessary to comply with the doctrine of 
the organisation
16
 or so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious 
convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers.17 Once again, the 
familiar alternative justification tests were used, although the compliance test related 
to the doctrine of the ‘organisation’ and not religion. This expanded the scope of the 
exception, as did the fact that the exception itself was defined to include 
organisations relating to belief.  
 
The EqA 2010 retains the test of ‘organisation relating to religion or belief’.18 It 
amends the alternative justification tests
19
 in order to cater for organisations 
following a belief system as opposed to a religion. In the case of religion, the second 
alternative test is the same as before;
20
 in the case of a belief system the second 
alternative justification test is to avoid conflict with the ‘strongly held convictions 
relating to the belief of a significant number of the belief’s followers’.21  This 
                                                     
12
 Schedule 3, Part 6, para. 24. 
13
 SI 2007/1263. 
14
 Regulation 14(2)(a).  
15
 Regulation 14(2)(b). 
16
 Regulation 14(5)(a). 
17
 Regulation 14(5)(b).  
18
 Schedule 23, para 2.   
19
 Schedule 23, para. 2(7) and (9).  
20
 Schedule 23, para. 2(9)(a). 
21
 Schedule 23, para. 2(9)(b).  
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addresses the anomaly that existed in the SO Regs 2007 whereby organisations 
relating to belief had to satisfy the second alternative justification regarding ‘strongly 
held convictions relating to religion’. Whilst this is appropriate in that it applies a 
logical alternative test to ‘belief,’ it does nevertheless signify a widening of the 
exception.  
 
In the EqA 2010 an ‘organisation relating to religion or belief’ is defined22 in exactly 
the same way as ‘organised religion’ in the corresponding sex discrimination 
exception for religion in goods and services provision in the EqA 2010.
23
 Whilst the 
test for determining such organisations is similar in these provisions, uncertainty is 
cast over the value of the test if it may apply equally to organisations relating to 
religion and organisations relating to religion or belief, the latter type potentially 
being capable of applying to a wider range of organisations. Sandberg notes that 
‘[t]here is no legal articulation of the difference, if any, between an “organisation 
relating to religion or belief” and the term ... “organised religion”’.24 Indeed, it has 
been said that the test of ‘organisations relating to religion or belief’ seems ‘wider 
than that or “organised religion” under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975’.25 
Certainly, ‘this is a matter of practical importance’26 because it indicates that ‘whilst 
an “organised religion” will always also be an “organisation relating to religion or 
belief”, an “organisation relating to religion or belief” will not always be an 
“organised religion”. However, the law remains silent as to the precise difference 
between the two’.27 The EqA 2010 Explanatory Notes highlight that an example of 
this exception in practice would be a Church refusing to let out its hall for a Gay 
Pride celebration as it considers that it would conflict with the strongly held religious 
convictions of a significant number of its followers.
28
 Clearly, a Church (as an 
organisation relating to religion or belief) would be able to demonstrate a religious 
non-commercial purpose. At the other end of the scale it is unlikely that this religious 
exception could be enjoyed by organisations whose purposes were not directly and 
immediately religious so as to satisfy the EqA 2010’s definition in Schedule 23, para. 
                                                     
22
 Schedule 23, para. 2(1).  
23
 Schedule 3, Part 7, para. 29(3). 
24
 R. Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 124 – 125.  
25
 R. Sandberg and N. Doe, ‘Religious Exemptions in Discrimination Law’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law 
Journal 302, p. 306.  
26
 Sandberg, above n. 24,p. 125.  
27
 Ibid. 
28
 EqA 2010: Explanatory Notes, para. 996. 
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2(1). For example, in the Australian decision of Cobaw Community Health Services 
Ltd. v. Christian Youth Camps Ltd.,
29
 a Christian youth camp wished to deny access 
to its adventure resort facilities (which it otherwise provided without restriction to 
any religious or secular groups) on grounds of sexual orientation. The Victorian Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal decided that the defendant organisation could not rely 
on a religious exception regarding sexual orientation and provision of facilities in the 
Equal Opportunity Act 1995 as it was not a ‘body established for religious 
purposes’:30 there was no religious component to its conduct as an organisation.31 
 
A particular restriction on this religious exception is the fact that, as under the SO 
Regs 2007,
32
 the EqA 2010 precludes use of it when a discriminatory act on the basis 
of sexual orientation is done on behalf of a public authority
33
 and under the terms of 
a contract between the organisation and the public authority.
34
 The role of public 
authorities in situations of sexual orientation discrimination will be returned to in 
chapter nine when commenting on the application of reasonable accommodation 
models to cases where religion has clashed with sexual orientation.  In relation to 
organisations which contract to provide services on behalf of a public body, the EqA 
2010 Explanatory Notes explain that a religious organisation which has a contract 
with a local authority to provide meals to elderly and other vulnerable people within 
the community on behalf of the local authority cannot discriminate because of sexual 
orientation.
35
  
 
Restriction on the use of this religious exception to those organisations relating to 
religion or belief which are not public authorities has deep practical implications. It 
appears that, whilst the state is prepared to legislate to allow exceptions based on 
religion or belief from much heralded and lauded anti-discrimination provisions, it is 
not prepared to be associated with these types of exceptions in connection with 
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 [2010] VCAT 1613. 
30
 per Justice Hampel, at paras 252 – 254. 
31
 Ibid., paras 243 – 248. 
32
 Regulation 14(8)(b).  
33
 Schedule 23, para 2(10)(a). 
34
 Ibid., para 2(10)(b).  
35
 EqA 2010: Explanatory Notes, para. 996. This is similar to the issue of provision of adoption 
services to same-sex couples by Catholic adoption agencies that arose in Catholic Care (Diocese of 
Leeds) v. Charity Commissioner for England and Wales [2011] UKFTT B1 (General Regulatory 
Chamber). This case is considered in chapter 6, section 2.1 and chapter 12, section 3.3.3.  
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services carried out by religious bodies when they are linked back to the state itself. 
There are undoubtedly political motivations in not wishing public money to be used 
or seen to be used to support discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and 
especially not through a legitimate religious exception drafted by Parliament to its 
very own anti-discrimination legislation. In facilitating religious liberty through this 
exception the state simultaneously seeks to distance itself from this where it may 
prove too controversial. 
 
A final issue under this anti-discrimination heading relates to the fact that the EqA 
2010 now permits civil partnerships to take place on religious premises.
36
 However, 
there is a religious exception within this provision to the effect that ‘nothing in [the] 
Act places an obligation on religious organisations to host civil partnerships if they 
do not wish to do so’.37 After some delay this exception has now come into effect: s. 
202 of the EqA 2010 has enabled removal of the ban in the Civil Partnership Act 
2004 on civil partnerships taking place on religious premises meaning the religious 
exception is now in effect. The ban itself was lifted on the 5
th
 December 2011
38
 by 
the Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2011.
39
 This evidently provides greater religious liberty on grounds of 
sexual orientation for same-sex couples where affirmation of such unions is 
permitted by the religious owners of relevant premises. At the same time it affords 
flexibility for religious liberty in exempting religious groups from the use of their 
premises for such activities.  
 
4. RELIGION OR BELIEF DISCRIMINATION 
 
Previously, the Equality Act 2006 (EqA 2006) contained a variety of religious 
exceptions from religion or belief discrimination. The most relevant concerned 
‘organisations relating to religion or belief’:40 this is continued under the EqA 201041 
although not applying to organisations that are commercial.
42
 Under the EqA 2010 
                                                     
36
 S. 202, with the definition of religious premises found in s. 202(4)(3C).  
37
 S. 202(4)(3A).  
38
 See: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/lgbt/>, accessed 21
st
 August 2011.  
39
 SI 2011/2661. 
40
 S. 57.  
41
 Schedule 23, para. 2. 
42
 Ibid., para. 2(2).  
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such organisations have to have as their purpose the same aims as those of 
organisations relating to religion or belief seeking exceptions from sexual orientation 
discrimination.
43
 Under the EqA 2006 an additional requirement was included 
whereby the organisation had to ‘improve relations, or maintain good relations, 
between persons of different religions or beliefs’.44 The EqA 2010 maintains this45 
although its wording may be slightly more generous to organisations of religion or 
belief in that the requirement now is to merely to ‘foster or maintain good relations 
between persons of different religions or beliefs’.46 As with the religious exception in 
sexual orientation discrimination under the EqA 2010 both organisations and 
ministers may restrict the provision of goods and services on grounds of religion or 
belief. 
 
The exception in the EqA 2006 could be successfully claimed only if the basis of an 
organisation’s claim was either ‘by reason of or on the grounds of the purpose of the 
organisation’,47 or ‘in order to avoid causing offence, on the grounds of the religion 
of belief to which the organisation relates, to persons of that religion’.48 These 
alternative tests were notably different in scope from those which had to be 
established by religious bodies in successfully claiming religious exceptions in sex 
and sexual orientation discrimination. For example, the ‘purpose’ of an organisation 
was apt to broader interpretation. This test is simplified further by the EqA 2010: it is 
now defined as ‘because of the purpose of the organisation’.49 The second alternative 
test is ‘to avoid causing offence, on grounds of the religion or belief to which the 
organisation relates, to persons of that religion or belief’.50 It is presumed this will 
have to be interpreted with a degree of subjectivity concerning what ‘persons of that 
religion or belief’ would find offensive which is likely to create problems of 
definition for the courts. There are few safeguards in place to prevent the test of 
‘avoid causing offence, on the grounds of the religion or belief to which the 
organisation relates, to persons of that religion or belief’, from being interpreted 
potentially generously when operation of the exception reaches the domestic courts.  
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 Ibid., para. 2(1).  
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 S. 57(1)(e).  
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 Schedule 23, para. 2(1)(e).  
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 Ibid (emphasis added).  
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 S. 57(5)(a). 
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 S. 57(5)(b).  
49
 Schedule 23, para. 6(a).  
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The EqA 2010 contains further religious exceptions. For example, charities may 
require members, or persons wishing to become members, to make a statement 
which asserts or implies membership or acceptance of a religion or belief.
51
 Pursuant 
to this, charities may also provide benefits, including the provision of goods and 
services, only to persons of a particular religion or belief.
52
 Moreover, there also 
exist religious exceptions for schools in the goods and services provision context. 
The EqA 2006 provided that it was not unlawful for an educational institution, 
established or conducted for the purpose of providing education relating to, or within 
the framework of, a specified religion or belief, to restrict the provision of goods or 
services.
53
 This is repeated in the EqA 2010 although there is a restriction of the 
types of relevant provisions. These are expressly confined to matters such as 
curriculum, admission and acts of worship.
54
 Furthermore, both schools with a 
religious character
55
 and institutions with a religious ethos
56
 are exempt from their 
otherwise respective duties not to discriminate on, amongst other grounds, religion or 
belief in admissions.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, these exceptions are both narrow and ‘the same in substance as the old 
law’.57 Arguably, as with the exceptions in employment, ‘it is likely that the 
narrowness of the exceptions will be continued to be stressed until the exceptions 
narrow to the extent that they cease to exist’.58 Others have argued that the restricted 
nature of the exceptions should be expected. For example, Roberts has contended 
that ‘it was clear from the outset ... that the Government intended the exception for 
religious organisations to be as narrow as possible’.59 This may prove to be overly 
negative given that attention in this chapter has been drawn to some of the ways in 
                                                     
51
 S. 193(5). The charitable instrument must allow for this: s. 193(1)(a).  
52
 S. 193(5). 
53
 S. 59(1)(a).  
54
 Schedule 3, para. 11.  
55
 Schedule 11, Part 2, para. 5(1).  
56
 Schedule 12, Part 2, para. 5(1).  
57
 R. Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157, p. 178. 
58
 Ibid., p. 179. 
59
 P. Roberts, ‘Religion and Discrimination: balancing interests within the anti-discrimination 
framework’ in N. Doe and R. Sandberg (eds.) Law and Religion: New Horizons (Leuven: Peeters, 
2010), p. 86 (Roberts argues this in relation to religious exceptions to sexual orientation 
discrimination, although it is arguably true of the religious exceptions to sex and religion or belief 
discrimination too).  
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which religious exceptions in goods and services may be broader than at first blush 
(it may also be noted that they do not contain a proportionality requirement)
60
. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of how the narrowly or broadly the exceptions may 
eventually be interpreted, there is no escaping the haphazard nature of the 
definitions, tests and concepts used to draft them. The circumstances in which an 
exception can be used are highly limited – their use effectively being restricted, as in 
employment, to religious bodies as opposed to individuals – meaning they serve little 
practical use in more everyday situations when those with a religious faith may seek 
particular individual treatment.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
60
 This is not required under EU law in relation to exceptions in goods and services provision given 
that EU law has not yet pronounced on the scope of exceptions in this area.  
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CHAPTER 6: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND THE  
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The exceptions explored in chapters four and five pose two chief drawbacks for 
religious liberty. Firstly, they only apply in very limited practical situations – 
admittedly, one advantage of this is that they do facilitate certainty of law: the 
exceptions are defined in advance and afford clarity of expectation on when the 
opprobrium of the law will be avoided. Secondly, their parameters are heavily 
policed by a collection of tightly defined tests and requirements that are often vague, 
inconsistent and arbitrary. This narrows their practical utility yet further. 
 
Restrictiveness was certainly to be expected. In chapter three it was emphasised that 
the decision to grant religious exceptions involved not only philosophical dilemmas 
but also, more significantly, a sensitive proportionality balance juggling different 
interests (including whether religion was deserving of special treatment). Even where 
that balance fell in favour of religious immunity, the exception could only ever 
provide minimal practical protection in breadth and depth from anti-discrimination 
law. In that sense, the fact exceptions exist at all may be seen as a useful addition to 
religion law and a victory for religious liberty as ‘discrimination law does make 
some concession to religious groups and religious employees whose religious beliefs 
clash with obligations placed on them’.1 Nonetheless, future judicial interpretation of 
the exceptions in anti-discrimination law is likely to continue the conservative trends 
already observed, particularly in relation to exceptions for religions. Indeed, ‘the 
only guidance to be derived from the cases to date is that the exceptions are to be 
interpreted narrowly’.2 It is ominous that in November 2009 the European 
Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the United Kingdom (UK) government 
‘asserting that exceptions for religious employers under UK law were broader than 
those permitted under the EC Directive [2000/78/EC]’.3 This would suggest that 
more narrowing of the exceptions (in employment at least) is possible although ‘to 
                                                     
1
 R. Sandberg: Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 129 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Ibid., pp. 118 – 119.  
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date, this opinion has not been followed by infringement proceedings against the 
UK’.4 
 
2. OUTSIDE THE RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS 
 
It might be ventured that religion receives appropriate, and indeed sufficient, legal 
recognition at the anti-discrimination level. This is enjoyed via a combination of 
protection from religious discrimination (be it direct or indirect) and exceptions from 
various forms of anti-discrimination law. The former act as a basic guarantee to 
affirm the religious liberty of individuals in a range of everyday circumstances; the 
latter exist to afford bodies, religious and sometimes otherwise, a privileged right of 
discrimination in certain specified situations. 
 
However, this straightforward characterisation masks a number of religious liberty 
challenges. It was said in chapter three that the inter-connected notions of human 
dignity, autonomy and equality
5
 provided a popular setting in which to conceive of 
religion law, including religious exceptions and the enhanced degree of protection 
they provide. Nevertheless, in the case-study in Part II it was said that the extra 
immunity from anti-discrimination rules those exceptions afford is considerably 
restricted. This was in terms of both practical application and the exceptions’ 
intended beneficiaries – they are clearly intended for use by religious bodies.  
 
As a result, it may be asked whether an argument can be formulated for further 
special protection of religious interests in anti-discrimination law (in the vein of an 
exception). Such an argument could be based on recent case law where individual 
divergence from the norm has revealed gaps in protection of religion in particularly 
common situations. Such a shift in emphasis back to – necessarily – more individual 
protection might be contested by some,
6
 although it has already been established that 
                                                     
4
 A. Donald et al, Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) Research Report 84: religion or 
belief, equality and human rights in England and Wales, p. 32. Available at: 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/rr84_final_opt.pdf>, accessed 24
th
 
August 2012, p. 96. 
5
 Discussed in chapter 2, section 2. 
6
 A focus on the individual is seen as undesirable from the perspective of organised religions given 
that it may diminish the autonomy of such groups. In response to criticisms by Julian Rivers that 
arguments for religious interests being based on individual rights is merely ‘a modern development in 
thinking about religious rights’, Vickers suggests that ‘[t]his may well be the case, but in order to 
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legal protection of religion as based on dignity, autonomy and equality may apply 
equally at either the collective or individual levels. This is supported by Vickers who 
submits that ‘religious interests ... contain a collective dimension, even though the 
recognition of religious interests ... [is] cast in terms of individual rights, based on 
the principles of individual autonomy, dignity and equality’;7 Khaitan also notes how 
dignity ‘is seen sometimes as an individualistic ideal, and at other times as a 
communitarian one’.8  
 
Of course, in calculating whether further special protection is needed, the anti-
discrimination law jurisprudence on religion needs to be evaluated to ascertain how 
far there exists any protection gap at the individual level which necessitates more 
accommodation of religious interests. By way of introduction, it can be said that the 
past few years have witnessed a rise in the number of unsuccessful anti-
discrimination judgments affecting religious interests across employment and the 
provision of goods and services (these spheres comprise the main discrimination 
contexts in which religious battles have recently been fought). Given the sheer 
volume of Employment Tribunal decisions, the focus in this chapter and those that 
follow will be on relevant high-profile decisions adjudicated in the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (EAT) or above.
9
 The emphasis, as in the whole thesis, will be on 
religious (that is, theistic) protection issues.
10
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
suggest that the new thinking is misguided, further debate is needed to explain why religion is 
protected at all in modern times’: L. Vickers, ‘Twin Approaches to Secularism: organised religion and 
society’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 197, p. 202. This is revisited in chapter 12, section 
1. 
7
 L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 
pp. 42 – 43. 
8
 T. Khaitan, ‘Dignity as an Expressive Norm: neither vacuous nor a panacea’ (2012) 32 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1, p. 14. 
9
 The exception is Chaplin v. Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2010] ET 
1702886/2009 which is included for discussion as the claimant is joined with the appellant in Eweida 
v. British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80 in an application currently pending before the European 
Court of Human Rights: Eweida and Chaplin v. UK [2011] ECHR 738. 
10
 Other cases raise interesting issues regarding whether individual atheist believers should be 
excepted from rules. See, for example, R (on the application of the National Secular Society) v. 
Bideford Town Council [2012] EWHC 175 (Admin) and an unsuccessful challenge on indirect 
discrimination grounds by an atheist town councillor to the saying of prayers as an integral part of 
town council meetings.  
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2.1 Domestic anti-discrimination law and the protection of religion
11
 
 
Unsuccessful cases of religious discrimination in employment have featured three 
types of claim. The first involves a clash between an employee’s religion and the 
extent to which that employee is able to fulfil their workplace duties according to 
their beliefs about sexual orientation, such cases including McClintock v. Department 
of Constitutional Affairs (McClintock),
12
 Ladele v. London Borough of Islington 
(Ladele)
13
 and McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd. (McFarlane).
14
 The second concerns a 
balance between the employee’s religion and the wish to modify personal appearance 
through the wearing of religious clothing or symbols at work, such modification 
conflicting with an employer’s uniform policy. These cases comprise Azmi v. 
Kirklees Metropolitan Council (Azmi),
15
 Harris v. NKL Automative Ltd. (Harris),
16
 
Eweida v. British Airways PLC (Eweida)
17
 and Chaplin v. Royal Devon and Exeter 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (Chaplin).
18
 Finally, the third type of claim relates 
to the conflict between an employee’s need to attend religious observance 
ceremonies and their scheduled work duties, the relevant domestic discrimination 
judgment being the unsuccessful EAT decision in Cherfi v. G4S Security Services 
(Cherfi).
19
 Prior to the domestic introduction of laws on religious discrimination 
there is also the decision in Copsey v. WWB Devon Clays Ltd. (Copsey),
20
 an unfair 
dismissal case which also considered the employee’s right to freedom of religion 
under Article 9.  
 
Unsuccessful discrimination cases with religious elements in the sphere of goods and 
services provision have chiefly involved a clash between religious service providers 
and whether they can restrict such services to prospective service users on grounds of 
sexual orientation. These cases include Hall and Preddy v. Bull and Bull (Bull)
21
 
                                                     
11
 All employment cases sign-posted here are discussed at length in chapters 9 – 11. For the sake of 
brevity, the facts of these claims are discussed later in those chapters. 
12
 [2008] IRLR 29.  
13
 [2009] EWCA Civ 1357.  
14
 [2010] EWCA Civ B1.  
15
 [2007] IRLR 484. 
16
 [2007] UKEAT 0134_07_0310. 
17
 See above n. 9. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 [2011] EqLR 825. 
20
 [2005] EWCA Civ 932. 
21
 [2012] EWCA Civ 83.  
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(provision of a double room in a Christian bed and breakfast), R (Johns) v. Derby 
City Council (Johns)
22
 (provision by a Christian couple of fostering services) and the 
protracted battle in Catholic Care v. Charity Commission for England and Wales 
(Catholic Care)
23
 (provision by a Catholic adoption agency of adoption services).  
 
Of the unsuccessful religious discrimination claims in employment, all raised matters 
of indirect rather than direct discrimination, although some claimants unsuccessfully 
argued direct discrimination.
24
 The exception is Copsey which was heard before 
domestic provisions on religious discrimination had come into force. Of the 
unsuccessful cases in goods and services provision, the legal mechanisms used were 
often more varied given the range of claims brought either by or against religious 
providers. In Bull, direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was 
upheld
25
 against the religious service providers, with the EAT indicating that indirect 
discrimination on the same grounds would also have existed.
26
 Johns raised issues of 
direct and indirect religious discrimination and a breach of Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. None were successful.
27
 The issue in Catholic Care 
was whether the claimant charity could change its objects under s. 64 of the Charities 
Act 1993 so as to accord with s. 193 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). This was 
an attempt to circumvent Schedule 23, para. 2(10) of the EqA 2010 so that it could 
register itself as a charity serving only heterosexual people. Under the EqA 2010 a 
charity will not necessarily contravene the Act by restricting the provision of benefits 
to persons who share a protected characteristic
28
 where this is ‘a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate end’,29or ‘for the purpose of preventing or compensating for 
a disadvantage linked to the protected characteristic’.30 Some of the key ways in 
which the courts’ reasoning has restricted religious interests in all the cases outlined 
above will now briefly be explored. 
 
                                                     
22
 [2011] EWHC 375 (Admin). 
23
 [2011] UKFTT B1 (General Regulatory Chamber). Catholic Care has now been given permission to 
appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber).  
24
 See McClintock, Ladele, McFarlane (chapter 9), Azmi, Harris (chapter 10)  and Cherfi (chapter 11). 
25
 In the Court of Appeal, per Hooper LJ at para. 57.  
26
 per Judge Rutherford at para. 53.  
27
 per Munby LJ at paras 107 – 109.  
28
 S. 193(1).  
29
 S. 193(2)(a).  
30
 S. 193(2)(b).  
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2.1.1 Issues common to employment 
 
The limitations of Article 9 jurisprudence have increasingly encouraged employees 
to frame cases as religious discrimination claims. In a recent report, Donald et al 
noted that ‘[t]he Equality Act 2010 (and its predecessors) has come to be viewed by 
legal practitioners as a firmer basis for pursuing claims relating to religion or 
belief’.31 Rivers similarly claims: ‘[e]quality law is now beginning to take over from 
the Human Rights Act 1998 as the larger cause of increased litigation’.32 One reason 
for this is that in freedom of religion claims the courts are clearly unsympathetic to 
the exercise of religion in employment due to the now established view that the 
religious adherent voluntarily places themselves in that specific situation. This 
‘applies where someone has voluntarily submitted themselves to a system of norms, 
usually by means of a contract. This voluntary submission creates a “specific 
situation” which limits the claimant’s right’.33 The operation of this rule reflects the 
fact that the courts now take a narrow interpretation of ‘interference’ under Article 
9(1),
34
 this being evident in cases heard at both the domestic and Strasbourg levels.
35
 
The specific situation rule is also found in cases heard at these levels concerning 
religious manifestation in schools and universities.
36
 Despite the fact that this has 
encouraged claimants to pursue religious discrimination routes instead, the ‘specific 
situation’ rule now influences judges in domestic religious discrimination claims in 
employment, leading Sandberg to conclude that ‘[t]he jurisprudence in these two 
areas is no longer separated’.37 Indeed, commentators have noted the operation of the 
                                                     
31
 Donald et al, above n. 4, p. 32.  
32
 J. Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 371, 
p. 382.  
33
 R. Sandberg, ‘Laws and Religion: unravelling McFarlane v. Relate Avon Limited’ (2010) 12 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 361, n. 27, p. 365. 
34
 For discussion of the doctrine of ‘non-interference’ under Article 9(1), see, for example, R. 
Sandberg, ‘The Changing Position of Religious Minorities in English Law: the legacy of Begum’ in 
R. Grillo et al (eds.), Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 270 – 276 
and J. Dingemans, ‘The Need for a Principled Approach to Religious Freedoms’ (2010) 12 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 371, pp. 375 – 378.  
35
 See, for example, Mummery LJ in Copsey at paras. 31 – 39 and at the Strasbourg level see, for 
example, Kalaç v Turkey (1997) 27 EHRR 552 at para. 27. 
36
 See, for example, Lord Bingham in R (on the application of Begum) v. Denbigh High School 
(Begum) [2006] UKHL 15, at paras. 22 – 25, Deputy Judge Supperstone QC in R (on the application 
of Playfoot) v. Millais School Governing Body (Playfoot) [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin) at paras. 25 – 
32 and Silber J. in R (on the application of X) v. Headteacher of Y School (X and Y) [2007] EWHC 
298 (Admin) at paras. 29 – 35. At the Strasbourg level see, for example, Sahin v Turkey (2007) 44 
EHRR 5 at para. 105 (Grand Chamber).  
37
 Sandberg, above n. 1, p. 117.  
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rule in many of the unsuccessful employment cases highlighted above, for example 
Azmi
38
 and both Ladele and McFarlane.
39
 Vickers has argued that such a right to 
resign should ‘remain the residual protection, rather than the starting (and swift 
ending) point for the provision of protection’.40 
 
Religious discrimination judgments in employment have also restricted religious 
liberty in other ways. For instance, in Eweida the claimant’s indirect discrimination 
claim against her employer for prohibiting her from wearing a crucifix above her 
work uniform failed. This was due to the fact that indirect discrimination requires 
that a provision ‘puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at 
a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share 
it’.41 It was held that she was the only employee who had complained of the 
prohibition and that there was no evidence that any other persons had been placed at 
a disadvantage. Despite the fact that for the time being ‘[a] careless expansion of the 
concept of indirect discrimination may unfairly burden defendants and lead to the 
filing of bogus claims’,42 the case raises important questions about individual 
religious liberty under indirect discrimination. As there was no identified group 
disadvantage there was no need to look at proportionality. The same conclusion as to 
lack of group disadvantage was found in Chaplin, citing the reasoning in Eweida.
 43
 
The logic of the decisions on group disadvantage poses a particular problem for 
individual religious interests, particularly in circumstances where indirect 
discrimination is the only realistic claim route option. Notwithstanding such 
comparator-based challenges, some have argued that it is possible – however strained 
– to interpret the use of the conditional ‘would apply; would put’ as affording 
individual disadvantage where other (hypothetical) persons of the same view, were 
there to be any, would also be disadvantaged.
44
 Unfortunately, for those who are 
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 M. Hill and R. Sandberg, ‘Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World’ [2007] Public 
Law 488, pp. 503 – 504.  
39
 Sandberg, above n. 33, p. 365. 
40
 Vickers, above n. 7, pp. 52 – 53.  
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 S. 19, EqA 2010. 
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 N. Hatzis, ‘Personal Religious Belief in the Workplace: how not to define indirect discrimination’ 
(2011) 74 Modern Law Review 287, p. 305. 
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Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280, p. 288 – 289.  
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unable to establish group disadvantage this argument has not found favour with the 
domestic judiciary.
45
  
 
2.1.2 Issues common to employment and provision of goods and services 
 
Within the spheres of employment and the provision of goods and services it has 
been perceived that religion or belief comes below sexual orientation in the 
protection ‘hierarchy’. This has been discerned from a number of judgments,46 
indicating that whilst recognised characteristics may be equally protected in principle 
(it might be said that the existence of religious exceptions disrupts this equilibrium) it 
is as a result of the courts’ attempts to balance competing rights within 
discrimination claims that the hierarchy has been formed and subsequently 
entrenched. Such a hierarchy is a product of discrimination law juridification:
47
 ‘[i]n 
this area, courts have shown an even stronger bifurcation between an essentialising 
view of sexuality and a choice-model of religion that has rendered irrelevant the 
concerns of those with tender consciences about complicity in behaviour they 
consider immoral’.48Whilst clashes between religion and other protected 
characteristics (for example, disability
49
) have yet to come before the courts, it may 
be asked whether religion or belief as a protected characteristic legally viewed as 
‘non-innate’ and ‘chosen’50 will ever be placed above other protected characteristics? 
                                                     
45
 For example, see comments by Sedley LJ in Eweida: paras. 16 – 17.  
46
 This trend has also emerged in Article 9 jurisprudence: for example, in Genderdoc-M v. Moldova 
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government that the refusal to allow the applicant, an NGO whose object was to support the LGBT 
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Discrimination Grounds in EU Law’ (2006) 13 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
445, pp. 469 – 470.  
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 Rivers, above n. 32, p. 390. 
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 For brief discussion see chapter 7, section 4.2. 
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 The law views religion as ‘chosen’ and therefore non-innate. See the comments of Sedley LJ in 
Eweida to the effect that whilst all the protected characteristics are ‘objective characteristics of 
individuals; religion and belief are matters of choice alone’ (para. 40). See also the attitude of the 
courts towards a baby’s (or very young child’s) capacity to be religious. For example, in An NHS 
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This perhaps highlights an emerging imperative for religion or belief to be protected 
differently in anti-discrimination law. Vickers contends that the reasoning for the 
emergence of the hierarchy needs to be explicitly explained by the courts: currently it 
is not.
51
 
 
In employment this development has become notorious, as highlighted by both 
Ladele and McFarlane. During proceedings in McFarlane, a witness statement was 
provided by Lord Carey of Clifton, former Archbishop of Canterbury, arguing that 
the case should be decided before ‘a specially constituted Court of Appeal of five 
Lords Justices who have a proven sensibility to religious issues’. This was 
precipitated by the fact that ‘both the EAT in McFarlane and the Court of Appeal in 
Ladele failed “to conduct the balancing exercise” between the two competing claims 
of religious discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination’.52 This has led to 
Sandberg drawing the conclusion that in employment cases where religion and 
sexual orientation clash, ‘[t]here seems to be no [legal] recognition that equality 
policy protects discrimination on grounds of religion as well as on grounds of sexual 
orientation,’53 whilst in relation to both employment and goods and services 
provision it is similarly noted that ‘[t]he law offers very little, if any, accommodation 
of [religious] views’.54 Sandberg illustrates the emergence of this protection 
imbalance in goods and services provision by noting the decision in Bull. 
Significantly, in relation to indirect sexual orientation discrimination: 
 
the judgment of the court ... does not mention the grounds upon which the 
discrimination could be justified and suggests that it would be difficult to 
identify such grounds, noting that, in contrast, it would be ‘easy to imagine 
examples of such cases’ in the sphere of religious discrimination. The 
judgment suggests that it is more difficult to justify indirect discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation than it is to justify such discrimination on 
grounds of religion’.55  
                                                                                                                                                      
Trust v. MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam), Holman J. stated at para. 50 that a child, ‘must himself be 
incapable, by reason of his age, of any religious belief’. Holman J. reinforced this point in The NHS 
Trust v. A [2007] EWHC 1696 (Fam) at para. 41.  
51
 Vickers, above n. 44, pp. 301 – 303.  
52
 Sandberg, above n. 33, pp. 363 – 364.  
53
 R. Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157, p. 172. This is 
also alluded to by Hambler in some employment scenarious: A. Hambler, ‘A Private Matter? 
Evolving Approaches to the Freedom to Manifest Religious Convictions in the Workplace’ (2008) 3 
Religion and Human Rights 111, p. 130. 
54
 Sandberg, above n. 53, p. 173.  
55
 Ibid., pp. 172 – 173, quoting the Bristol County Court in Bull at para. 52.  
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The developing impression in anti-discrimination law is that the jurisprudence does 
not adequately support those with faith convictions concerning beliefs surrounding 
issues of sexual orientation. In the sphere of employment this means that the ultimate 
option of last resort – the right to resign – is frequently the only realistic option. This 
point is made by Hambler, albeit only in relation to public officials such the 
claimants in McClintock and Ladele.
56
 Indeed, the need to think more creatively 
about accommodation options in such cases has been emphasised elsewhere by 
Hambler:  
 
where the main source of ethical opposition to a particular practice is drawn 
from a particular faith standpoint, and where the employer is rich in 
resources, then it is surely not too great a burden to expect the employer to at 
least consider the possibility of a religious objection and act accordingly? In 
[McClintock] ... it would have meant the employer giving greater 
consideration to [the claimant’s] request for a suitable ‘accommodation’.57  
 
 
Vickers has submitted that ‘it may be inevitable that a hierarchy will be created as 
between different grounds of equality.’58 although it is important to recognise that 
‘further thought needs to be given to where religion should sit on the spectrum and 
why’.59 Malik counsels against this, stating that ‘where there is a religion and 
sexuality conflict, it is important to take an approach that does not create a hierarchy 
between rights or equality grounds’.60  
 
3. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
 
The cases alluded to above illuminate problematic trends in religious discrimination 
adjudication. Whilst individual believers obviously cannot and do not expect carte 
blanche dispensation from either workplace expectations or laws governing the 
provision of goods and services, the decisions indicate the rather hostile way in 
which the courts have interpreted the rules on anti-discrimination law against 
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 A. Hambler, ‘A No-Win Situation for Public Officials with Faith Convictions’ (2010) 12 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 3, pp. 7 and 15; Hambler, above n. 53, p. 121. 
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 Hambler, above n. 53, p. 120. 
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 Vickers, above n. 44, p. 302. 
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 Ibid.  
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religious individuals. In employment claims, the difficulties lie in interpretation of 
the tests in indirect discrimination, be it at the initial stage of disadvantage or the 
second stage of justification. Two separate factors that have limited religious success 
in these indirect discrimination cases have been the specific situation rule and the 
need, as an individual, to be able to show group disadvantage. Meanwhile, in both 
employment and goods and services provision the limiting factor has been the 
perceived creation of a hierarchy between religion or belief and sexual orientation. 
Across all the cases, three main areas of clash can be categorised: religion and issues 
of sexual orientation;
61
 religion and employer dress codes; and religion and employer 
work schedules. These three sites of clash should not entail as quick a surrender of 
dignity, autonomy and equality as the courts’ decisions might indicate. In particular, 
the idea of human dignity ‘demands a core level of respect for the person, which may 
include respect for their religious interests. This core respect is not undermined by a 
person doing as he is bid’,62 for example by voluntarily either undertaking 
employment or offering to provide goods or services to the public. These areas of 
clash are revisited across chapters nine to eleven.  
 
3.1 A new religious exception system in anti-discrimination law 
 
A solution to this state of affairs is the domestic introduction of reasonable 
accommodation, a doctrine common in other jurisdictions. Such a concept has the 
potential to better address individual religious interests in anti-discrimination law: 
this is via a more sophisticated reconciling of competing positions. Indeed, 
reasonable accommodation joins with direct and indirect discrimination in forming 
part of anti-discrimination law
63
 (and is therefore grounded in one of the main pillars 
of religion law). However, it can also be viewed as an attempt to afford additional 
special protection to religion on top of these two anti-discrimination claim routes – 
akin to the role of the exceptions discussed in Part II. Moon has commented that ‘the 
requirement of accommodation may rest on the view that there is something special 
                                                     
61
 This characterisation is intended to highlight simply that in the relevant cases religious believers 
had faith convictions which directly or indirectly related back to human sexual orientation. 
62
 Vickers, above n. 7, p. 51. 
63
 For an illustration see discussion in section 3.2.1 below of reasonable adjustments in domestic 
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or significant about religious beliefs that they are deeply rooted’.64 To this extent, it 
has been said that reasonable accommodation connotes ‘modification or 
adjustment’65 – this being in the spirit of an exception. Consolidating this idea, it has 
been reasoned that ‘where the controversial measure seems the best way to achieve a 
certain legitimate objective, the adjustment of that measure by means of an exception 
may be the only way to eliminate the discriminatory character without compromising 
the measure’s purpose. From this perspective, reasonable accommodation can be 
interpreted as a specific response, in the form of an exception, to an indirect 
discrimination’.66 The remainder of this thesis in Parts III to V shall expose 
reasonable accommodation’s value at a practical and policy level in balancing the 
religious liberty of individuals versus another’s legitimate aim. This will entail 
application of the reasonable accommodation doctrine to some of the cases 
pinpointed above.
67
   
 
3.2 Models of reasonable accommodation 
 
Attention can now turn to the specifics of how and where the doctrine protects 
religious interests in anti-discrimination law. The two most identifiable and classic 
models of reasonable accommodation for religion exist in the anti-discrimination 
laws of Canada and the United States (US). Academic research on comparative 
methods of religious protection in anti-discrimination law regularly references these 
examples,
68
 whilst they have also been cited during discussion in the domestic courts 
on matters of religious liberty.
69
 The Canadian and US models will be critiqued in 
chapters seven and eight, respectively, before being applied to the domestic cases in 
Part IV. In applying these models it will be important to recall the historical, political 
and social contexts of those jurisdictions so that any comparison is not misleading. 
Of course, comparative perspectives are of value ‘notwithstanding the different 
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65
 E. Bribosia, J. Ringelheim and I. Rorive, ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Minorities: a 
promising concept for European antidiscrimination law?’ (2010) 17 (2) Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 137, p. 138. 
66
 Ibid., p. 139.  
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social contexts. When considering difficulties such as how to balance conflicting 
rights, the experience of other jurisdictions can be helpful’.70 
 
3.2.1 Reasonable adjustments and disability in the United Kingdom 
  
The concept of making reasonable accommodation is not entirely foreign to UK anti-
discrimination legislation. From its inception in 1995, the law dealing with 
disability
71
 discrimination has contained a particular head of unlawful discrimination 
in the form of failure to provide ‘reasonable adjustments’.72 This is the only 
protected characteristic to which reasonable adjustments is expressly applied at the 
domestic level, save for limited examples in relation to pregnancy and maternity.
73
 
The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) introduced a duty to make reasonable 
adjustments in, for example, employment and the provision of goods and services, 
although the scope of the duty differed slightly across these contexts. The most 
relevant claim routes now constitute discrimination ‘arising from disability’ and the 
duty to make reasonable adjustments, both found in the EqA 2010.
74
  The former 
may be defended by the employer demonstrating that the treatment was a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
75
  Although these are both free-
standing causes of action
76
 they are inter-connected in that the former will fail if the 
employer has failed to make adjustments judged to be reasonable. 
 
In employment, the duty to make reasonable adjustments is reactive, not proactive: 
an employer need not, for example, make physical adjustments to the workplace if it 
                                                     
70
 Vickers, above n. 7, p. 179. 
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 For background commentary on the domestic system see A. Lawson, Disability and Equality Law 
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currently has no disabled employees.
77
 Moreover, it only arises if the employee 
knows, or could be reasonably expected to know that an employee is disabled.
78
  The 
EqA 2010 provides that the duty encompasses taking such steps as is reasonable to 
address three requirements
79
: i) where a provision, criterion or practice
80
 of A's puts a 
disabled person at a substantial disadvantage
81
 in relation to a relevant matter in 
comparison
82
 with persons who are not disabled; ii) where a physical feature puts a 
disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in 
comparison with persons who are not disabled; and, iii) where a disabled person 
would, but for the provision of an auxiliary aid, be put at a substantial disadvantage 
in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled. In 
order to trigger the duty the disabled employee must establish that one of the three s. 
20 requirements applies and that a particular, identifiable, adjustment would have 
assisted.
83
  It is then for the employer to defend its failure to comply with the duty, 
for example by showing that the adjustment would not be reasonable or that the 
adjustment would not have avoided the disadvantage.
84
  Although an employer is 
under no separate to duty to consult the employee to establish whether reasonable 
adjustments might be possible,
 85
  a failure to do so will not help its defence.
86
   
 
The EqA 2010 does not specify the kind of adjustments which may be made, 
although the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) Equality Act 2010: 
Code of Practice (Employment) (Code of Practice: Employment)
87
 replicates the kind 
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of examples which previously appeared in the DDA.
88
 These include reallocation of 
duties, transferring the disabled person to an existing vacancy; altering hours of 
work; assigning the disabled person to a different place of work or training; or 
allowing home working.
89
 While the nature of adjustments might differ in religious 
discrimination, the disability model is instructive if only because it reveals ‘[s]ome of 
the accommodations ... may be suitable for individuals who request an 
accommodation in order to allow them to practise their religion (where the law 
requires such accommodations)’.90  
 
The duty is restricted by the test of reasonableness
91
 which is judged objectively.
92
 
Although the onus is on the employer to decide what is ‘reasonable,’ suggestions by 
the worker should be considered.
93
 The Code of Practice: Employment mentions as 
relevant: whether taking any particular steps would be effective in preventing the 
substantial disadvantage; the practicability of the step; the financial and other costs 
of making the adjustment and the extent of any disruption caused; the extent of the 
employer’s financial or other resources; the availability to the employer of financial 
or other assistance to help make an adjustment; and the type and size of the 
employer.
94
 The Code of Practice: Employment also provides that it is unlikely to be 
a defence to argue that an adjustment was unreasonable because staff were 
obstructive or unhelpful when the employer tried to implement it. An employer 
would at least need to be able to show that they took such behaviour seriously and 
dealt with it appropriately.
95
 Reasonableness requires the adjustment to be both 
effective and not unduly onerous for the employer although on occasions the duty 
has been applied very generously in favour of employees.
96
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The duty to make reasonable adjustments applies also to the provision of goods and 
services.
97
 There are some differences from the employment scheme, in particular the 
fact that the duty is ultimately anticipatory
98
 but the general approach is the same as 
in employment and the EHRC has produced a guide outlining similar adjustments 
and criteria for ‘reasonableness’: Equality Act 2010: Code of Practice (Services, 
Public Functions and Associations).
99
 
 
Reasonable adjustments might seem to offer a useful comparison with reasonable 
accommodation of religion.  The legitimacy of applying it to religion has certainly 
been recognized: ‘[r]easonable adjustment (or accommodation) duties require duty-
bearers to recognise that individuals with certain characteristics (such as ... a 
particular religious belief) might be placed at a disadvantage by the application to 
them of conventional requirements or systems’.100 However, there are aspects of 
disability discrimination which mark it out as different from other protected 
characteristic of anti-discrimination law. The reasonable adjustments duty is 
asymmetrical:
101
 favourable treatment afforded to a disabled employee cannot be 
used as the basis for a claim by a disgruntled able-bodied employee. This is 
significant as religious discrimination is symmetrical: it protects both religion and 
belief and a lack of religion and belief.
102
 Of course, this does not present a barrier to 
reasonable accommodation of religion in Canada or the US. Nonetheless, the 
singular approach to reasonable adjustments for disability recognises that it is 
different from other protected characteristics: ‘formal guarantees of equal treatment 
without the provision of special support and access mechanisms for disabled persons 
will not be sufficient to achieve genuine equality of opportunity ... reasonable 
accommodation requirements are essential to address the exclusion of disabled 
persons’.103  There is a recognition that in order to achieve equality for those with 
disabilities there are times when they must be treated differently (that is, more 
                                                     
97
  EqA 2010, s. 29 and Schedule 2. Under the EqA 2010 provision of services is defined to include 
provision of goods and facilities: s. 31(2). See also the EqA 2010: Explanatory Notes, p. 30. 
98
 EqA 2010, Schedule 2, para. 2(2); EqA 2010: Explanatory Notes, para. 684; Doyle et al, above n. 
77, p. 86. 
99
 Available at: <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/EqualityAct/servicescode.pdf>, 
accessed 24
th
 August 2012.  
100
 Lawson, above n. 71, p. 1.  
101
 Archibald. 
102
 For reference to the definition of religion or belief, see chapter 3, sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
103
 N. Bamforth, M. Malik, and C. O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law: theory and context (London: 
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favourably) in order to realise the social goal of fuller participation in the labour 
market and society more generally.  As Baroness Hale has observed, disability 
discrimination ‘does not regard the differences between disabled people and others as 
irrelevant. It does not expect each to be treated in the same way. It expects 
reasonable adjustments to be made to cater for the special needs of disabled people. 
It necessarily entails an element of more favourable treatment’.104  
 
As such, there should be caution in directly applying the reasonable adjustments 
model to religion. It has been designed with disability as a characteristic in mind. To 
that extent, ‘where legal systems do establish an accommodation requirement to 
benefit individuals other than people with disabilities, evidence suggests that the 
standard required is frequently lower than that required for disability-related 
accommodations, meaning that it is far easier to justify a failure to make an 
accommodation’.105Arguably, therefore, the special nature of disability 
discrimination means that the reasonable adjustments analogy cannot necessarily be 
transferred in a straightforward way to the cases explored in Part IV. Nevertheless, 
reasonable adjustment issues will be footnoted during application of the Canadian 
and US models where they present useful points of comparison.  
 
3.3 Locating reasonable accommodation in anti-discrimination law 
 
It is necessary to discern a firm basis for applying reasonable accommodation to 
domestic situations of religion and discrimination. This will aid in understanding the 
wider legal impact of applying the comparative models at the domestic level. 
 
The doctrine is usually found in anti-discrimination law and is viewed as an 
alternative option to a claim in direct or indirect discrimination. There are good 
reasons for protecting discrimination against individuals, the disadvantageous effects 
of which are often harmful and unfair:
106
 central amongst these reasons is the concept 
of equality, already noted
107
 as a principle (intertwined with human dignity and 
autonomy) upon which legal protection of religion can be based. In discussing 
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equality, and critiquing formal equality (the notion that all classes of individual 
receive the same equal treatment), Connolly notes that ‘in cases involving religion 
claimants will often be seeking different rather than equal treatment’.108 Different 
treatment as the basis of a claim lies behind the operation of indirect discrimination; 
the same is true for reasonable accommodation. However, this is more subtle in 
relation to the latter. Whilst indirect discrimination uses this differentiation in 
determining an outcome (as based on a comparator test) this is not the case with 
reasonable accommodation. It has no such comparator test, focusing solely on any 
omission to provide a reasonable accommodation in the first place. Consequently, 
any resulting equality of opportunity is reached in contrasting ways: ‘reasonable 
accommodation discrimination typically emerges in response to the failure to make 
an adaptation to ensure equal opportunities and commonly does not follow from 
differentiation on a forbidden or seemingly neutral ground’.109 Nevertheless, there 
must be an initial particular characteristic of which religion or belief is one, with 
Schiek et al reasoning that ‘[t]he obligation to make a reasonable accommodation is 
based on the recognition that, on occasions, the interaction between an individual’s 
inherent characteristic ... and the physical or social environment can result in the 
inability to perform a particular function or job in the conventional manner’.110 
 
This moves the debate in the direction of substantive equality. Whilst the term 
‘equality’ is contested,111 commentators have been able to agree that substantive 
equality connotes the idea that ‘equality does not need to include the ‘same’ 
treatment, but may instead involve different groups being able to pursue their version 
of the good life’.112 At a basic level, this underlies indirect discrimination which ‘is 
more concerned with the effects of any behaviour, rather than the nature of the 
behaviour itself’,113 revealing an emphasis on ‘the detrimental impact of rules on less 
powerful groups’.114 Consequently, ‘equality law must be concerned with both 
                                                     
108
 Ibid., p. 6 (original emphasis). 
109
 L. Waddington and A. Hendriks, ‘The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: from direct and indirect discrimination to reasonable accommodation discrimination’ (2002) 
18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 403, p. 426. 
110
 Schiek et al, above n. 72, p. 631. 
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individuals and groups’.115 Reasonable accommodation clearly centres its attention 
on detrimental impact at the level of the individual. However, it sidelines the group 
to which the individual belongs meaning that it does not seek to ensure equality of 
opportunity for all – only the person seeking accommodation. This affirms the view 
that it is ‘generally framed in terms of an individual right ... [meaning] that 
individuals, pertaining to a covered group, are entitled to require that an 
accommodation is made which takes account of their specific needs’.116 Accordingly, 
‘it allows for an individualised approach to providing protection’,117 which might 
better target the religious protection gaps already identified in domestic indirect 
discrimination cases. As well as being based on equality, reasonable accommodation 
has also been seen as a way of specifically enhancing human dignity. This is perhaps 
unremarkable given that dignity can underpin the religious interests of individuals
118
 
with which reasonable accommodation is exclusively concerned. Moon has argued 
that reasonable accommodation ‘underpins dignity, and in so doing it implies a need 
to be ready to adapt to the diverse situations of people from different 
backgrounds’.119  
 
The above signifies that it is possible to arrive at a broadly coherent theoretical and 
conceptual understanding of reasonable accommodation. It provides individualised 
protection benefits which find a basis in dignity and (substantive) equality. At a more 
doctrinal level, it provides an additional discrimination claim route which takes 
account of individual differences and investigates modifications to help support those 
differences. Whilst it is susceptible to a proportionality analysis (similar to indirect 
discrimination), a key difference with reasonable accommodation is that 
‘disadvantage is not necessarily experienced by all or most members of a particular 
group, but is ... experienced on the individual level, depending on both individual 
and environmental factors.
120
 This buttresses its individual-centric nature. The 
emphasis is ultimately on proportionality to undertake the work in determining 
whether an individual should be accommodated. As will be seen in chapters seven 
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and eight, proportionality in reasonable accommodation is often guided by 
imposition of a set standard of review and, additionally, prescription of identifiable 
and concrete factors which help guide courts in reaching a decision. This 
distinguishes it from indirect discrimination.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Reasonable accommodation offers a new form of religious ‘exception’ to a wide 
array of situations. Such additional protection may be predicated on the basis that 
religion in some circumstances deserves special treatment. This coheres with the 
principles of human dignity, autonomy and equality which already apply to religion 
law and the religious exceptions assessed in Part II; these principles are equally 
consistent with either a collective or individually orientated focus on religious 
liberty. Recent domestic case law concerning religion in the spheres of employment 
and goods and services provision highlights the various jurisprudential deficiencies 
of indirect discrimination: this has resulted in the characterisation of three areas of 
clash to which comparative models of reasonable accommodation can be applied. 
Reasonable accommodation’s focus on the individual, and the precise and attuned 
way in which it explores ways of achieving equality of opportunity for the 
individual, makes it an attractive alternative solution to indirect discrimination.  
 
As a consequence of its distinct doctrinal make-up, reasonable accommodation 
places great prominence on proportionality as the main filtering device, balancing 
whether, and if so how far, a practical accommodation can be made in the face of a 
legitimate aim. Proportionality will be the prime focus in Part IV when applying the 
comparative models explored in chapters seven and eight. The cases to which the 
models will be applied will be those outlined above in the context of employment. As 
will be seen, the comparative models are not as yet developed in the provision of 
goods and services, although the possible effect of reasonable accommodation on the 
cases outlined above in this field will be briefly considered in chapter nine.
121
 Where 
domestic cases have been argued both at first instance and on appeal, decisions at all 
levels will be considered. This is in order to take maximum advantage of the 
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domestic treatment of the facts in all decisions. Of course, reasonable 
accommodation could also be applied to unsuccessful Article 9 cases; however, 
given that the doctrine has been predominately conceived of as a device in anti-
discrimination law, and given that this thesis is concerned with special treatment of 
religion in anti-discrimination law, the emphasis remains on the anti-discrimination 
field.  
100 
 
CHAPTER 7: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF 
RELIGION IN CANADA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Reasonable accommodation plays a critical role in helping Canadian courts 
determine religious issues.
1
 Its existence has enabled judges to fine-tune ways in 
which a balance may be struck between the interests of the religious individual and 
other parties. The rule ‘essentially allows an individual who is detrimentally affected 
by an otherwise neutral norm the possibility to require, as a matter of law, to be 
accommodated. This accommodation ... essentially consists in the bending of an 
existing norm or in the creation of a particularized regime for the claimant (whether 
through an exemption or through a specific permission to do something)’.2 Whilst the 
aim of reasonable accommodation is to accord an individual remedy, ‘the individual 
decision has a clear impact on others in similar situations’.3 Indeed, it expects that ‘a 
consideration of the relationship between those different persons’ rights and 
freedoms is required. Accommodation encompasses the adjustment of a rule, 
practice, condition or requirement so as to take into account the specific needs of an 
individual or group’.4 Adjustment ‘does not require that a regulation or statute be 
abrogated, rather that its discriminatory effects be mitigated’.5  In this chapter the 
substantive law on reasonable accommodation in Canada will be traced after a brief 
exploration of legal protection for religion in Canada – in particular, non-
discrimination on grounds of religion. 
                                                     
1
 Its development in relation to religion has also been of particular interest to Canadian campaigners 
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2. LAW AND RELIGION IN CANADA 
 
The laws protecting religion in Canada are varied and complex. Religious interests 
are protected under anti-discrimination provisions and the right to freedom of 
religion,
6
 although this protection exists in different forms across Canada’s legal 
system at both the federal and provincial levels. This means that whilst laws 
protecting religious freedom and religious discrimination exist at the federal level, 
individual provinces also operate separate and distinct legal provisions relating to 
these guarantees,
7
 the consequence being that ‘[t]he wording of the various 
provisions differs’.8 The doctrine of reasonable accommodation predominately 
operates in religious discrimination
9
  claims (as opposed to freedom of religion 
claims), although any differences in the various provincial discrimination codes are 
insignificant given that these laws follow the same basic model whatever the 
province, making little difference to the outcome of a case.
10
  To that end, relevant 
decisions of Canada’s Supreme Court and lower courts will be considered below, 
taking into account similar federal or provincial religion laws where necessary. 
 
2.1 Religious discrimination mechanisms in Canada 
 
In bringing a reasonable accommodation claim, the appropriate anti-discrimination 
mechanism must be identified and followed. Discrimination on the basis of religion, 
together with other protected grounds, is protected as a constitutional right under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 (the Charter).
11
 This right, along 
with all others contained in the Charter, ‘operates to limit all provincial and national 
legislation’12 where it has a discriminatory effect on an individual. However, it is 
limited by the language of s. 1 which guarantees the rights contained therein ‘subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
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free and democratic society’. This check, which also applies to the other rights 
contained in the Charter,
13
 is unremarkable: it provides the standard point at which a 
court can determine how far non-discrimination can be guaranteed. However, the 
right in s. 15(1) is clearly limited to actions against the state itself: it ‘does not apply 
to private law’14 and may only be invoked against the actions of the Canadian 
government, its entities and agents. It ‘aims to prevent governments from enforcing 
laws or policies, absent a compelling justification, that have the purpose or effect of 
coercing individuals to abandon sincerely held religious beliefs or practices’.15  
 
This means that further provisions are required to protect against discrimination in 
private situations. Such protection is provided by the Canadian Human Rights Act 
1985 (CHRA) on the grounds of, amongst others, religion.
16
 This applies in the 
spheres of employment
17
 and the provision of goods and services
18
. Nevertheless, the 
CHRA ‘has a limited application to federal institutions and federally governed 
institutions such as the federal government, banks, airlines, [schools] and the 
Canadian armed forces’.19 As a result, its application is confined to ‘private parties 
operating under federal law’.20 Indeed, where private individuals wish to pursue 
religious discrimination claims against other private individuals in the areas of 
employment, private education and goods and services, those parties will be subject 
to the relevant discrimination provisions – or ‘sister statutes’21 of the CHRA – which 
apply in the province or territory in which they are located. These ‘statutory 
provisions on religious discrimination in all Canadian jurisdictions make it illegal for 
... private actors to erect religious barriers to equal access to employment, housing, or 
services, unless the actor responsible ... can demonstrate that it was not possible to 
accommodate religious beliefs or practices’.22 This is reinforced by the fact that 
‘each province has a Human Rights Act and/or Charter that specifically enacts 
                                                     
13
 For example, freedom of religion as contained in s. 2. 
14
 Commandé, above n. 3, p. 19. 
15
 B. Ryder, ‘The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship’, in R. Moon (ed.), Law and 
Religious Pluralism in Canada (University of British Columbia Press: Vancouver, 2008), p. 87. 
16
 S. 3(1).  
17
 S. 7.  
18
 S. 5.  
19
 Moon, above n. 4,p. 697. 
20
 Commandé, above n. 3, p.19. 
21
 C. Cheng, ‘Re-evaluating Reasonable Accommodation: adapting the Canadian proof structure to 
achieve the ADA’s equal opportunity goal’ (2009 – 2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Business Law 581, p. 596. 
22
 Ryder, in Moon, above n. 13, p. 87. 
103 
 
[discrimination] law. There are slightly different provisions from province to 
province’.23 On a procedural point, ‘the discrimination decisions of provincial courts 
are subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada;’24 moreover, ‘all specific 
Charters from the different provinces must abide by [the Charter’s] … principles as 
they emerge from case law’.25  These various claim routes are outlined for contextual 
purposes only; it is not necessary to apply them to the domestic cases considered in 
chapters nine to eleven.  
 
3. ASSESSING DISCRIMINATION IN CANADA 
 
Where an individual wishes to pursue a discrimination claim in Canada on the basis 
of religion (or any other protected characteristic) there is no need to distinguish 
between direct and indirect discrimination. After British Columbia (Public Service 
Employee Relations Comm) v. BCGEU (known as the ‘Meiorin’ case in which a 
female fire-fighter won a sex discrimination claim and the right to be reasonably 
accommodated in fitness tests which favoured men)
26
 a single ‘unified’ approach to 
determining prima facie discrimination now exists.
27
 In relation to religion this 
includes investigation of whether there is an indentified religious belief, the extent to 
which this is sincere and how far that belief is the basis for the claim. This indicates 
that ‘the Canadian courts have taken a fairly subjective approach when determining a 
person’s religion, allowing self-determination to individuals and groups in terms of 
their religious identity’.28 
 
4. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION DUTY  
 
The Canadian reasonable accommodation duty ‘is an idea familiar ... in the context 
of employment’.29 To be sure, ‘[r]easonable accommodation arose in the context of 
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employment law as a way to articulate the necessary standard to be used by 
employers in dealing with requests for exemption from particular work requirements. 
These requests for exemption usually arose in relation to religious beliefs’.30 
Nevertheless, the concept has also been transferred to other discrimination areas in 
Canada, notably goods and services provision 
31
 although it will be seen that the test 
has developed almost exclusively in employment.
32
  
 
Where discrimination on a protected ground, including religion, is prima facie found, 
it is necessary to investigate whether the discriminatory act constitutes a bona fide 
occupational requirement or whether it may be subject to a general justification in 
favour of the discrimination. In relation to both of these: 
 
[s]ome codes additionally impose a duty on the employer to accommodate 
religious difference … In those provinces which do not have this additional 
duty, however, the duty is imported through the question of whether the 
occupational requirement is bona fide: if no reasonable accommodation has 
been made then an occupational requirement will not be bona fide, and so 
will not provide an exception to the non-discrimination rule. Similarly, where 
a general ‘reasonable and justifiable’ defence is used, the question of whether 
there was an attempt to accommodate can be relevant to the question of 
justification.
33
 
 
Consequently, it can be seen that the doctrine of reasonable accommodation is 
incorporated as part of the test for assessing the legitimacy of the type of 
discrimination. To this extent it has been observed that: 
 
[u]nder Canadian law, the notion of reasonable accommodation is conceived 
of as a derivation of the equality principle and more specifically of the 
prohibition of indirect discrimination, namely the discrimination resulting 
from the prejudicial impact of a facially neutral provision, practice or policy. 
The duty of accommodation, construed as a corollary of the prohibition of 
indirect discrimination, is the duty for the author of a provision, practice or 
policy, which de facto penalizes an individual on the basis of a prohibited 
ground of discrimination, to take into account as far as possible the specific 
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needs of that individual and to protect him or her from the discriminatory 
effects of such provision, practice or policy. 
34
 
  
The duty may be categorised as free-standing – once a bona fide occupational 
requirement has been identified – or, alternatively, read as forming part of the bona 
fide occupational requirement test itself. If no bona fide occupational requirement 
issue is identified then the duty of reasonable accommodation will become germane 
to a general justification defence. This test of reasonable accommodation may be 
codified in law. For example, at the federal level, the CHRA requires that any bona 
fide occupational requirement
35
 or bona fide justification
36
 must be subject to a 
reasonable accommodation consideration.
37
 Moreover, some statutes at the 
provincial level also make reference to the concept of ‘reasonableness’ when 
assessing justification: see, for example, s. 11 of the Alberta Human Rights, 
Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act, RSA 2000 in relation to employment
38
 and s. 
8(1) of the British Columbia Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, in relation to the 
provision of accommodation, services and facilities.
39
  
 
Even where reasonable accommodation has not been explicitly codified, the 
Canadian common law has ‘read in’ an ‘overarching duty to accommodate’40 – as is 
clear from Meiorin: 
 
[a]n employer may justify the impugned standard by establishing on the 
balance of probabilities:  
(1) that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected 
to the performance of the job; and, 
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(2) that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good 
faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-
related purpose; and, 
(3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that 
legitimate work-related purpose.  To show that the standard is reasonably 
necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate 
individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without 
imposing undue hardship upon the employer.
41
 
 
As a result, ‘the duty can be understood to form part of the common law’.42 In any 
event, whether part of the common law or statute, the courts in Canada have made 
much use of reasonable accommodation to determine how a discriminatory situation 
should be resolved. Indeed, ‘[g]uidance from the courts has developed [the] concept 
extensively.’43  
 
4.1 The duty in employment 
  
Where discrimination on a protected ground is found, the test of reasonable 
accommodation requires demonstration that such accommodation would impose 
‘undue hardship’ on the discriminator. This requirement is contained at the federal 
level in the CHRA
44
 – as already highlighted the Charter does not make reference to 
the test of reasonable accommodation in relation to discrimination rights. At 
common law it emerged in the mid-1980s in Ontario Human Rights Commission 
(O’Malley) v. Simpson Sears (O’Malley),45 a case where the Canadian Supreme 
Court found that an employer had not sufficiently accommodated a religious 
employee whose religion forbade her from working between sundown on Fridays 
and sundown on Saturdays.  
 
Before undue hardship can be explored it is necessary to set out the factors an 
employer may cite in relation to which an accommodation would cause undue 
hardship. Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission) 
(Alberta)
46
 provides guidance on what factors will be legitimate in establishing 
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undue hardship. The case concerned a dairy worker who did not wish to work on 
Easter Monday. The court required the worker’s employers to reasonably 
accommodate the request and in doing so set out ‘a non-exhaustive list of criteria to 
be considered,’47 noting that it was ‘not ...  necessary to provide a comprehensive 
definition of what constitutes undue hardship’.48 This list49 focuses on reasons for 
resisting an accommodation request (either in full or part) and is applicable 
throughout Canadian discrimination law across all protected characteristics. Of 
course, the specific facts of a claim are likely to determine how far the criteria in 
Alberta are useful – it has been said that ‘it is up to the organisation to prove the 
contextual unreasonableness of the demand’.50  
 
Reasons cited in support of undue hardship have to be proportionate, as noted by 
Vickers.
 51
 Moreover, in isolation, the phrase ‘undue hardship’ does little to 
illuminate the actual boundary at which a balance can be found.
52
 Helpfully, later 
cases have more clearly defined the parameters of ‘undue hardship’, outlining a strict 
standard for employers. In Meiorin, ‘the Court held that to show that a requirement 
was necessary, an employer had to show that the accommodation of the individual in 
question was impossible without imposing undue hardship on the employer’.53 This 
demonstrates that Canadian courts have interpreted the undue hardship test so as to 
impose a very high expectation on employers that they will attempt to accommodate 
in some way; conversely, the test may be seen to be generous to employees. It has 
been declared that ‘employers ... must demonstrate that they have made every effort 
to accommodate an employee and that it would be impossible to modify or eliminate 
a particular requirement without incurring undue hardship’.54  
 
The high threshold for undue hardship requires that, aside from interrogating the 
employer’s legitimate reasons in responding to an accommodation claim, sharp focus 
is also placed on how each of these relate to the employee’s circumstances in the 
workplace – in particular, the nature of their job, the extent of responsibilities aligned 
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to that job, the possible terms of any accommodation and how these might impact 
upon the employer’s environment. To this extent, ‘the decision on what 
accommodation is reasonable and what hardship is undue ... requires a balancing of 
interests and is based on a proportionality test’.55 This sets up an intriguing if not 
precarious equilibrium between the employee’s arguments for a practical 
accommodation in their circumstances and the legitimate reasons (which might 
involve a mixture practice or policy) of the employer in addressing accommodation. 
The context and facts of a case will be critical when determining the point at which 
undue hardship and impossibility will be found. Whilst it is true that the Canadian 
courts put the onus on both parties to compromise,
56
 the employee is also encouraged 
to aid in the search for a solution and accept offers that may fall short of full 
accommodation.
57
 The significance of this for comparative purposes is that the high 
threshold of impossibility permits, if not requires, a highly attuned analysis, 
necessitating a detailed and forensic assessment of all the issues, including not only 
those relating to the employer but also those which might affect the employee. This 
necessitates a more complete interrogation of all accommodation options comprising 
those which either fully or partially meet the employee’s request(s).  
 
Of course, in some cases the facts will inevitably raise separate matters which fall 
outside the non-exhaustive Alberta list.
58
 This was confirmed in Chambly 
(Commission Scolaire Regionale) v. Bergevin (Chambly)
59
 where it was said that 
‘[t]hese factors are not engraved in stone. They should be applied with common 
sense and flexibility in the context of the factual situation presented in each case’.60  
Consequently, it is clear that the list in Alberta, ‘must be adapted to the contexts in 
which accommodation requests are made’,61 suggesting that whilst the reasonable 
accommodation case law is of indicative use, the context of a given discrimination 
dispute will be critical in looking at the totality of factors that must be considered 
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outside the Alberta criteria and sign-posted accordingly. The express Alberta 
criteria
62
 are as follows: 
 
4.1.1 Financial cost to the employer 
 
Predictably, financial impact upon an employer is one of the usual determiners in 
assessing undue hardship. Here, the courts have taken a case-by-case approach 
depending on the facts and context. Some requests have required the employer to 
bear the full financial burden where their actions are perceived as wholly 
unreasonable. For example, in Chambly a school’s requirement that Jewish staff use 
unpaid leave to celebrate Yom Kippur amounted to religious discrimination and an 
accompanying failure of reasonable accommodation. This was particularly because 
the absence would only be on an annual basis; moreover, no evidence had been 
adduced by the school to show that accommodating this holiday request and paying 
staff to take it would amount to undue hardship. It was contended that ‘[t]here was 
no proof presented by the respondent School Board, that to pay the salaries of the 
Jewish teachers would impose an unreasonable financial burden upon it’.63 However, 
it was stated that ‘if the religious beliefs of a teacher required his or her absence 
every Friday throughout the year, then it might well be impossible for the employer 
to reasonably accommodate that teacher's religious beliefs and requirements’.64 This 
signifies that, in relation to employee absence from work, employers will only be 
liable for the full cost where employee absences are sporadic.  
 
In relation to more regular absences, the existence of a reasonable accommodation 
requirement does ‘not require that religious adherence be cost-free for the 
employee’.65 This was the case in O’Malley which concerned a worker who was 
Seventh Day Adventist requesting absence from work from sunset on Friday to 
sunset on Saturday. Here, the court ruled
66
 that in situations like this, and even more 
so where an employer has gone to sufficient lengths to accommodate an employee, 
‘it is not unreasonable for some cost to be put on the employee, who may be faced 
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with the option of choosing employment of full religious observance’67 (it should be 
noted that, on the basis that the employer in O’Malley had made no effort to 
accommodate, it was found that the duty to accommodate had not been satisfied). 
Nevertheless, based on the approach in O’Malley this would once more be context-
specific depending on the regularity and level of financial inconvenience the 
employer would suffer, with the balance favouring the religious employee.  
 
4.1.2 Disruption of a collective agreement 
 
Where there is a multi-party agreement across employer, employees and any relevant 
union, this will not necessarily frustrate any determination of the best mode of 
accommodation for a particular employee. This is clear from Central Okanagan 
School District Number 23 v. Renaud (Renaud)
68
 which held that ‘a collective 
agreement could not automatically stand in the way of a necessary 
accommodation’.69 It was said that, ‘[o]n the employer’s part this may involve 
flexibility’.70 This can be interpreted as meaning that even where a union to which an 
employee belongs does not support a call for accommodation – perhaps because it 
has itself sanctioned the work practice the employee complains about – there may 
still be a requirement of accommodation on the employer and the union. Notably, a 
union may be required to modify a rule with an employer ‘by participating in the 
formulation of the work rule that has the discriminatory effect [in the first place]’.71 
However, this will not of course be absolute: ‘[s]ubstantial departure from the normal 
operation of the conditions and terms of employment in the collective agreement 
may constitute undue interference in the operation of the employer's business’.72 
 
4.1.3 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
How far should an employer be required to reasonably accommodate an employee 
where this may adversely affect the morale of that employer’s workforce? In Renaud 
                                                     
67
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a religious employee refused to work on days he designated as religious by virtue of 
the religion he followed. He was subsequently dismissed. Part of the employer’s case 
was that to accommodate such requests would be unpopular with other staff 
members. However, the court rejected this and advised that ‘such considerations 
should be applied with caution. The fact that an accommodation may be unpopular 
with others in the workplace is not sufficient of itself to amount to undue hardship … 
[T]o decide otherwise would enable an employer to contract out of its human rights 
obligations as long as other employees are ‘ad idem’ with the employer on the 
issue’.73 Whilst the court left open the idea that the perspective of the disadvantaged 
groups is not the only relevant one,
74
 it appears that a high threshold will be applied 
to instances of reasonable accommodation where the morale of other workers is 
concerned. This impression is buttressed by Sopinka J’s comments that ‘[t]he 
employer must establish that actual interference with the rights of other employees, 
which is not trivial but substantial, will result from the adoption of the 
accommodating measures.  Minor interference or inconvenience is the price to be 
paid for religious freedom in a multicultural society’.75 This reflects the fact that 
other workers’ opinions on the virtue of the religious accommodation request should 
not be an automatic bar to accommodation success; far from it, employee opinions 
will only be taken into account where there is a large proportion of the workforce 
who complain that their rights whilst at work will be affected by accommodation.  
 
4.1.4 The inter-changeability of workforce and facilities 
 
In relation to this factor the courts have positioned the balance more evenly as 
between employer and employee. In Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Social 
Services) (Moore)
76
 a Roman Catholic religious employee refused to perform 
elements of her job on conscientious grounds. She worked as a Financial Aid Worker 
for the Ministry of Social Services in the Province of British Columbia, her 
responsibilities including the determination of individuals’ eligibility for benefits. 
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She decided to refuse financial assistance to a female who required an abortion, her 
decision having been made behind the scenes for religious reasons. She was 
subsequently dismissed. Her refusal could be construed as constructing an indirect 
clash between religion and another protected discrimination characteristic, 
specifically sex (given that only females have abortions).
 77
 However, the British 
Columbia Council of Human Rights was not of the view that such a clash should 
preclude an accommodation where this was possible at a practical level for the 
employer. As with O’Malley, it was found that, because no steps had been taken to 
reasonably accommodate her, Moore had suffered religious discrimination. Indeed, 
other workers could have been reassigned to cover the employee’s refusal at no extra 
inconvenience and without an increase in the work load of other employees.
78
 
Vickers also notes this in commenting that ‘requests of the type refused by [the 
employee] were relatively infrequent, and other workers could have been asked to 
deal with them’79 whilst, similarly, Lafferty emphasises that: 
 
it would not have created undue hardship on either the employer or ... fellow 
employees to re-assign any files that would require [the employee] to make 
decisions contrary to her religious beliefs. If [she] had been the only 
employee able to approve an application for abortion, it is less clear that she 
would have been able to maintain both her exclusive religious belief and her 
employment at the expense of the inclusiveness necessary to serve the public 
and meet public expectations.
80
 
 
The decision of the court in Moore was replicated in Jones v. Eisler 
81
 where an 
employee who was a Jehovah’s Witness was dismissed because he refused to be 
involved with a Christmas display for religious reasons. There had been a total 
failure of reasonable accommodation as the employer had made no efforts to address 
the employee’s complaint.  
 
Although the basis for these decisions lies in the fact that no steps whatsoever were 
taken to accommodate the employees, Vickers has further remarked that in future 
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cases it might be useful and helpful for employer and religious employee to arrive at 
an arrangement as to what obligations such an employee may or may not be happy to 
do. Given that in Moore, the ‘failure [of the employee] to disclose her religious bias 
at the outset did not ... go to the merits of the case, only to remedy’,82 Vickers has 
observed that the judgment ‘does not place much responsibility on the employee to 
avoid the problem of clashes between religious scruple and compliance with the 
employer’s reasonable job requirements … [I]t may well be that in some cases the 
onus will pass to the employee not to undertake work which he or she is unable fully 
to perform on religious grounds’.83 This has been affirmed by others who have 
remarked that ‘[i]ndividual employees also have the obligation to inform their 
employer and union of their special accommodation needs’.84 Likewise, where an 
arrangement not to undertake a particular obligation is formalised between employer 
and religious employee it may be the case that a one-off request to perform that 
obligation would be reasonable depending on the employer’s reasons for the one-off 
request. In such a situation it may be the court’s view that for the religious employee 
to refuse to undertake the one-off obligation would impose undue hardship on the 
employer: for example, during unusually busy period of business. Conversely, where 
a religious employee makes a one-off request, it is unlikely to be viewed as undue 
hardship on the employer to fully accommodate that request. In Alberta it was 
submitted that ‘[i]f the employer could cope with an employee's being sick or away 
on vacation on Mondays, it could surely accommodate a similarly isolated absence of 
an employee due to religious obligation’.85  
 
The cooperation of other employees is often needed when an employee requires an 
accommodation by way of a timetabling change. If the putative accommodation were 
to affect their spirit or morale they may well refuse in order to frustrate that particular 
accommodation. However, the employer must at least ‘canvass this possibility’86 to 
establish real proof of undue hardship. In relation to the knock-on effects of any 
accommodation of a religious employee on other workers, Swinton has underscored 
the need to recall that ‘it is not just the employer or the abstract “enterprise” being 
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asked to accommodate, but the other employees whose contractual rights and 
expectations are detrimentally affected’.87 It is not obvious that this should extend to 
taking into account the opinions of other workers on the religious accommodation 
request when asking for cooperation in swapping duties. To do so, as seems 
consistent with the Canadian approach, might operate harshly in some situations and 
lead to circumstances where other employees could be maliciously uncooperative. 
Hambler has commented on the potential inappropriateness of taking into account 
other employees’ views, arguing that ‘sympathy for minority positions cannot be 
guaranteed from other employees, particularly if there is likely to be some 
inconvenience for members of the majority, however minor, in making adjustments 
in the workplace’.88 Vickers highlights that, in relation to this matter, ‘[i]t remains to 
be seen whether the discontent of other workers will be a factor that allows 
employers to justify refusing to give priority to religious staff’.89  
 
4.1.5 The size of the employer 
 
This is a factor which relates not only to the financial burden an employer should 
bear in reasonably accommodating an individual but also the practical challenges 
they may face in making suitable accommodation.
90
 It is submitted that where an 
employer’s organisation is larger this is likely to reduce the financial and practical 
burdens shouldered in the search for reasonable accommodation although, as with 
the other criteria considered here, this could depend on the facts of any individual 
case. To the extent that the size of the employer has an effect on the practical 
difficulties faced in accommodating an employee, there is also a clear link back to 
the previous criterion concerning the inter-changeability of the workforce and 
facilities.  
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4.1.6 Where safety is in issue, both the magnitude of the risk and the identity of those 
who bear it  
 
Under this requirement the favourable balance in favour of the employee’s right to be 
accommodated – as set against the level of undue hardship created for the employer 
– has been inverted. In Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway (Bhinder),91 a case 
assessing a Sikh worker’s refusal to wear a hard hat at work in his maintenance job 
in order that he could wear his turban, a majority of the Supreme Court found that the 
hard-hat requirement was a bona fide occupational requirement and that his religious 
dress did not need to be accommodated: to do so would impose undue hardship on 
the employer. Notably, it was said by Dickson CJ for the minority that an 
accommodation would not have had any deleterious effect on the public or the 
application of the employer’s safety policy regarding other employees.92 The 
majority’s decision in Bhinder, which seemed to provide a defence for many 
workplace rules that imposed serious burdens on protected groups,
93
 was mirrored in 
Pannu v. Skeena Cellulose Inc
94
 where a no-beard rule imposed on a Sikh employee 
for health and safety reasons was upheld. His work required him to wear a close-
fitting mask. It was found that ‘the failure to adapt a rule to accommodate a Sikh 
employee was not discriminatory as health and safety concerns prevail over religious 
interests’.95 These decisions are in contrast to the freedom of religion judgment in 
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys
96
 by the Canadian Supreme 
Court where there was no contravention of health and safety rules in allowing a boy 
to wear his kirpan at school.
97
 
 
4.2 The duty in goods and services provision  
 
The factors listed relate to the employment sphere; as such, they do not appear 
transferable to the field of goods and services provision. Nevertheless, whilst 
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reasonable accommodation case law in Canada has been limited to employment there 
is evidence to suggest that should religious discrimination be pursued in goods and 
services provision then the test of undue hardship might be applied.
98
 A key 
indication as to this stems from the fact that the Meiorin test, requiring impossibility 
as to undue hardship, has now been imported into goods and services provision 
across all protected characteristics. This was indicated in British Columbia 
(Superintendant of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights) 
(the ‘Grismer’ case),99 a disability discrimination matter concerning a partially 
sighted individual’s challenge to the revocation of his driving licence. The Canadian 
Supreme Court stated that ‘[t]here is more than one way to establish that the 
necessary level of accommodation has not been provided,’100 and went on to find that 
the threshold of undue hardship where goods and services provision is concerned – 
as in the employment sphere – is considerably high, imposing a substantial burden on 
the relevant provider to accommodate the service user.
101
 The Supreme Court held 
that where a service user requires accommodation by a service provider, the service 
provider will have to demonstrate a bona fide justification. This means it will have to 
show: 
 
(1)   it adopted the standard for a purpose or goal that is rationally connected 
to the function being performed; and, 
(2)   it adopted the standard in good faith, in the belief that it is necessary for 
the fulfilment of the purpose or goal; and 
(3)   the standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose or goal, in 
the sense that the defendant cannot accommodate persons with the 
characteristics of the claimant without incurring undue hardship.
102
 
 
However, the final hurdle is still the test of undue hardship which remains set at a 
high level in the spirit of Meiorin.  
 
In the absence of religious discrimination cases in goods and services provision, 
there are freedom of religion decisions which provide some assistance as to the 
balance between accommodation and undue hardship. In support of this it has been 
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said that ‘religious freedoms and religious equality rights are allied in advancing the 
right of religious persons to participate equally in Canadian society without 
abandoning the tenets of their faith. The core idea is that society must accommodate 
individuals’ freedom to hold and express religious beliefs and engage in religious 
practices unless doing so would interfere with the rights of others or with compelling 
social interests’.103 Indeed, regarding this overlap Beaman has argued that the 
language of limits in s. 1 of the Charter has a number of different forms, including 
an assessment of the need for reasonable accommodation.
104
 
 
These cases are charted here for illustrative purposes to show that, whilst a 
reasonable accommodation analysis was not used, the idea of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ appears in the courts’ reasoning in religious freedom cases105 
relating to goods and services provision. For example, in Scott Brockie and Imaging 
Excellence Inc v. Ray Brillinger (No. 2) (Brockie),
106
 the owner refused to print 
stationery for a local lesbian and gay group as he felt this violated his right to 
freedom of religion. Whilst the service provider in Brockie invoked his right to 
religious freedom and not religious discrimination (this contrasting with Grismer 
where a disabled service user pursued a discrimination claim), the court still seemed 
to view the ultimate question of prescribed limits through the lens of reasonable 
accommodation. This clash of rights was resolved by the court requiring the service 
provider to actually provide the service in question: however, it ‘reasonably 
accommodated’ him to the extent that he would not be required to print any material 
which could reasonably be considered to be in direct conflict with his core beliefs. 
As such, this required him to provide basic printing services to the group, for 
example producing ordinary materials such as envelopes and letterheads. Had the test 
for undue hardship been applied the same view could be taken that it was not 
impossible to accommodate the service provider even where this would have meant 
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compromising part of the service offered. Moon draws attention to similar cases 
regarding service providers, notably instances where Muslim taxi or bus drivers have 
withheld their services from blind people where such provision of such a service 
might necessitate close or physical contact with a guide dog, Islam forbidding 
proximity with canines.
 107
 However, in these situations the religious service 
provider’s risk of contact with a dog was weighed as less important than the interests 
of a blind service user’s needs.108 It is difficult to reconcile these decisions with 
Brockie on one particular view: that it might be argued as ‘impossible’ to 
accommodate a service provider where their refusal (based on religious conviction) 
to provide the service required cannot be reasonably accommodated without 
effectively removing the service completely.
109
   
 
Notably, the language of reasonable accommodation was not used in Syndicat 
Northcrest v. Amselem,
110
 another freedom of religion claim. This was based on s. 2 
of the Charter in relation to Jews who wished to erect temporary succahs
111
 on 
balconies of residential buildings they partly owned, the co-owners of the building 
claiming this contravened their own property rights. The case had originated in 
Québec under the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, an instrument 
applying only to private law relationships, and, whilst the Canadian government was 
not involved in what was essentially a private dispute, the Charter itself was invoked 
as providing the appropriate test for freedom of religion at the level of the Supreme 
Court. Here, the majority performed a straightforward analysis of s. 2 as balanced 
against the s. 1 test of ‘reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society’. It was found (without recourse to any 
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notion of reasonable accommodation) that the appellants’ freedom of religion would 
only have minimally impacted on the respondent’s property rights.112  Moreover, 
whilst disagreeing with the majority on this balance, the minority went further in 
declaring that reasonable accommodation was irrelevant to a Charter analysis.
113
  
 
In a significant development, the Canadian Supreme Court has recently confirmed its 
rejection of the possibility of reasonable accommodation having any role to play in 
analysis of s. 1 Charter limits where the circumstances are analogous to the 
discrimination spheres – at least so far in relation to freedom of religion. In Alberta v. 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (Hutterian Brethren)
114
 members of a religious 
community who believed they could not consent to being photographed were forced 
to have their photographs on driving licences (the provision of such licences being a 
service provided by the government). As service users they claimed a violation of 
their freedom of religion under s. 2 of the Charter. However, in relation to 
reasonable accommodation it was said by a majority of the Canadian Supreme Court 
that ‘a distinction must be maintained between the reasonable accommodation 
analysis undertaken when applying [discrimination] laws, and the s. 1 justification 
analysis that applies to a claim that a law infringes the Charter’.115 Beaman has 
identified this as an attempt ‘to rectify some of the confusion caused by the use of a 
reasonable accommodation framework with a section 1 [analysis].
116
 The Supreme 
Court was clear that: 
 
minimal impairment [the test in s. 1 of the Charter] and reasonable 
accommodation are conceptually distinct … Whilst the law’s impact on the 
individual claimants is undoubtedly a significant factor for the court to 
consider in determining whether the infringement is justified, the court’s 
ultimate perspective is societal. The question the court must answer is 
whether the Charter infringement is justifiable in a free and democratic 
society, not whether a more advantageous arrangement for a particular 
claimant could be envisaged.
117
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Whilst McLachlin CJ for the majority was determined to remove any vestige of 
reasonable accommodation from the tests of justification and proportionality under s. 
1 of the Charter, passages of her judgment ironically seem reminiscent of the undue 
hardship approach.
118
  In particular, when discussing the minimal impairment test 
under s. 1 she referred to the fact that, if compelled to provide an exemption for the 
Hutterites, the government would place security seriously at risk. Indeed ‘[a]ll other 
options would significantly increase the risk of identity theft using driver’s [sic] 
licences’,119 perhaps indicating that, even if the case had been pursued as a religious 
discrimination matter, it might have been impossible for the Hutterites to be 
reasonably accommodated as per Grismer. This signifies that in Canada the ability of 
litigants to use reasonable accommodation in future cases concerning religion will be 
limited to claims argued under discrimination law, in particular employment disputes 
(it will be recalled that the application of reasonable accommodation in religious 
provision of goods and services is currently untested). This is notwithstanding the 
ability to equally frame the claims as freedom of religion issues in some 
circumstances.
120
 Of course, where the dispute is between two private parties a 
discrimination route will have to be taken in which case reasonable accommodation 
may become a live issue irrespective of which side is bringing the case.  
 
4.3 A duty in other areas? 
 
In the sphere of education the Canadian Supreme Court has found that reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship do have a role to play in regulating disputes: as 
with goods and services this has been in relation to religious freedom and not 
religious discrimination. Reasonable accommodation was found to be relevant in 
Multani, a case pursued as a freedom of religion claim under s. 2 of the Charter as 
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balanced against the limits of s. 1. Thus, ‘it [was] not strictly speaking a “reasonable 
accommodation” case’.121 Significantly, Multani was decided before Hutterian 
Brethren and its rule against invocation of reasonable accommodation in freedom of 
religion cases: as such Multani should be treated with caution on the issue of 
reasonable accommodation. 
 
Multani concerned a Sikh schoolboy who wished to be permitted to take his kirpan to 
school. In balancing the limits of s. 1 with the right to religious freedom in s. 2, the 
court declared the school should reasonably accommodate this request despite the 
school’s severe reservations about acceding to the request on, amongst others, health 
and safety grounds. For the majority, Charron J. said that the reasonable 
accommodation test was very similar in essence to the s. 1 reasonable limits test: 
 
[t]he correspondence between the legal principles is logical. In relation to 
discrimination, the courts have held that there is a duty to make reasonable 
accommodation for individuals who are adversely affected by a policy or rule 
that is neutral on its face, and that this duty extends only to the point at which 
it causes undue hardship to the party who must perform it … [T]he analogy 
with the duty of reasonable accommodation seems to me to be helpful to 
explain the burden resulting from the minimal impairment test.
122
 
 
The majority found that undue hardship would not be caused to the school by 
accommodating the request. They considered the issue of maintaining safety 
standards in the school and contended that this could be satisfied by the schoolboy 
wearing the kirpan under his clothes, covered and sealed into the lining of those 
clothes. This would entail no burden on the school unless another student attempted 
to restrain the pupil in question and go to the necessary lengths required to remove 
the knife.
123
 In any event, if other students wished to perpetrate acts of violence 
against each other or staff members then other dangerous articles such as scissors, 
pencils and baseball bats were far more easily accessible.
124
 Additionally, the 
argument that other students would feel threatened by a pupil armed in this way 
causing undue hardship on the running of the school was also dismissed. It was 
unlikely other students would feel threatened by someone who carried a knife sewn 
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into their clothes that was not directly accessible.
125
 Indeed, such an arrangement 
would be unlikely to pose a threat of danger or harm to those other pupils.
126
 
 
Overall, the Supreme Court’s view was that the kirpan should not, in fact, be 
considered a weapon when it is properly worn by a member of the Sikh faith who 
recognizes it as having real religious value; rather, it is above all else a religious 
symbol with the characteristics of a weapon and thus not a weapon in the 
conventional sense.
127
 A common theme perceived to be running through the 
arguments of the school was that the kirpan was a symbol of violence: this at best 
ignored and at worst misrepresented the kirpan’s religious function. Such an 
approach is one frequently employed by those seeking to minimize or reject a 
religious tradition, using language that displaces or disrespects the practices of the 
religious group in question.
128
  
 
Interestingly, this decision shows the appropriateness of the courts’ case-by-case 
approach to reasonable accommodation, albeit in a religious freedom decision. 
Where there are no set tests in determining undue hardship, unlike those outlined in 
Alberta for employment, it becomes critical to use the specific facts and 
circumstances when assessing the validity of whether the totality of such arguments 
amounts to an overall impression of undue hardship.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship have been extremely important in 
helping the Canadian courts determine certain religious issues. The application of a 
reasonable accommodation duty in discrimination means that ‘[e]mployers ... can be 
required to tolerate some level of inconvenience or expense’,129 although these levels 
of inconvenience or expense can fluctuate on the facts. The test has mainly been 
developed in relation to discrimination in employment; further indications as to what 
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may amount to undue hardship have also germinated in goods and services provision 
and elsewhere, albeit in relation to freedom of religion analyses. Undoubtedly, the 
doctrine is far more advanced in employment and to this extent it is readily 
transferable to the UK legal system regarding religious discrimination in 
employment given the tried and tested ways in which it has been used in a variety of 
conflicts. After Grismer, it also applies to goods and services: ‘[w]hereas the 
principle developments [have] occurred in the employment context, reasonable 
accommodation equally applies to the public supply of goods and services – in 
particular in education and health’.130 However, the utility of this extension is 
tempered by the fact there exists a paucity of reasonable accommodation 
jurisprudence available at the Canadian level in relation to religious discrimination in 
the provision of goods and services and education.
 
 
 
Adoption of the Canadian reasonable accommodation doctrine would act as a more 
sophisticated filter on discrimination issues in domestic law. Indeed, it would 
explicitly force judges to consider in greater detail how proportionate it might be for 
a religious individual to be accommodated. Of course, the Canadian context should 
be emphasised: the development of reasonable accommodation in Canada has taken 
place in a country well renowned for its commitment to multiculturalism, tolerance 
and diversity. Moreover, whilst Alberta has set out clear criteria for reasonable 
accommodation cases, the subsequent case law in interpreting those criteria has not 
always been thoroughly clear. Indeed, it has been said ‘that the outcome of cases 
depends to a large extent on the ideological approach of the court rather than the 
technical wording’;131 further, ‘the highly contextual and casuistic nature of the 
inquiry pursued by courts adjudicating upon disputes concerning the application of 
the doctrine has inevitably left some questions unanswered’.132 
 
In recommending the use of Canadian reasonable accommodation in domestic 
discrimination law, it needs to be reinforced that the test of undue hardship forms 
part of a different discrimination system to the direct and indirect approach which 
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exists in the UK. Notwithstanding this, Moon comments that the Canadian process of 
reasoning ‘certainly provides a useful methodology for testing the extent to which an 
occupational or service requirement is appropriate and necessary ... it appears to 
produce demonstrably acceptable, workable progressive solutions’.133 Indeed, 
‘despite constitutional and legislative differences, it remains instructive to consider 
Canadian case law as it may provide guidance on how to tackle the difficult 
questions of principle that are common to both the UK and Canada. Such questions 
include … how far employers should be required to accommodate religious 
practice’.134With respect to the continuing development of reasonable 
accommodation in employment, and whether this will begin to permeate through to 
discrimination claims in education and goods and services provision, this may 
require more time to take shape: it appears that ‘the doctrine is a never-ending work 
in progress’.135  
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CHAPTER 8: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF 
RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 Law and religion in the United States 
 
In the United States (US) there exists a range of federal and local statutes protecting 
individuals from religious discrimination and which also separately guarantee 
freedom of religion. In relation to discrimination law in the US, ‘many individual 
states have their own human rights laws which cover discrimination. In effect, there 
are hundreds of courts making decisions on cases involving religion, under many 
different local provisions’.1 In employment it has been claimed that ‘[a]ll 50 states ... 
statutorily prohibit religious discrimination ... in their respective fair employment 
practice laws. Many municipalities likewise have ordinances that prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of religion’.2 Given the differences in the protection of 
religious discrimination between local state laws and federal laws, the focus in this 
chapter will be on the legal protection at the federal level, in particular the use and 
application of reasonable accommodation in the relevant religious discrimination 
provisions.  
 
Aside from combatting religious discrimination, the US has a long history of 
guaranteeing freedom of religion at a constitutional level. This is noteworthy given 
that freedom of religion cases in the US also use the language of ‘accommodation’. 
These claims may be pursued courtesy of the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution which provides that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’.3 The decisions of 
the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut
4
 and Everson v. Board of Education of 
Ewing Township
5
 extended, respectively, both the non-establishment and free 
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exercise guarantees from the federal level to the state level. They provided the 
opportunity for greater religious recourse against government and state violations of 
religious freedom. Decisions dealt with under the free exercise guarantee have 
frequently addressed laws of general application which: 
 
are not directed at religion per se, but are designed to deal with some secular 
problem that incidentally affects religious practices. The issue is whether the 
individual’s interest in the free exercise of religion requires that the law give 
way (so that the individual gains an exemption from a governmental 
requirement or prohibition), or the state’s interest in universal compliance 
prevails over the individual’s religious interest’.6  
 
The legal test for determining this has evolved into the requirement that, where a 
religious right is found to be interfered with, only a compelling state interest that 
could not have been advanced by less restrictive means is capable of justifiably 
limiting religious freedom. The burden of proof as between religion and the state in 
such free exercise claims has been summarised as ‘creat[ing] a presumption in favour 
of the religious adherent ... the presumptions [being] rebuttable by the state’s proof 
of a compelling interest’.7 
 
This ‘compelling state interest’ position, also referred to as the ‘strict scrutiny 
approach’,8 was outlined in Sherbert v. Verner9 (Sherbert) and later applied in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder
10
 (Yoder). Sherbert concerned a religious employee’s refusal to 
work on a Saturday, their dismissal from work and subsequent state claim for 
unemployment benefits, whereas Yoder concerned the right of Amish parents to 
withdraw their children for religious reasons from school. In both these cases religion 
prevailed, highlighting that the ‘compelling state interest’ test ‘placed free exercise 
claimants in a very strong bargaining position when working out accommodations 
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when government programmes burdened their religious practices’.11 In Sherbert, it 
was conceded by the state that its reason for refusing to pay unemployment benefits 
was predominately due to the fact that fraudulent claims based on fabricated 
religious impediment might have been made,
12
 albeit with no evidence to support this 
contention. Ultimately, this unsubstantiated concern was found to be an insufficiently 
compelling state interest, with the court also finding that – in any event – the state 
could have pursued a policy less restrictive of religious rights looking at, for 
example, good causes for not working on a specific day.
13
 In Yoder, the state was 
simply unable to establish that its requirement that all children must attend school 
until the age of sixteen could not be carried out in a way which was less restrictive of 
Amish beliefs. Such beliefs preferred the removal of children from school before 
sixteen due to Amish feeling that ‘high-school years should be used to acquire Amish 
attitudes favouring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to 
perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife’.14 The court held there was 
no evidence that an Amish exception would adversely affect the objectives of the 
state in protecting the best interests of Amish children.
15
  
 
The compelling state interest approach has been further developed in later cases. 
These tests and their developments are considered briefly below
16
 in relation to their 
overlap with reasonable accommodation in US religious discrimination 
jurisprudence.  
 
1.2 Religious discrimination mechanisms in the United States
17
 
 
Application of the reasonable accommodation doctrine is expressly required in US 
anti-discrimination law. Whilst it exists in disability discrimination law,
18
 with the 
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US leading the way in allowing for reasonable accommodation of disabled 
individuals,
19
 it has played an even more significant role in religious discrimination. 
Indeed, ‘the concept was first applied in the context of religious discrimination under 
US law.’20Gaudreault-DesBiens notes that ‘[t]he origins of [reasonable 
accommodation] can be traced back to a series of American labour statutes and cases 
of the 1970s’.21 At the federal level Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 (CRA 1964) 
protects against religious discrimination, together with other characteristics, across 
all states in employment.
22
 It has been interpreted as covering ‘all employers with 
over 15 employees, those employed by the state and local government as well as 
private sector employers’.23 Further to this, an amendment made to Title VII by the 
US Congress and contained in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 1972
24
 now 
provides that both public and private employers
25
 must be able to ‘reasonably 
accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or 
practice’,26 signifying that most types of employers are now obliged to consider how 
far a religious employee must be reasonably accommodated. This amendment was 
seen as particularly necessary given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to deal 
accommodation of religious employees. This was evident from Dewey v. Reynolds 
Metals Co.,
27
 a decision concerning an employee who objected to working on 
Sundays for religious reasons and whose request for reasonable accommodation was 
refused by his employer and the Court of Appeals. It was also clear from Riley v. 
Bendix Corp.
28
 (regarding an employee who similarly wanted time off work for 
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religious reasons) where the District Court (Florida, Orlando Division) adopted the 
same stance in refusing accommodation.  
 
There is no authority in the US supporting the extension of reasonable 
accommodation into other recognised areas such as goods and services provision.
 29
 
Of course, there exist legal provisions in the US protecting against religious 
discrimination in the provision of goods and services, although these contain no 
reasonable accommodation duty either in relation to a religious service user who is 
discriminated against by a provider of goods or services or a religious service 
provider who wishes to refuse provision of a specific service to a particular user. 
Such legal provisions include the Civil Rights Act 1968
30
 which precludes 
discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing based on, amongst other 
protected characteristics, religion. Elsewhere, other parts of the CRA 1964 are 
notable for their efforts in addressing religious discrimination outside employment. 
For example, Title II provides that there shall be no discrimination based on, amongst 
other characteristics, religion in the provision of goods, services, facilities, and 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations provided by any place of public 
accommodation
31
 (for example establishments providing lodgings to transient 
guests,
32
 those engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises such as 
restaurants,
33
 and any motion picture house, theatre, concert hall, sports arena, 
stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment
34
). In addition, Title III 
prohibits state and municipal governments from denying access to public facilities 
on, amongst other grounds, religion when those public facilities are owned, operated 
or managed by or on behalf of any State or subdivision thereof.
35
 Beyond goods and 
services provision, Title IV precludes discrimination on the basis of religion, and 
other protected characteristics, in the provision of public education operated by the 
state. These education provisions, similar to the laws regulating provision of goods 
and services, contain no reasonable accommodation duty. Title IV covers education 
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in elementary schools through to secondary schools and higher education.
36
 
Religious discrimination protection outside employment enables a claim to be fought 
against either the state or private individuals. This matches the protection afforded in 
employment.  
 
2. ASSESSING DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
As the operation of reasonable accommodation in the US is most developed with 
respect to employment matters in religious discrimination, the following analysis is 
necessarily limited to the doctrine’s interaction with religion in employment.  
 
Where an employee brings a case against their employers based on a protected 
characteristic, such a claim may cover either direct
37
 or disparate impact (indirect) 
discrimination. Disparate impact discrimination originally emerged as a common law 
development
38
 although it is now codified by the CRA 1964, Title VII, s. 703(k) as 
amended by the Civil Rights Act 1991.  Whilst disparate impact discrimination can 
be defended – it may be justified where the employer can demonstrate that ‘an 
employment practice is required by business necessity’39 – no defence exists to a 
claim of direct discrimination. These discrimination routes are similar to those 
available for all protected characteristics in the UK, although they differ somewhat 
from the more streamlined approach in Canada. 
 
3. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION DUTY  
 
The use of reasonable accommodation to aid assessment of religious discrimination 
claims in employment in the US is long-standing. It pre-dates its use in Canada, and, 
indeed, anywhere: ‘[t]he term ‘reasonable accommodation’ was born in the United 
States and was first used in connection with a duty to accommodate the religious 
beliefs of employees’.40 This is further reinforced by the observation that ‘the 
concept of reasonable accommodation appeared and evolved in United States’ law 
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from the 1970s, and in Canadian law from the 1980s onward’.41 The 1972 US 
Congress amendment introducing an employer duty of reasonable accommodation to 
CRA 1964, Title VII, was felt necessary ‘if staff were to be protected in their rights to 
practise their religion’,42 although the duty had arguably been operating at common 
law in any event. As a result of common law developments and the 1972 codification 
there is consequently a rich seam of reasonable accommodation case law in religious 
discrimination in the US addressing the scope of the employer reasonable 
accommodation duty.
43
  
 
Reasonable accommodation as a duty on employers has come to replace the use of 
disparate impact discrimination in religious discrimination claims by employees,
44
 
meaning that ‘[w]here an employee fails to meet a requirement imposed by an 
employer, this is treated as a question of whether the employer should accommodate 
the employee, rather than as a matter of indirect discrimination’.45 This 
categorisation, which appears to force disparate impact religious discrimination cases 
down a reasonable accommodation route has been criticised by some 
commentators.
46
 A particular objection is that reasonable accommodation allows 
employers (who may be biased against the employee’s religion – and therefore non-
neutral) to provide a low-level unsatisfactory accommodation which masks the 
prejudice that would otherwise have become evident and illegal in a disparate impact 
claim. Whilst this has resulted in the suggestion that the two claim route be blended 
into an alternative ‘disparate accommodation’ option claim, the focus here is on the 
courts’ interpretation of reasonable accommodation.47  
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Before the employer’s duty of reasonable accommodation can be addressed it must 
first be determined whether a bona fide occupational requirement exists which 
prevents the employer from having to reasonably accommodate the religious 
employee in the first place. Given that the duty of reasonable accommodation is 
codified in CRA 1964, Title VII, it is not necessary to import the reasonable 
accommodation test into the bona fide occupational requirement assessment. 
  
3.1 The duty in employment 
 
Where religious discrimination is in issue and the religious employee wishes to claim 
a failure of the employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate, then the CRA 1964, 
Title VII, s. 701(j) sets out the relevant test. The religious observances and practices, 
as well as beliefs, of employees or prospective employees must be reasonably 
accommodated by an employer unless that employer can demonstrate that to do so 
would amount to undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.48 
Clearly, this duty is not absolute. Where an employee believes that their employer 
did not reasonably accommodate their religion, there exists a burden of proof on the 
employee to first establish that their beliefs meet the definition of ‘religion’ outlined 
in CRA 1964, Title VII, s. 701(j) which includes all aspects of religious observance 
and practice as well as belief. This was originally developed to mean belief in a 
supreme being but not political, sociological or philosophical views;
49
 more recently, 
this has been expanded to ethical or moral beliefs of conscience,
50
 and 
vegetarianism.
51
 The employee’s religious belief and corresponding manifestation 
must be communicated to the employer so that the employer is put on notice of the 
employee’s requirement to be reasonably accommodated.52 These steps have been 
summarised as requiring that: 
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[a]n employee alleging a violation of the reasonable accommodation principle 
must prove that a religious command in which (s)he genuinely believes 
conflicts with an employment regulation, that (s)he informed the employer of 
this situation, and that (s)he was sanctioned for not observing such regulation. 
At this point the employer in turn has to show that (s)he offered a reasonable 
accommodation which would allow the employee to follow the commands of 
his or her religion, or that any reasonable accommodation would have led to 
an undue hardship on the employer’s business.53  
 
The requirement that an employee should establish a sincere (or ‘genuine’) religious 
command via belief or practice (or ‘manifestation’) before then arguing for 
reasonable accommodation has drawn academic attention in its own right,
54
 
particularly because of the generous and relaxed way in which the US courts have 
been prepared to assess sincerity
55
 (this matching the same approach to sincerity in 
Canada). Indeed, the courts have given ‘“great weight” to the plaintiff’s own 
characterisation of [their] beliefs’56 and it is believed that ‘[i]n nearly all instances, 
the courts will reject efforts to denominate an individual’s personal beliefs as non-
religious’.57 In this way, where ‘a plaintiff testifies that [their] beliefs are sincerely 
held, that ordinarily ends the matter’.58  
 
Nevertheless, these steps still have to be filtered through the reasonable 
accommodation test. Here, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
makes it clear that undue hardship, and a refusal to accommodate, may be influenced 
by legitimate employer reasons which concern whether the accommodation sought 
‘is costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes 
on the rights of other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their 
share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work’.59 Of course, where none of 
these factors are compromised then full accommodation may well be required; 
conversely, if one of more of these factors is compromised then no accommodation 
may be required. Alternatively, some form of modified accommodations may be 
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suggested. An accommodation offer, whether constituting full or alternative 
accommodation, may amount to flexible scheduling, voluntary substitutions or 
swaps, job reassignments and lateral transfers, modification of grooming 
requirements and other workplace practices, policies and/or procedures.
60
  
 
Whilst the employer factors under the US scheme seem reminiscent of the Canadian 
approach in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission) 
(Alberta)
61
 it is submitted that the US factors seem rather redundant. This is because, 
unlike Canada where there exists a stringent approach to proportionality under undue 
hardship (which requires careful balancing of the employer’s legitimate reasons 
against the employee’s accommodation claim), in the US the standard of undue 
hardship has been set at so low a level that the legitimate factors cited by the 
employer are rendered somewhat irrelevant. The level of undue hardship above 
which employers are not obliged to provide accommodation has been set at the level 
of a de minimis – more than minimal62 – obligation. This seems a fairly nominal 
burden which Sonné has explained as meaning that undue hardship will be 
established where accommodation ‘would cost the employer something beyond 
inconvenience’.63 Indeed, Howard describes it as ‘not very onerous for employers’.64 
Cromwell has gone further and suggested that de minimis may mean merely 
‘trifling’,65 indicating perhaps a lower threshold. Given that the standard of undue 
hardship is set at such a minimal level, it appears that factors affecting both employer 
and employee will be of less prominence in US reasonable accommodation analyses 
than in Canada, apart from in the most flagrant cases of religious discrimination. 
Vickers has formed a similar view, stating that ‘despite the suggestion from the 
wording of the duty and the EEOC’s guidelines that religion should be 
accommodated unless there is undue hardship, the interpretation of the duty to 
accommodate has been somewhat restrictive, leaving employers with a most slender 
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of duties to accommodate’.66 Arguably, the de minimis test neuters the effect of the 
EEOC guidelines meaning it ‘substantially weakens the potential protections offered 
by the duty of reasonable accommodation’. 67 This is liable to result in superficial 
analyses of reasonable accommodation claims.  
 
Legal authority for the de minimis threshold is found in two seminal US cases on 
reasonable accommodation of religious employees, notably Trans World Airlines v. 
Hardison (Hardison)
68
 and Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook (Ansonia).
69
  
Both effectively held that ‘if an accommodation is to be required, there must be no 
more than de minimis cost, either in terms of financial cost or in terms of disruption 
or administrative inconvenience’.70 For example, in Hardison the employee 
requested that he be placed on a four-day week so as to avoid work at times of 
religious significance to him. He was offered alternative accommodations but 
rejected these. In applying the de minimis standard the Supreme Court noted the 
relevance of cost but was able to swiftly dismiss it based on the de minimis standard. 
Extra costs on the employer may have arisen from switching staff to cover the 
absence, resulting in reduction in productivity in their original department, or 
employing a new and additional member of staff. It was said that requiring the 
employer ‘to bear additional costs when no such costs are incurred to give other 
employees the days off that they want would involve unequal treatment of employees 
on the basis of their religion’.71 Whilst the minority questioned the utility of a de 
minimis standard which appears to defeat reasonable accommodation (in relation to 
the criterion of cost) where there is the danger of any expense being borne by the 
employer,
72
 this was evidently acceptable to the majority
73
 meaning ‘from that point 
onward the courts [did not need to] grant even the most minor accommodation to 
religious observers to enable them to follow their religious beliefs and practices’.74  
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Undue hardship as defined in such a way is liable to impoverished analyses of 
acutely fact-sensitive circumstances, closer assessment of which may better 
determine the accommodation balance. The low undue hardship test in the US 
contrasts starkly with the impossibility standard of undue hardship in Canada. On the 
face of it, the US conception of undue hardship appears unlikely to further expand 
religious liberty in the workplace, an issue which is exacerbated by the fact that – as 
will be seen – the US courts have interpreted the undue hardship test vaguely, 
haphazardly and inconsistently when assessing reasonable accommodation claims.  
 
3.1.1 Outside the scope of undue hardship: spiritual hardship 
 
At one point it appeared that the undue hardship test should relate only to economic 
hardship: it should not correspond to anything else. This included a rejection of 
spiritual hardship as held in EEOC v. Townley Engineering and Manufacturing 
Company (Townley Engineering)
75
 where the defendant company was a faith-based 
Christian business. Part of its activities included a weekly devotional service during 
work time which was mandatory for all employees. An atheist employee claimed that 
the compulsory nature of this requirement was a failure of reasonable 
accommodation which could have been met by excusing him from attendance at the 
services. The employer resisted the accommodation request, arguing that to excuse 
attendance would cause ‘spiritual hardship’ by having a ‘chilling’ effect on the 
spiritual purpose of it as a company.  
 
The idea that a de minimis cost under the undue hardship test could incorporate the 
idea of spiritual hardship alongside the more usually cited economic hardship, was 
emphatically rejected by the Court of Appeals. It was said that a company’s 
contention that its religious purposes would be ‘chilled’ if spiritual hardship was not 
considered a form of undue hardship was ‘irrelevant if it has no effect on its 
economic well-being’,76 ruling out the use of non-economic harm to justify a refusal 
to accommodate religion.
77
 There was evidence in Townley Engineering that the 
employer had tried to accommodate the employee by offering to transfer him to 
                                                     
75
 859 F.2d 610 (Ninth Circuit, 1988).  
76
 per Sneed J. at para. 25.  
77
 Vickers, above n. 1, p. 186. 
137 
 
another manufacturing plant, although it appears that the employee was not obliged 
to accept any such accommodation given that the type of undue hardship otherwise 
claimed by his employer in relation to his request was not recognized by the court. 
Indeed, this accommodation was not accepted by the employee. Nevertheless, the 
idea that only economic hardship would suffice should any employer attempt to rely 
on undue hardship was favoured: indeed, the court spoke of the need to promote 
‘economic efficiency’.78 The decision in Townley Engineering seems correct 
regarding spiritual hardship; had the court counted such hardship as capable of being 
‘undue’ it may have been asked whether it was appropriate for a corporate entity to 
cite its beliefs where the focus should have been on the reasonable accommodation 
of the individual employee’s beliefs. Moreover, it would have constituted rather an 
abstract notion of undue hardship and led to one set of beliefs appearing to trump 
another set in the undue hardship analysis.  
 
3.1.2 Inside the scope of undue hardship: economic hardship  
 
It is clear that economic hardship on an employer can satisfy the de minimis 
threshold for undue hardship. Whether all that is needed is the slightest economic 
hardship is to be judged on the facts – essentially the circumstances of the employer 
as based on the evidence,
79
 although given the low level at which undue hardship is 
set it is submitted that an employer’s circumstances will not have to be especially 
unique, unusual or indeed restrictive to clear the de minimis hurdle. Whilst an 
employer may not have to demonstrate much to cross the threshold for establishing 
economic hardship, it must be the case that there is some evidence of cost stemming 
from any accommodation. In Protos v. Volkswagen of America Inc.
80
 it was found by 
the Court of Appeals that where an employee had asked to be excused from working 
on Saturdays for religious reasons there was ‘no economic loss because ... the 
“efficiency, production, quality and morale” of the ... department remained in 
                                                     
78
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79
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Marietta Corp. 648 F.2d 1239 (Ninth Circuit, 1981). 
80
 797 F.2d 129 (Third Circuit, 1986). 
138 
 
tact’81on the facts. Ultimately, the employer had not demonstrated that there would 
be any cost associated with accommodation.
82
 
 
3.1.3 Inside the scope of undue hardship: automatic non-economic hardship 
 
Undue hardship may also amount to a non-economic burden, providing employers 
with greater protection against being required to reasonably accommodate religious 
employees. Some forms of non-economic hardship appear to be treated so seriously 
by the US courts that, where they exist, the courts will be generally be satisfied (on a 
de minimis standard) that undue hardship would be suffered by the employer were 
they required to accommodate the employee. The employer does not need to have 
engaged with or responded to the request for accommodation – it merely has to show 
that to have acceded to the request would have crossed the de minimis threshold. This 
was tacitly acknowledged post-Townley Engineering in Hardison where the Supreme 
Court, whilst finding that economic hardship was present on the facts, also argued 
that non-economic ‘costs’ could satisfy the undue hardship test.83 Here, the matter 
was whether the employer could be required to violate the seniority provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement
84
 in order to ensure that the religious employee 
would not have to work on Saturdays. It was said that requiring the employer to 
violate such an agreement would amount to undue hardship,
85
 the decision on this 
point meaning that ‘courts since Hardison have ruled that employers are not 
required, and perhaps not even permitted, to accommodate an employee when the 
accommodation would require the violation of a collectively-bargained seniority 
system’.86  
 
The idea of legal infringement amounting to a non-economic burden was followed in 
United States v. Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia)
87
 where it was held by the US Court of Appeals that undue hardship 
could be found if a school board was required to reasonably accommodate a religious 
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employee by contravening anti-religious dress laws.
88
 Where reasonable 
accommodation of an employee’s religion would require the employer to contravene 
the law it is to be expected that the courts will favour the employer. Indeed, 
individual religious discrimination claims do not appear the most appropriate forum 
in which to argue the merits of generally applicable (neutral) laws which impact 
upon religion. It can also be seen that contravention of employer health and safety 
policies in the name of reasonable religious accommodation should, prima facie, 
constitute a legitimate non-economic hardship as in, for example, EEOC v. Kelly 
Services Inc. (Kelly Services Inc.)
89
 
 
More recently, however, other types of non-economic hardship have been found to 
operate outside the spheres of legal restrictions and health and safety, in particular 
those based on self-determined employer codes or policies relating to expected 
employee standards of behaviour and dress. For example, in Webb v. City of 
Philadelphia (Webb)
90
 a police officer's request for reasonable accommodation 
concerning the wearing of religious clothing with her uniform was found to impose 
an undue burden upon her employer. The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
employer’s contention that any effect of the reasonable accommodation on ‘the 
perception of its impartiality by citizens of all races and religions whom the police 
are charged to serve and protect’91 would have amounted to a non-economic hardship 
given the employer’s commitment – without exception – to values such as religious 
neutrality. Whilst no attempt at accommodation had been made the effect of the 
religious neutrality policy would have meant accommodation for the employee 
passed the de minimis undue hardship threshold.
92
  
 
Clearly, the courts have been active in expanding the types of non-economic 
hardship that can be cited by an employer; however, the bar has been set low 
regarding how those forms of non-economic employer hardship will, at a de minimis 
level, usually block a religious employee’s reasonable accommodation claim. 
                                                     
88
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Assuming accommodation would not have automatically led to non-economic 
hardship, other factors which tend to either refute or suggest non-economic hardship 
may be present.  
 
3.1.4 Inside the scope of undue hardship: factors refuting non-economic hardship? 
 
Outside the rather arbitrary sets of circumstances considered in section 3.1.3, should 
employers offer no attempt at accommodation and no explanation for the lack of 
accommodation then, provided the accommodation would not have led to undue 
hardship, they will be unable to defend an employee’s claim of reasonable 
accommodation. Indeed, ‘the statutory burden to accommodate rests with the 
employer’.93 This rule is the same for all religious discrimination cases raising the 
question of reasonable accommodation as established by EEOC v. Ithaca Industries 
(Ithaca Industries)
94
 which decided that ‘[o]nly if no attempt is made to 
accommodate will the employer be found to have failed in its duty’.95 The case 
concerned a religious employee who refused to work on Sundays, with the Court of 
Appeals finding that no attempts at accommodations were made for reasons of 
religion.
96
 This may be distinguished from Webb on the basis that in Ithaca 
Industries there was no evidence from the employer that its lack of engagement with 
the accommodation request could be explained by the fact it already pursued a policy 
of religious neutrality in requiring all employees to work on Sundays, thereby – as in 
Webb – making its response clear from the outset. Similarly, unlike Kelly Services 
Inc. there was no health and safety provision at stake, or – unlike Hardison or 
Philadelphia – no legal provision that would have been contravened by making an 
accommodation offer.  
 
The principle that a total lack of employer engagement with accommodation fails the 
accommodation duty, meaning that undue hardship is not satisfied, was reaffirmed in 
                                                     
93
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Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband LLC (Buonanno).
97
 Here, an employee had refused to 
sign his employer’s diversity statement which he believed required him to confirm 
that he was supportive of – or valued – homosexuality, a form of sexuality which he 
claimed was incompatible with his religious view that homosexuality itself was a sin. 
There was evidence that ‘[h]e was prepared to sign an alternative statement agreeing 
to value the fact that there are differences between people (as opposed to valuing the 
difference themselves)’,98 although the employer acceded to none of the employee’s 
suggested ways of accommodation and suggested none of its own. As a result, the 
District Court (Colorado) found that the employer had failed to offer the employee 
any accommodation whatsoever (it ‘steadfastly insisting that he had to agree with the 
ambiguous [diversity] policy’99) and concluded, notwithstanding the legitimate aim 
of the policy,
100
 there had therefore been a straightforward failure to accommodate 
the employee’s religious beliefs101 with no evidence that to do so would have 
resulted in undue hardship at a de minimis level. The decision in Buonanno may be 
likened to that in Ithaca Industries where there was also no good reason for the 
employer’s lack of engagement with the accommodation request.  Moreover, it may 
be distinguished from Webb where the policy seemed more clearly defined with a 
clear public relations purpose.  
 
As established, a total lack of accommodation and an inability to demonstrate undue 
hardship will fail the reasonable accommodation duty, notwithstanding 
circumstances such as those in Webb, Kelly Services Inc., Hardison and 
Philadelphia. Notably, in all cases, undue hardship will also not be found where an 
employer tries to defend a reasonable accommodation claim based on hypothetical 
difficulties which are unaccompanied by supporting evidence. This means there is an 
expectation that: 
 
an employer make some attempt at accommodation. Although only de 
minimis hardship is required, it must at least be real hardship, not merely 
hypothetical. This means that the employer cannot rely, for example, on the 
fact that other staff might become unhappy, but must show that they will be. 
                                                     
97
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In effect, the duty of reasonable accommodation puts the onus on the 
employer to show that they have thought about trying to accommodate and 
have actual reasons why to do so would be difficult.
102
  
 
The rejection of hypothetical hardship has been confirmed in the jurisprudence with 
it being commented in Tooley v. Martin—Marietta Corp.103 that ‘[a] claim of undue 
hardship cannot be supported by merely conceivable or hypothetical hardships; 
instead, it must be supported by proof of actual imposition on co-workers or 
disruption of the work routine’.104 This rule was applied in EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-
Car (Alamo)
105
 where it assisted an employee to successfully argue before the 
District Court (Arizona) that dismissal from her job in a car rental office was based 
on hypothetical difficulties raised by her employer relating to perceived undue 
hardship. The employer had asserted that the employee’s wish, as a Muslim, to wear 
the headscarf would have amounted to a definite burden based on an impermissible 
deviation from its carefully cultivated image with customers. The court was scornful 
of this claim, contending that there was ‘no material factual basis for Alamo's 
conclusions about the cost of "any deviation" from the uniform policy’106 and that the 
employer had ‘[failed] to support its assertion of undue burden with anything other 
than speculation, which [was] not a basis to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact’.107 Once again, Webb may be distinguished given that the religious neutrality 
policy was clearly defined and could have been viewed as more legitimate given that 
it assisted a public body maintaining perceptions of impartiality. 
 
Whilst Alamo clearly sanctions the rule against hypothetical undue hardship, it is 
clear that the definition of ‘real hardship’ has become diluted. In Cloutier v. Costco 
(Costco)
108
 the Court of Appeals decided that an employee who belonged to the 
‘Church of Body Modification’ and who wished to wear facial jewellery at work in 
contravention of her employer’s ‘no facial jewellery’ dress code did not need to be 
reasonably accommodated. Such reasonable accommodation would have amounted 
                                                     
102
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to undue hardship ‘because it would adversely affect the employer's public image. 
Costco has made a determination that facial piercings, aside from earrings, detract 
from the "neat, clean and professional image" that it aims to cultivate. Such a 
business determination is within its discretion’.109 It is clear that ‘Costco had a 
legitimate aim in presenting a workforce that was reasonably professional in 
appearance ... Clearly, exemption from the dress code would have thwarted the 
company’s business goals’.110 Presumably, the court in Costco was persuaded that 
the existence of the dress code itself – which was contained in a handbook – was 
sufficient evidence to support its clams of hardship.
111
 Indeed, it was simply accepted 
as purely ‘axiomatic’ that there was a link between the dress code and business 
efficacy.
112
 This chimes with the low standard of undue hardship that the de minimis 
test affords.  
 
Whilst it may seem clear that supporting evidence from an employer should help 
demonstrate why undue hardship would be present
113
 (even if the de minimis 
standard seemingly allows any form of evidence, however flimsy), this is 
undermined by the fact that occasionally the US courts have allowed hypothetical 
hardship to count as undue without such supporting evidence. In Hardison, the 
Supreme Court jettisoned the notion that undue hardship could not be hypothetical 
by finding that accommodating an employee who wished to avoid working for 
religious reasons from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday would have amounted 
to undue hardship. The decision referred in various parts to the possible effects on 
other employees amounting to hypothetical hardship, albeit without any firm 
evidence supporting the likely negative effects on those other employees.
114
  Indeed, 
Vickers has confirmed that ‘in Hardison the Supreme Court did allow TWA to rely 
                                                     
109
 per Lipez J., at p. 136.  
110
 Gregory, above n. 56, p. 207.  
111
 per Lipez J at p. 135. 
112
 Ibid.  
113
 Supporting evidence has been found to demonstrate undue hardship in other situations, notably 
where an employer can show that there are real health and safety concerns. See, for example, Kalsi v. 
New York City Transit Authority 62 F.Supp.2d 745 (1998) where there was evidence that an employer 
required employees working in a mine to wear hard hats to help avoid electric shocks or electrocution 
from overhead wires. The employee, a Sikh who wore a turban, wished to be excused from the hard-
hat rule. His request to be accommodated was refused because of the health and safety evidence via an 
expert’s report: per Gleeson DJ at pp. 759 – 760.  
114
 See, for example, comments per White J. at pp. 84 – 85.  
144 
 
on hypothetical hardship’.115 It may be noted that Hardison pre-dates Alamo: it is 
possible that, in future, the courts will follow Alamo and find that employer claims of 
hypothetical reasonable accommodation difficulties without evidence (although after 
Costco the threshold for ‘evidence’ appears low) will not surmount the de minimis 
hurdle.  
 
3.1.5 Inside the scope of undue hardship: factors suggesting non-economic 
hardship? 
 
Where an employer does engage with an accommodation request it may either try 
and show that the request would require undue hardship (in which case the employee 
may pre-empt this by suggesting their own accommodations)
116
 or offer alternative 
accommodations.  In relation to alternative accommodations offered by the employer 
to the employee, the courts have found that the burden on the employee to accept is 
strict: to refuse and still expect to be accommodated would be unreasonable because 
it would impose undue hardship on the employer.
117
 In Bruff v. North Mississipi 
Health Service (Bruff),
118
 a counsellor with religious beliefs that persuaded her that 
homosexuality was immoral requested that her employers accommodate this by no 
longer requiring her to counsel homosexual people on sexual matters. When it 
became clear that this would have inevitably required shifting responsibilities 
between the remaining counsellors – something which would have been highly 
awkward thereby causing undue hardship on her employer
119
 – she was asked 
whether she would consider transferring to a section of the counselling service 
performing pastoral or Christian counselling.
120
 The employee refused this 
accommodation due to the fact that the employer charged with running that section 
was a liberal Christian and unlikely to tolerate the employee’s conservative values.121 
Whilst the Court of Appeals accepted the employer’s contention that to have 
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accommodated further in this case would have amounted to undue hardship, it is 
debatable whether any of the hardships claimed by the employer (for example 
‘determining specific patient care issues in advance’)122 would have amounted to 
much more than minimal undue hardship. Additionally, it was suggested that the 
request would have led to other forms of undue hardship given the potential for 
uneven distribution of work among colleagues had the employee been 
accommodated.
123
 Of course, this may also be debatable given that determining 
patient care issues ahead of counselling (so that an even spread of work was 
produced) might not necessarily have been found to have been an insurmountable 
task had the issue been investigated by the court in more detail.  
 
Bruff establishes that where an accommodation is offered to the employee the onus is 
normally on them to accept it even where it may be undesirable. This is to be 
expected given the de minimis standard, although cases like Bruff do question the 
appropriateness of the de minimis threshold where unrealistic, impractical or 
unhelpful alternative accommodations are offered by the employer. Nevertheless, 
‘the employee is required to make a good-faith attempt to satisfy her needs through 
the means offered by the employer’.124 Of course, accommodation offers made to the 
employee must be on the basis of an attempt to accommodate for religious reasons, 
and not merely other incidental reasons. For example, in Proctor v. Consolidated 
Freightways
125
 the employer’s accommodation offers to the employee concerning 
Saturday working were not found by the Court of Appeals to have been made for 
religious reasons. Indeed, it transpired that all employees had been similarly 
accommodated.
126
 Moreover, the claimant had been told by superiors that they had 
been under no obligation to offer her an accommodation
127
 due to her religion.  
 
It may be said that the de minimis test quite correctly helps identify the threshold of 
hardship needed; to require further accommodation would sometimes place the 
employer under an intolerable strain. This may be seen from Shelton v. University of 
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Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (Shelton)
128
 where the employee, a staff nurse 
who was also a member of the Pentecostal faith, refused to participate in abortion 
procedures. Whilst this was accommodated in the trading of assignments with other 
nurses, the employee was required a number of times at short notice to treat patients 
in emergencies; such treatment would have included the termination of pregnancies. 
On one particular occasion the patient that the employee refused to treat was 
‘“standing in a pool of blood” [and] diagnosed with placenta previa. The hospital 
employer claim[ed] that [the] refusal to assist delayed the emergency procedure for 
thirty minutes’.129 Additional accommodations were proposed by the employer 
including transferring to other nursing positions, all of which were rejected by the 
employee. The Court of Appeals determined that requiring the employer to 
accommodate even further may have seriously and fundamentally compromised its 
efforts to treat patients in emergencies, amounting to undue hardship – particularly 
given the numerous steps that had been taken to reasonably accommodate the 
employee with which she had failed to cooperate.
130
 However, it is important to treat 
the facts of cases on their merits. As can be seen from the similar results in cases like 
Bruff and Shelton of differing accommodation circumstances, the de minimis test is 
perhaps too unsophisticated and blunt a device in deciding whether alternative 
accommodations suggested by the employer are fair and whether any reasonable 
accommodation claimed by the employee would constitute undue hardship on an 
employer.   
 
The de minimis rule for determining undue hardship has also operated in instances 
where an employer may not have proposed suggestions but instead tried to show that 
an employee’s own suggestions would have required undue hardship. As with 
Shelton and employer accommodation offers, the de minimis rule here can arguably 
work satisfactorily to prevent unreasonable accommodation due to likely undue 
hardship. For example, in Peterson v. Hewlett Packard (Peterson)
131
 the employee 
displayed bible verses denouncing homosexuality in response to posters celebrating 
the diverse make-up of the employer’s workforce which was supported by the 
employer’s diversity policy. Once again, the Court of Appeals indicated that to have 
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allowed accommodation, which would effectively have meant sacrificing the 
diversity programme, would have seriously and fundamentally contravened the 
employer’s efforts in respecting and treating individuals with dignity. This would 
have amounted to undue hardship, particularly given that the only accommodation 
suggested by the employee was an insistence that the employer remove all the 
offending posters celebrating the company’s diversity policy.132 This may be 
regarded as the right outcome for the case, as supported by Ruan who declares that 
‘there is a line at which an employee’s religious expression crosses over into 
harassment’.133 The outcome in Peterson was reflected in an earlier Court of Appeals 
case, Virts v. Consolidated Freightways (Virts),
134
 where all the employee’s 
proposals ‘would have required [the employer] to violate the seniority provision of 
its collective bargaining agreement’.135 Evidently, where an employee’s proposals 
are scrutinised it is required that they would not put a more than minimal burden on 
the employer. 
 
In contrast to Peterson and Virts, circumstances of more measured and realistic 
employee accommodation requests which provide the employer with a potentially 
workable solution have been accepted by the courts. This may be seen from 
Buonanno, discussed earlier, where the employee refused to sign his employer’s 
diversity statement which would have affirmed that he valued differences amongst 
people including differences in sexuality. There was no evidence raised in the case 
that he would discriminate or behave offensively to non-heterosexual colleagues
136
 
and indeed ‘he was prepared to sign an alternative statement agreeing to value the 
fact that there are differences between people (as opposed to valuing the differences 
themselves)’.137 As a result, the court found that the failure to reasonably 
accommodate did not amount to undue hardship.
138
 This admits of a balancing 
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133
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exercise between ‘individual rights and the rational operation of the workplace’,139 
the result of which is not necessarily determined fairly by the de minimis test 
depending on the facts of the case. However, this approach does outline that 
imbalances exist in the jurisprudence concerning claims for accommodation. In 
particular, whilst realistic employee accommodation requests are treated favourably 
and unrealistic ones are not, this contrasts with unrealistic employer accommodation 
solutions in cases such as Bruff where the courts have required that employees accept 
such difficult accommodation offers. These imbalances may lead to differing levels 
of success in reasonable accommodation claims depending upon whether an 
employee is responding to an employer’s accommodation suggestions or whether an 
employee is in fact making their own suggestion for accommodation. Such 
unpredictability is unjustifiable in principle when the outcomes of cases, which 
themselves may have accommodation merits, could depend on whether it is the 
employer’s or employee’s offer of accommodation which the court is considering. It 
is submitted that the differences observed here are symptomatic of a reasonable 
accommodation doctrine which has been loosely defined and applied by the courts. 
This in turn creates the potential for contrasting results across similar cases. Without 
more concrete tests in place this appears unfair, arbitrary and unsatisfactory.  
 
Unfortunately, the uncertainty which the de minimis test creates is continued in 
circumstances where an employee makes an alternative accommodation suggestion 
in response to one already offered by the employer. It has been held that where an 
employer makes an accommodation suggestion the employee will be required to 
agree to it irrespective of a separately identified accommodation option which the 
employee may propose. This issue came before the Supreme Court in Ansonia where 
it was held that there was no requirement that the employer offer an employee their 
preferred accommodation. It was said that there was no basis ‘for requiring an 
employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation ... Thus, where the 
employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the 
statutory inquiry is at an end’.140 Indeed, ‘[t]he fact that an employee can identify an 
alternative accommodation which he or she would prefer does not change matters: 
the employer is under no obligation to offer the employee the least disadvantageous 
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accommodation available. There is a requirement on the employee to be flexible in 
accepting an accommodation if it is reasonable, even if he can identify less 
disadvantageous accommodations’.141 This was mirrored in Wilson v. US West 
Communications
142
 where an employee who wore a graphic badge of an aborted 
foetus in order to display her religious objections to abortion was required to remove 
it by her employer. Accommodations were suggested by the employer, all of which 
were rejected by the employee in favour of alternative suggestions. The employee 
lost the case as ‘the company was not required to accept any of the accommodations 
... proposed’.143 The expectation of reasonableness appears to fall on the employee 
when accommodation requests between employer and employee clash, a point 
reinforced in other cases such as Breech v. Alabama Power
144
 which, quoting 
Morgan J. in Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Department,145 highlighted that 
‘while an employer has a duty to make reasonable accommodations for an 
employee's religious beliefs, the employee has a corresponding “duty to make a good 
faith attempt to accommodate his religious needs through means offered by the 
employer”’.146 This is acutely difficult to justify in circumstances where a reduction 
in pay or a demotion will not prevent a finding that the employer’s original 
accommodation was reasonable.
147
 
 
4. ‘ACCOMMODATION’ IN FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAIMS 
 
The de minimis test may be compared with the approach taken to exception claims in 
American constitutional religious rights cases. These cases, as in Canada, are not 
limited to employment matters. Here, under the free exercise of religion guarantee, 
the courts undertake an ‘accommodation’ investigation where an individual claims 
that state or government interests in restricting religious practice should have been 
pursued through less restrictive means.
148
 Whilst such free exercise cases do not 
apply the de minimis test from religious discrimination, the overall effect of the legal 
analysis is very similar: where the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion 
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is compromised by a particular legislative provision with no attempts to 
accommodate religion – where such attempts could have been made – then the lack 
of exception (or ‘accommodation’) may be unconstitutional. The language of 
‘reasonable accommodation’ has even begun to be used in academic commentary 
with McConnell commenting that ‘[t]he central questions under the Religion Clauses 
have come to be framed in terms of “accommodation” of religion’.149 This reinforces 
the view that a total lack of engagement with a request for (reasonable) 
accommodation of religion at both the constitutional and discrimination law levels is 
impermissible given that to conclude otherwise would render the accommodation 
duty practically invisible.  
 
In Sherbert, ‘the Court recognised for the first time that, under certain circumstances, 
an individual is entitled to an exception from the application of a general rule based 
on his freedom of religion’.150 It was decided that an exception could be granted 
where the application of a rule would amount to an infringement of religious liberty 
which could not be justified by a compelling state interest where there were less 
restrictive means of pursuing this interest.
151
 The test supported the granting of an 
exception in Yoder which granted Amish parents the right to withdraw their children 
from school at the age of 14 so as to continue their education within the religious 
Amish community.   
 
However, the approaches in these two cases were rejected in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith (Smith) 
152
 a ‘formal neutrality’ 
decision which refused an exception for religious use of the hallucinogenic drug 
‘peyote’ by members of the Native American Church, a right limited by drugs laws 
of general applicability to all.
153
 There was particular evidence in the Supreme 
Court’s judgment that it was influenced in this decision by the fact that the generally 
applicable neutral law in question was a criminal law,
154
 ‘the Court fear[ing] that to 
create exemptions under such circumstances would be to allow a religious objector to 
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become a law unto himself’.155 Support has been found for the formal neutrality of 
Smith, with it being said that prior to 1990 ‘there was a widespread fallacy that 
religious entities should not be answerable to any law but the most necessary’.156 
However, the decision that a law of general application should apply to all citizens 
without dilution via an exception has been described as a ‘cavalier relegation of 
religious claims.’157 This is due to the fact that the judgment’s effect was to 
‘substantially narrow ... the range of circumstances in which burdens on the free 
exercise of religion would be submitted to strict constitutional scrutiny, and 
correspondingly expand ... the range of permissible state interference in the religious 
realm’.158  
 
After Smith, it appeared that the free exercise of religion would be subordinated in 
instances where a generally applicable and neutral rule restricted religious freedom: 
this position could only be reversed by a number of minimal qualifications. These 
included ‘hybrid’ situations where free exercise claims were made in tandem with 
other constitutional protections such as freedom of speech and of the press,
159
 and the 
operation of non-neutral/non-general laws
160
 that ‘intentionally target and 
discriminate against religious groups or religious activities’.161 However, the hostile 
reaction to Smith resulted in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 (RFRA) 
‘which established a ‘right to exemption’ for religious motives within the limits laid 
down in Sherbert’.162 This reasserted the ‘substantive neutrality’ idea from Sherbert 
that justification of a compelling state interest would also involve proving that such 
an interest was being furthered by the least restrictive means, ‘attempt[ing] a 
substantive change in constitutional protection’.163 To this extent, the RFRA ‘sought 
to provide the same statutory protection that the Supreme Court had previously 
provided as a matter of constitutional interpretation’.164 The RFRA, which first 
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appeared for judicial discussion in City of Boerne v. Flores, (Boerne)
165
 was an 
important vindication of the ‘compelling state interest’ test, interpreted initially as 
restoring the position pre-Smith in relation to all interferences with the free exercise 
of religion. This meant that, as with cases such as Sherbert and Yoder, a religious 
adherent had to adduce evidence of their religion, belief and sincerity in that exercise 
of belief. This had to be done before proceeding to demonstrate how the restriction 
placed upon the free exercise of their religion was sufficient enough to require a 
religious exemption, so far as it overrode a compelling state interest which could not 
be achieved by less restrictive means.  
 
This reassertion of the pre-Smith position was short-lived. Boerne also established 
that the RFRA did not apply to claims of religious freedom against individual states: 
it could only be pursued at the federal level.
166
 Nevertheless, the test has since been 
applied in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal
167
 to 
successfully allow an exemption for a religious minority to use hoasca – a 
hallucinogenic tea banned under federal law – in sacramental services. This was a 
‘particularly vigorous interpretation of the RFRA ... [E]ven where apparently strong 
[federal law] claims are present, an individualised assessment of the federal interests 
and possible alternative means of achieving those interests is necessary’. 
Significantly, a large range of states have now enacted legal provisions which are 
more generous to religion than the position in Smith. Research by Durham Jr. and 
Smith
168
 has found that thirteen states
169
 have implemented their own RFRA-
equivalent laws, whilst eleven
170
 have applied a more protective standard than Smith, 
leading to the view that ‘[t]oday, looking back, it is becoming increasingly evident 
that the worst fears have not been realised. Because of strong legislative and judicial 
responses to Smith at both the federal and state levels, classic free exercise 
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protections insisting on strict scrutiny of burdens on religion ... have been 
reinvigorated’.171  
 
Given the absence of a reasonable accommodation duty in the provision of goods and 
services, the use of accommodation language in free exercise claims is significant: it 
may be of use in any future attempts to draft a reasonable accommodation duty and 
accompanying undue hardship test in this sphere. Moreover, it may also be 
instructive in highlighting a more benevolent standard of undue hardship in 
employment cases. Indeed, the expansion of free exercise protection post-Smith has 
implications for reasonable accommodation generally. It is instructive to note Ruan’s 
observation that: 
 
[n]ot since several landmark rulings of the 1970s and 1980s has the 
[Supreme] Court reviewed the Title VII statutory mandate that employers 
must accommodate religion in the workplace ... [W]hen the religious 
accommodation law is reviewed by the Court again, in order for the Court’s 
Title VII workplace jurisprudence to be consistent with its shift toward 
supporting religious expression [in free exercise claims], the Court is likely to 
support more protection for religious workers.
172
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The US has opted for a restrictive approach to reasonable accommodation, guided by 
a narrow test for undue hardship: the restrictively defined de minimis standard. 
Unfortunately, this standard has been clumsily applied by the US courts when 
assessing ‘reasonable accommodation’ claims in employment. There are 
inconsistencies in the case law and difficulties in discerning clarity. To that extent, 
the jurisprudence may be viewed as not hard and fast but, rather, indicative. In 
contrast to Canadian discrimination law, it has ‘severely limited employers’ 
obligations to accommodate religious employees’.173 The US approach also shows 
how ‘it is possible to have a generous and broad understanding of religion for the 
purposes of the discrimination protection, without having to provide broad and 
generous levels of accommodation for the practice of such beliefs’.174 
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Whilst, at the very lowest level, reasonable accommodation has provided protection 
for religious employees where the employer makes no effort to accommodate (and 
cannot show that undue hardship would have been present had they accommodated), 
once accommodation suggestions are proposed, either by the employer or the 
employee, the balance seems to become more perilous for the employee. This is 
exactly because of the courts conception of undue hardship as embodying a de 
minimis rule – a standard already conceived of as placing a ‘low evidentiary burden 
on employers’175 which as a result means that courts may take little cognisance of the 
EEOC criteria for exploring accommodation matters (for example, cost or inter-
changeability of workforce). Indeed, such criteria seem to have become rather 
obsolete given the focus on the extent of employer/employee cross-engagement in 
the accommodation dialogue. Prenkert and Magid support this perspective, 
submitting that the US courts have ‘limited the effectiveness of the [EEOC] 
Guidelines’ employee-friendly orientation regarding reasonable accommodation’.176 
This contributes to the fact that ‘there remains concern over the interpretation of 
guidelines’ which are used to assess reasonable accommodation of religion’177 with 
other commentators such as Vickers reinforcing this by suggesting that ‘the duty of 
accommodation is more apparent than real. It would seem that what is given with one 
hand via the duty of accommodation is taken away with the other via the low level of 
hardship needed to defeat the duty. In effect, although a duty to accommodate exists 
it is so easily overridden that employees’ religious interests are given very little 
practical protection’.178 Indeed, ‘the courts [have not] relied on the included EEOC 
guidelines’.179  
 
As a result, the US de minimis test for reasonable accommodation of religion is 
perhaps unsuited to any transfer to the domestic setting. It compares unfavourably 
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with the more structured tests for undue hardship which feature in Canada. Recent 
legislative attempts to incorporate into religious discrimination the undue hardship 
standard of US disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
1990 (ADA) have failed, the most recent being the unsuccessfully proposed 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act 2007. Such a change would have replaced the 
lower de minimis threshold ‘with the much more demanding ADA “significant 
difficulty or expense” standard. The net result would be a greater burden on 
employers’.180 It also remains to be seen how instructive the more flexible free 
exercise jurisprudence will be in future cases of reasonable accommodation in either 
employment or, if it is extended further, other spheres such as goods and services 
provision. 
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CHAPTER 9: RELIGION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Canadian and United States (US) reasonable accommodation models will now 
be applied to the religious discrimination cases in employment discussed in chapter 
six, sections 2.1 and 4. The current chapter deals with the clash between religion and 
issues of sexual orientation. Chapters ten and eleven, respectively, deal with the clash 
between religion and employer dress codes and employer work schedules. 
Throughout these three chapters it will be seen that the Canadian model affords a 
more exhaustive proportionality consideration of all relevant accommodation factors 
than its US counterpart. Conclusions on both this and all other relevant reasonable 
accommodation matters are deferred until chapter twelve. 
 
2. McCLINTOCK v. DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS 
(McClintock)
 1
 
 
The appellant (McClintock) was a Justice of the Peace (JP) in Sheffield and a 
committed practising Christian. He commenced his post in 1988 and on starting his 
job was required to take the Judicial Oath which obliged him to apply the law to all 
individuals irrespective of ‘religion, creed or persuasion’.2 Part of his duties for the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs (the DCA) included serving as a JP on the 
Family Panel, a post which he had held since 1991 and, by virtue of subsequent 
legislation
3
 (which effected a change to his job role), might have required him to 
agree to place children for adoption with same-sex couples. His request to be 
excused from this duty by way of an administrative arrangement was refused.
4
 He 
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resigned from the Family Panel, although continued to serve as a JP on the Adult 
Panel. He claimed, inter alia, direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief.
5
  
 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) noted that the Employment Tribunal (ET) 
had found McClintock had strong views on same-sex adoption, viewing any children 
involved as ‘“guinea pigs” in a “social experiment”’.6 Moreover, the evidence 
revealed that he found the existence of divided expert evidence on same-sex adoption 
to have implications for his legal duty to act in the best interests of the child. He 
claimed he would have liked advice from the DCA on how to reconcile these ethical 
matters. However, the ET also found that his specific religious views on the matter 
had not been communicated to the DCA when he requested accommodation; indeed 
his objections were restricted to those based on the limited research available 
regarding the impact of children raised in same-sex households. The EAT said this 
was of critical importance in the ET’s rejection of the direct discrimination claim7 as 
he could not have been treated less favourably on grounds of religion or belief. 
McClintock did not pursue the direct discrimination claim later in the EAT. The 
indirect discrimination claim in the EAT was rejected. The ET’s reasoning was 
followed: McClintock had ‘chose[n] not to put his objections on the basis of any 
religious or philosophical belief’.8 There was no disadvantage suffered on the basis 
of his religion as at the time this ‘was not the basis of his personal objections’.9 It 
was decided that, even if McClintock had communicated his religious beliefs 
effectively, the indirect discrimination would have been justified as proportionate.
10
 
Moreover, there had been no pressure for him to resign: that had been his choice. The 
DCA had reminded him of his duties and obligations as a JP under the Judicial Oath.  
                                                                                                                                                      
he commenced his post at a time when the law and social mores were very different. This is akin to 
the operation of the specific situation rule (see chapter 6, section 2.1.1), although under reasonable 
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It is clear that McClintock should have raised his religious objections earlier on in 
proceedings to better prepare any indirect discrimination claim.
11
 This would also 
have provided a basis for any reasonable accommodation query.  
 
3. McCLINTOCK: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
The relevant factors in McClintock are discussed below. As will all domestic cases 
discussed across chapters nine to eleven, important decisions from Canada will be 
identified and applied. References to these will be in the form of either footnotes or 
sections from chapter seven depending on – respectively – whether an argument 
relates to a specific point from a case or, alternatively, a general debate which the 
case raises.   
 
3.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
Cost and size can be considered together given that they are linked. It will be recalled 
that the standard affixed to undue hardship is very challenging for employers to 
surmount. That standard is one of ‘impossibility’ from British Columbia (Public 
Service Employee Relations Comm) v. BCGEU (the ‘Meiorin’ case).12 It is possible 
that there would have been some (perhaps negligible) financial cost to the DCA in 
accommodating McClintock. This might have come from having to make special 
administrative arrangements to replace him on the Family Bench with another JP and 
from having to pay that other JP additional subsistence expenses (although this might 
have been covered by a corresponding reduction in McClintock’s subsistence 
allowance given the reduced workload which may have resulted from his 
accommodation). However, it might have been appropriate for such cost to have 
been borne by the DCA given that it had gone to no lengths to investigate or offer 
any possible exception.
13
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Interestingly, the EAT said there was ‘no doubt’14 that ‘an administrative exception 
could have been made, but it does not follow that there was a duty to make it’.15 The 
court’s use of accommodation language here is significant: although it is not 
currently obliged to interrogate the various ways in which potential accommodations 
could have been offered, it would be required to consider this more fully if a 
reasonable accommodation doctrine were incorporated into domestic discrimination 
law. In Canada, recognition of reasonable accommodation for religion means that if 
an accommodation can be made then it is possible to discern a duty on the employer 
to accommodate, particularly if the employer goes to no lengths to investigate 
possible exceptions or its refusal is wholly unreasonable.
16
 Of course, the Canadian 
model does provide for equitable apportioning of financial costs for accommodations 
as between employee and employer,
17
 although it remains critical to consider 
McClintock’s circumstances – the fact that any excusal from serving on same-sex 
adoption panels might have been sporadic and infrequent could have meant that, as 
in Chambly (Commission Scolaire Regionale) v. Bergevin, the DCA would be 
required to meet most of the cost, unlike in Ontario Human Rights Commission 
(O’Malley) v. Simpson Sears (O’Malley)18 where the accommodation was required 
on a more regular basis. Alternatively, costs for all involved may have been 
minimised by partially accommodating McClintock to the extent that, depending on 
practicability at the time, he was sometimes excused from sitting on same-sex 
adoption panels.  
 
3.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
There was no evidence that other employees’ rights and morale were a legitimate 
concern. Given that no other JPs had come forward to express the same concerns as 
McClintock, it may be reasonably inferred that they did not share his objections. 
Whether it is possible to further infer from this that they particularly supported 
adoption for same-sex couples and, therefore, would have been offended by his 
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stance (thereby affecting their morale) is perhaps moot. In any case, the Canadian 
jurisprudence
19
 shows that even where employee morale has been identified as a 
legitimate factor this does not necessarily mean it will of itself amount to undue 
hardship. Problems with employee morale in the accommodation of a religious 
employee have to stem from substantial
20
 interference with the rights at work of 
those employees. As McClintock was objecting to undertaking a part of his job 
which related to the adoption rights of gay couples it is possible that other JPs could 
have viewed accommodation as incompatible with equality rights, particularly if 
there were homosexual JPs with which McClintock worked (although this might be 
better understood as an affront to their dignity at work rather than interference with 
their equality rights at work). Any complaints from heterosexual JPs who were 
offended by proxy might be said to be too remote from the subject of the 
accommodation due to their sexual orientation. The issue of employee morale in the 
context of reasonable accommodation and issues of sexual orientation is considered 
further in section 5.2 below.  
 
3.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer21 
 
These two criteria can also be considered together due to the overlap between them. 
In relation to inter-changeability of the workforce the Canadian system has identified 
again that where an employer takes no steps to accommodate they will fail the 
reasonable accommodation duty, particularly where other workers could have been 
assigned.
22
 The DCA made no attempt to engage with the accommodation request 
made by McClintock. It is difficult to predict whether this would have been different 
had they known about his religious convictions. As there was a total failure to 
                                                     
19
 Renaud: see chapter 7 n. 74.  
20
 See chapter 7 n. 76. 
21
 Under domestic law on reasonable adjustments in disability discrimination this heading would have 
provided a range of potential adjustments: see the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) 
Equality Act 2010: Code of Practice (Employment) (Code of Practice: Employment), para. 6.33 and 
‘enabling the [religious] person to have some of their duties allocated to another person’, ‘transferr[al] 
within the organisation to fill an existing vacancy’, having ‘hours of work ... altered’, or getting 
‘assigned to a different place of work or training’. Of course, this would have had to pass the EHRC’s 
criteria for ‘reasonableness’ contained in paras. 6.28 (including practicability, disruption and cost) and 
6.35 (cooperation of other workers). Reasonableness is assessed objectively: para. 6.29. The Code of 
Practice: Employment is available at:  
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/EqualityAct/employercode.pdf>, accessed 24
th
 
August 2012.  
22
 Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Social Services) (Moore) (1992) 17 CHRR D/426: see 
chapter 7 n. 79 (see also generally chapter 7, section 4.1.4). 
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respond to the accommodation request in any way it might have been difficult for the 
DCA to claim undue hardship on the basis of Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of 
Social Services) (Moore)
23
 and Jones v. Eisler (Eisler).
24
 Had they investigated the 
possibility of accommodation it could have been the case that other JPs might have 
been assigned to all or some of McClintock’s same-sex adoption cases, albeit at 
some administrative burden and cost which the DCA might have had to bear. Of 
course, the DCA would have had to canvass
25
 other JPs’ willingness to swap with 
McClintock and this would be dependent on not only how palatable those JPs’ found 
McClintock’s views (it seems necessary to take this into account after Renaud26) but 
also their own contractual arrangements and availability. Putting these matters aside, 
the redeployment of JPs in McClintock would also have depended on the number of 
them with suitable experience and expertise in McClintock’s location, specifically 
Sheffield.  
 
Of course, the danger with this solution is that an accommodation could ‘impose 
greater burdens on others or lead to a situation whereby another pool of judges with 
views in another direction might have to sit and adjudicate on such cases’.27 It is 
possible that this may have been mitigated or indeed negated by McClintock being 
prepared to assume additional duties to replace those he was accommodated from 
having to undertake. Accommodation might also have depended on demand for 
same-sex adoption applications and whether there were sufficient numbers of JPs on 
the Family Panel available to hear such applications in McClintock’s absence. Had 
the DCA made an exception for him it may have been able to deal with this by 
requesting that he serve on same-sex adoption panels in ‘one-off’ cases, with any 
refusal by him causing undue hardship to the DCA.  
 
On the assumption that other JPs could have been assigned to swap same-sex 
adoption duties with McClintock, both Vickers
28
 and Lafferty
29
 have argued that any 
potential for duty-swapping will reduce the chances of the employer being able to 
                                                     
23
 See above n. 22.  
24
 [2001] BCHRTD No. 1. 
25
 As determined in Renaud: see chapter 7 n. 87. 
26
 See Hambler and Vickers who question this approach: chapter 7 n. 89 and n. 90, respectively. 
27
 The view of the ET as highlighted by Elias J at para. 29.  
28
 See chapter 7 n. 80. 
29
 Ibid., n. 81.  
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establish undue hardship under the Canadian model. Indeed, in Central Alberta 
Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission) (Alberta)
30
 it was noted that 
accommodation will be particularly irresistible where an employee absence from a 
duty is isolated in nature
31
 (as indeed it may have been in McClintock).  
 
3.4 Other undue hardship factors 
 
Following Alberta, suggestions could have been made as to other factors which 
could have tipped the accommodation balance McClintock’s way. This is one of the 
benefits of the Canadian system – reasonable accommodation allows proportionate 
consideration and intricate assessment of all the circumstances to reveal any practical 
accommodation(s) which would not compromise the employer’s legitimate aims.  
 
3.4.1 Internal policies and external public relations 
 
The judicial oath which McClintock had signed was a key factor in blocking his 
accommodation request. The ET had noted previous instances where ‘judges had 
been allowed to recuse themselves from a general class of case because of hostility 
towards, or conscientious objection to applying, particular laws’.32 These included 
the absences of Lord Scott from cases involving the Hunting Act 2004 (who, in 
opposition to the legislation, had made speeches to that effect during debates on the 
Act in the House of Lords) and certain JPs in South Yorkshire from appearing in 
cases concerning miners’ strikes (due to the appearance of bias and/or for 
administrative reasons). However, the EAT was of the view that these previously 
permitted exceptions were not analogous to McClintock’s situation.33 Bearing in 
mind the fact that he had not made his religious feelings clear, creating any 
accommodation for him at his whim (rather than because of a more fundamentally 
grounded objection) might have undermined public confidence in the judiciary. The 
ET commented that ‘it would be invidious were judges to pick and choose which 
                                                     
30
 [1990] 2 SCR 489. 
31
 See chapter 7 n. 86 
32
 per Elias J at para.10.  
33
 Ibid., at para. 52. 
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cases they were prepared to sit on. It would undermine the basis of our judicial 
system, one that ‘warts and all’ has served people well for a very long time’.34  
 
Consequently, it was a matter of internal policy that meant McClintock could not be 
accommodated. Whilst the undermining of public confidence was based on assertion 
rather than fact, the link between that and upholding the judicial oath was no doubt 
viewed as self-evident.
35
 Had he made his religious views known earlier on it is 
unclear whether this would have persuaded the ET or EAT otherwise. Under the 
Canadian model it would be necessary to determine how far, if at all, a practical 
accommodation would have been possible so as to not override the spirit of the 
judicial oath,
36
 taking into account the tension with sexual orientation equality that 
preferential treatment for him would have created.  This balance is revisited in more 
depth during discussion below of Ladele v. London Borough of Islington. 
 
4. McCLINTOCK: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
The same approach to referencing as employed under application of the Canadian 
model is used here, as it is across chapters nine to eleven, when discussing the US 
system of reasonable accommodation.  
 
4.1 Economic hardship 
 
It must be recalled that the US adopts a de minimis (more than minimal) test for 
undue hardship:
37
 if the accommodation would require a more then minimal 
obligation on the part of the employer then that employer will not be required to 
accommodate the religious employee. It is unclear how much of a financial cost the 
                                                     
34
 Ibid., at para. 29. 
35
 Domestic decisions have ruled that in some situations where the link is ambiguous there should be 
specific evidence. In Noah v. Desrosiers t/a Wedge (Noah) [2008] ET 2201867/07 a hair salon 
terminated a Muslim woman’s interview for the position of assistant stylist on the basis that she wore 
a headscarf which concealed her own haircut. The salon was known for very modern hair styles and 
viewed it as legitimate that staff display their own hair cut to clients. The ET ruled that although ‘there 
was evidence that supported the legitimacy of the general concern in relation to the Respondent’s 
particular business, there was no specific evidence ... as to what would (for sure) have been the actual 
impact’: per Judge Auerbach at para. 159 (original emphasis). 
36
 Which obliged McClintock to apply the law to all individuals irrespective of ‘religion, creed or 
persuasion’. 
37
 Trans World Airlines v. Hardison (Hardison) 432 US 63 (1977) and Ansonia Board of Education v. 
Philbrook (Ansonia) 479 US 60 (1986). See chapter 8 n. 68 and n. 69, respectively.   
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DCA would have had to bear by accommodating McClintock, although it seems 
unlikely this would have been very high. Given that the employer’s circumstances 
will be taken into account in deciding whether economic hardship will surmount the 
de minimis hurdle
38
 more might have to be asked about the nature of the DCA’s 
available resources in subsidising McClintock’s accommodation claim. In any event, 
evidence would of course be required of economic hardship.
39
  
 
4.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
Non-economic hardship may include employer policies of equality and general 
impartiality that employees are intended to honour in projecting such a message to 
the public. As the DCA was a public body, and given that McClintock in signing the 
judicial oath would have been aware from the outset of his duty to apply the law to 
all individuals irrespective of religion, creed or persuasion,
40
 it is possible that the 
circumstances were analogous to those in Webb v. City of Philadelphia (Webb)
41
 
where a public employer had a well-known policy of religious neutrality. Given the 
fixed and familiar nature of this policy it was found in Webb that any obligation the 
public employer had to engage with the employee’s accommodation request was 
neutralised.
42
 As such, the DCA’s failure to engage with McClintock’s 
accommodation request might also have been condoned unless he could have been 
accommodated behind the scenes. This highlights the US courts’ findings that certain 
arbitrary reasons
43
 (of which the example in Webb is one) will negate any need for 
                                                     
38
 Tooley v. Martin—Marietta Corp. (Tooley) 648 F.2d 1239 (Ninth Circuit, 1981): see chapter 8 n. 
79. 
39
 For example, as in Protos v. Volkswagen of America Inc. (Protos) 797 F.2d 129 (Third Circuit, 
1986): see chapter 8 n. 81 (see also generally chapter 8, section 3.1.2). 
40
 See above n. 36. 
41
 562 F.3d 256 (Third Circuit, 2009). For discussion of the facts in Webb, see chapter 8, section 3.1.3. 
42
 However, Vickers makes the argument that is it ‘not clear-cut’ why public-sector organisations 
should automatically find it less difficult to justify non-accommodation of religion. Whilst they may 
exist to perform a more ‘secular’ role than private institutions it could equally be argued that the 
public sector should ‘reflect its community and so accommodate both sexual orientation and religion 
and belief’: ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: an emerging hierarchy’ (2010) 12 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280, p. 292 and, generally, pp. 292 – 294. Rivers has gone further and said 
that arguments against accommodation of religion by public bodies on the basis that such bodies are 
publicly funded is misconceived: ‘the notion that “ethics flow with money” [is] “irrational, wrong and 
illiberal”’ (as quoted in A. Donald et al, Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 84: 
religion or belief, equality and human rights in England and Wales, p. 103. Available at: 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/rr84_final_opt.pdf>, accessed 24
th
 
August 2012). 
43
 For discussion of these reasons see chapter 8, section 3.1.3. 
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the employer to engage with the accommodation request other than to refuse it 
outright and claim that the reason automatically clears the de minimis hurdle.  
 
4.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
Arbitrary reasons aside, a total lack of accommodation dialogue from employer to 
employee (as happened in McClintock)
 44
 will usually result in a finding of no undue 
hardship on the employer. However, this can be avoided if the employer makes a 
counter-offer which attempts at some sort of partial accommodation. No such 
counter-offers were made in McClintock. Nevertheless, it is still not clear on the facts 
of McClintock that an accommodation would have been required under the US 
model. Although there was little evidence on the facts either way, it is worth 
speculating briefly on the distinction between real and hypothetical hardship. The 
general view of the US courts is that refusal of an accommodation request must be 
based on the former and not the latter.
45
 Whilst the DCA did not identify either real 
or hypothetical hardship, the latter was identified by the ET in respect of the various 
effects of an accommodation on other employees.
46
 Of course, had the DCA relied 
on hypothetical hardship, Tooley v. Martin—Marietta Corp. (Tooley) and EEOC v. 
Alamo Rent-A-Car (Alamo) have ruled that this should preclude any finding of undue 
hardship. However, some US decisions
47
 have allowed hypothetical hardship to 
surmount the de minimis hurdle for the employer although these pre-date the 
judgment in Alamo. In any event, Cloutier v. Costco
48
 has established that the 
existence of employer policies of themselves (it is possible the DCA’s judicial oath 
would count as such a policy) will establish real hardship.
49
  
                                                     
44
 This would have been significant under the EHRC’s Code of Practice: Employment on reasonable 
adjustments which requires employers to conduct a proper assessment of what reasonable adjustments 
may be required (para. 6.33). Indeed, the holding of an enquiry to determine possible steps to take in 
potentially meeting the accommodation request has been viewed as ‘good practice’ in disability cases: 
Cosgrove v. Caesar & Howie [2001] IRLR 653. 
45
 Tooley and EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car (Alamo) 432 F.Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Arizona, 2006): see 
chapter 8 n. 104 and n. 107, respectively.  
46
 For example, it is noted at para. 29 of Elias J.’s judgment in the EAT that the ET had commented 
that accommodation ‘could ... impose greater burdens on others or lead to a situation whereby another 
pool of Judges with views in another direction might have to sit and adjudicate on such issues’ 
(emphasis added). No evidence was presented in support of the ET’s view.  
47
 Hardison: see chapter 8 n. 114. 
48
 390  F.3d 126 (First Circuit, 2004).  
49
 See chapter 8 n. 111. 
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5. LADELE v. LONDON BOROUGH OF ISLINGTON (Ladele)
50
  
 
The appellant (Ladele) was appointed as a registrar of births, marriages and deaths in 
November 2002 having worked for the respondent (Islington) since 1992. On 
becoming a registrar, whilst continuing to work for Islington and receiving a salary 
from them, she held a statutory office under s. 6 of the Registration Services Act 
1953 which continued until December 2007. In that time she was not an employee of 
Islington: she was an independent office holder although she was under a duty to 
abide by Islington’s work policies. In December 2007, by virtue of s. 69 of the 
Statistics and Registration Services Act 2007, she gained employment status and 
rights as a registrar and so became a direct employee of Islington until she resigned 
with effect from September 2009. During her time as a registrar, albeit before she 
became a direct employee of Islington, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA) came 
into force in December 2005 which afforded legal recognition to same-sex couples 
who became civil partners. The Act not only provided for the designation of civil 
partnership registrars
51
 but also required that each registration authority ensure that 
there was a sufficient number of civil partnership registrars for its area to carry out 
the various functions needed regarding the posts.
52
 No authorities were required to 
designate all existing registrars.  
 
During summer 2004 Ladele made it clear to her employers that she would find it 
difficult to conduct civil partnerships due to her Christian belief that marriage was 
the union of a woman and man, not two people of the same sex. An exception from 
such duties was required whilst she continued officiating mixed-sex unions. 
However, Islington decided that civil partnership duties would be shared out amongst 
existing registrars and so they elected (although there was no legal obligation to do 
so) to designate all registrars as civil partnership registrars. This was not a procedure 
followed by all authorities, some of which chose not to designate all existing 
                                                     
50
 [2009] EWCA Civ 1357. The facts referred to in the section which follows are taken from the 
judgments of Elias J. in the EAT ([2009] IRLR 154), Lord Neuberger MR in the Court of Appeal 
(CA), the Statement of Facts in Ladele and McFarlane v. UK [2011] ECHR 737, the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) submission in Ladele and McFarlane v. UK, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) Comments on the third party interventions in Ladele and McFarlane 
v. UK, 14
th
 October 2011 and the FCO Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom in 
Ladele and McFarlane v. UK, 14
th
 October 2011.  
51
 Section 29(1).  
52
 Section 29(2).  
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registrars. Islington made its decision and accompanying designations whilst Ladele 
was on sick leave between May and November 2005, this decision going against her 
wishes. Moreover, she was not consulted. Two other registrars had also raised 
objections to carrying out civil partnership ceremony duties; one left Islington’s 
service and the other, who was a direct employee of Islington, was offered alternative 
employment on the same pay. This offer was accepted.  
 
As the legislation did not necessarily have to apply to Ladele (unlike the scenario in 
McClintock) there arose the question as to what effect the designation process might 
have on her request to be excused from civil partnership duties.  Relevant to this was 
the issue of how far Ladele could have avoided the clash; especially given that she 
could not possibly have known when she first commenced her job that in future years 
she would be required to conduct civil partnership ceremonies. Of particular note 
was the scope of Ladele’s role at the time the law on same-sex civil partnerships was 
introduced, such a legal development being the catalyst for the revision of her role 
which formed the basis of her discrimination claims. When the Civil Partnership Act 
2004 came into force she was employed as a registrar of births, marriages and deaths. 
It could be argued that at the time she commenced her job and received her duties 
(putting aside the switch in employer which occurred during her tenure) she 
effectively agreed to conduct marriage ceremonies irrespective of the genders, mixed 
or otherwise, of the parties marrying. Had the legal change been to introduce a law 
permitting same-sex marriage this would have mirrored the issue in McClintock – a 
subsequent legal change which updated and redefined a specific concept that directly 
related to certain of the individual’s job duties. In McClintock this concept was 
adoption, the relevant job duty being the decision-making role in adoption 
applications; in Ladele the concept was marriage, the relevant job duty being the 
registration of, amongst other things, marriages.  
 
However, the relevant legal change in Ladele introduced a new concept to the 
operation of the appellant’s job duty, that of the civil partnership (available only for 
same-sex couples) which for legal purposes was distinct to the concept of marriage.
53
 
Arguably, this change to Ladele’s role was different in nature to that effected in 
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 This distinction has been debated in R. Sandberg: ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157, pp. 163 – 166.  
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McClintock in that ‘civil partnership’ could never, even on an inclusive 
understanding of ‘marriage’, have been included as part of her original job 
description. If this is correct then it is possible the specific situation rule in relation to 
the subsequent legal change did not apply to Ladele as she had not voluntarily agreed 
to a contract of employment that included civil partnership.
54
  
 
After raising her objections, Ladele was offered an accommodation by Islington. 
This was a temporary measure which would only have required her to conduct civil 
partnership ceremonies confined to the simple signing process, as opposed to the full 
ceremonies themselves. It is possible she was not offered the same alternative 
employment as the other employee because she was not a direct employee of 
Islington at the time. Ultimately, she refused the temporary accommodation 
compromise (because it would not have excused her from all civil partnership duties) 
and renewed her request for full accommodation. During this time her obligation to 
perform civil partnership ceremonies still stood although she was able to make 
informal rota swaps with other colleagues to avoid officiating at such ceremonies. 
Islington turned a blind eye to this practice. As a result of these circumstances, two 
of Ladele’s colleagues who were gay complained to Islington claiming that they 
found her behaviour offensive and in breach of Islington’s ‘Dignity For All’ policy: 
this provided, inter alia, that there should be equality and freedom from 
discrimination on grounds of, amongst others, sexual orientation for all staff and that 
all staff were to be treated with dignity and respect.  
 
Ladele was the subject of a disciplinary process during summer 2007 during which it 
was conceded by Islington that there was no obligation to impose civil partnership 
duties on her and that they were also not part of her job description.
55
 This process 
did not involve any further investigations as to other potential accommodation offers 
which Islington could have made. From December 2007 Ladele became a direct 
employee of Islington who reminded her once again that accommodating her fully 
would be in breach of its ‘Dignity For All’ policy. However, it repeated to her the 
                                                     
54
 R. Sandberg, ‘The Implications of the Court of Appeal Decision in Ladele and other Case Law 
Developments’: available at: 
<http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/networks/Sandberg%20_%20The%20Implications%20of%20the%20Co
urt%20of%20Appeal%20Decision%20in%20Ladele.pdf>, accessed 22
nd
 August 2012, p. 7.  
55
 It was noted at this time that Ladele was happy to carry out other certain duties for the respondent 
that were also not in her original job description. 
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temporary accommodation offer she had been made previously. Ladele refused this 
offer again and commenced legal proceedings against Islington. In both the EAT and 
Court of Appeal (CA) it was found that, inter alia, she had not suffered either direct
56
 
or indirect
57
 discrimination. This went against the findings of the ET. In relation to 
indirect discrimination, both the EAT and CA found that disadvantage had been 
suffered although this was justified.
58
 Ladele was refused leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court and now applies to the European Court of Human Rights on, amongst 
other grounds, Article 9 both separately and in conjunction with Article 14.
59
 A 
decision from Strasbourg is awaited.  
 
6. LADELE: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
Before any assessment of the Alberta factors, it is necessary to consider whether 
Ladele should have been put in the position of having to request an accommodation 
in the first place. 
 
Ladele was designated as a civil partnership registrar whilst on sick-leave and 
without prior consultation. The designation implemented a substantial change to her 
responsibilities which, as Islington conceded, were not in fact part of her original job 
description.
60
 Even more noteworthy, Islington was under no legal obligation to 
designate her as a civil partnership registrar in the first place: critically, they had a 
choice
61
 to not designate her if they wished, this situation having been deemed 
acceptable by the Registrar General who ‘had left it to each local superintendent 
registrar to make the appropriate arrangements’.62 Consequently, an alternative 
option (in contrast to requiring Islington to accommodate her post-designation) 
                                                     
56
 per Elias J. at para. 90 in the EAT and per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 42 in the CA. Direct 
discrimination was claimed under the RB Regs 2003, Regulation 3(1)(a). 
57
 per Elias J. at para. 117 and per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 75. Indirect discrimination was 
claimed under the RB Regs 2003, Regulation 3(1)(b).  
58
 per Elias J. in the EAT at para.s 111 – 112 and per Lord Neuberger MR in the CA at para. 52.  
59
 Ladele and McFarlane v. UK.  
60
 per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 15.  
61
 This choice is made clear in para. 7 of Lord Neuberger MR’s judgment where it is noted that 
Islington‘decide[d] that civil partnership duties should be shared out between all the existing 
registrars’ (emphasis added). See also comments at  para. 46 of  the judgment.  
62
 per Elias J. at para. 4 (emphasis added).  
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would have been to not designate her or, once designated, to ‘un-designate’63 her so 
that she ceased being a civil partnership registrar. It is regrettable that in the case it 
‘was not fully explored ... whether it [had been] proportionate to designate [Ladele] 
as a civil partnership registrar in the first place’.64 This would have necessitated a 
reclassification of her role and responsibilities, something which presumably would 
have not been ‘impossible’ under the Canadian scheme because there was no 
compulsion to designate all or even specific members of staff as registrars for civil 
partnerships. Of course, such ‘un-designation’ may have been objected to by the 
appellant’s gay colleagues,65 although considering the circumstances of her 
designation in the first place, the fact that designation was not compulsory and that 
un-designation may well have been a useful practical solution, it is suggested that 
such objections should have been dismissed.  
 
The possibility of un-designating Ladele once she had been assigned civil partnership 
duties was confirmed by the decisions of other local authorities in choosing not to 
designate employees as civil partnership registrars if this would have presented 
religious conscience difficulties. This was well documented in the various stages of 
Ladele and viewed by the courts as being unproblematic. In the EAT it was said ‘the 
evidence demonstrated that in other regions accommodation had been made to allow 
those with strong religious beliefs not to have to carry out civil partnership duties. 
The relevant registrar would not be designated for civil partnership services or else 
the work would be distributed to other registrars who had no concerns about 
performing those ceremonies’.66 The practical value in this approach was lauded by 
Elias J. who commented that ‘we would be sorry if pragmatic ways of seeking to 
accommodate beliefs were impermissible ... it may be that choosing not to designate 
those with strong religious objections would be a lawful way of reconciling conflicts 
in this highly sensitive area ... there seems to us to be some virtue in taking a 
pragmatic line if it is lawful’.67 The lawfulness of not designating employees who did 
not wish to be civil partnership registrars on religious grounds was also reinforced by 
                                                     
63
 Whilst this term may seem ugly it captures the idea that Ladele’s duties could have reverted back to 
those she undertook prior to the coming-into-force of the CPA. The alternative term ‘re-designate’ 
does not sufficiently convey this option.  
64
 Vickers, above n. 42, p. 293.  
65
 The morale of Ladele’s gay colleagues is assessed under the Alberta criteria below at section 6.2. 
66
 per Elias J. at para. 23.  
67
 Ibid., at para.s. 116 – 117.  
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the CA
68
 and, whilst the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (on behalf of the 
United Kingdom (UK) Government in Ladele and McFarlane v. UK) was against 
this as a solution,
69
 it is lamentable that the courts in Ladele did not consider whether 
it was really necessary to designate all registrars as civil partnership registrars. The 
EAT was emphatic in the merits of non-designation in Ladele’s situation, arguing 
that ‘choosing not to designate those with strong religious objections would be a 
lawful way of reconciling conflicts in this highly sensitive area. We would certainly 
have thought it arguable that a council who then made all its designated officers 
available for civil partnership would be acting without discrimination in the 
provision of the civil partnership service’.70  
 
Nevertheless, Islington did elect to ‘ensure that all [its] registrars were designated to 
conduct, and did conduct, civil partnerships, as they regarded this as consistent with 
their strong commitment to fighting discrimination’.71 Moreover, their attitude was 
that to make such an accommodation was wrong 
72
 and, as identified by Vickers, 
against the spirit of its ‘Dignity For All’ policy which committed it to equality on 
grounds of sexual orientation.
73
 However, the fact that Islington did not have to 
designate her as a civil partnership registrar (which would, effectively, have 
accommodated her), was noted by the CA: ‘[i]f they had not so designated her, it 
seems ... that there would have been a powerful case for saying that she would then 
have had no cause to refuse to officiate at civil partnerships’.74 Moreover, non-
designation/’un-designation’ would not have been inconsistent with its ‘Dignity For 
All’ policy: this had a specific scope, applying as it did to Islington’s employees in 
the expectation that they fulfil their roles whilst promoting values of non-
discrimination. Had the appellant not been designated from the outset, or had she 
been un-designated, she would not have been placed in a position where she would 
have had to refuse to perform certain civil partnership ceremonies, such refusals 
having the capacity to contravene the policy and its expectations of staff once placed 
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 per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 75.  
69
 It was said that ‘[i]t is ... no answer that other local authorities had chosen to arrange their civil 
partnership services in a different manner’: Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom, 
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 per Elias J. at para. 116.  
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 per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 46.  
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in a given role. In any event, the fact another employee had not been designated a 
civil partnership registrar and reassigned elsewhere also suggests that non-
designation (and by extension, ‘un-designation’) would not have contravened the 
policy. 
 
Having argued that Ladele could have been fully accommodated from the start, 
reasonable accommodation will now be assessed from the post-designation 
perspective via the relevant factors from Alberta.  
 
6.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
The financial costs associated with fully accommodating Ladele’s request would not 
have established any undue hardship on Islington. There is no suggestion from the 
various judgments that this was an issue; moreover, it had not been a problem in 
accommodating the other employee who had been moved to another role. If there 
had been any monetary cost it is submitted that this would have been negligible in 
which case the same approach would be followed as that in McClintock.
75
 One factor 
affecting this would be the offers made by Islington to Ladele during the dispute.  
The existence of such alternative offers of partial accommodation is likely to have 
meant that it would be less fair to expect Islington to foot all the financial costs 
associated with a finding that it had to reasonably accommodate Ladele in full,
76
 
although the exact balancing of negligible costs as between the parties would also be 
determined by the fact that the alternative accommodations were temporary.
77
 In any 
event, evidence of costs would have been needed.
78
  
 
6.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
This was a distinct problem post-designation for Ladele’s other colleagues, 
specifically two gay employees who objected to her stance on civil partnerships
79
 
and had argued that such a stance and any attempt to accommodate it would be 
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 See above, section 3.1. 
76
 O’Malley: see chapter 7 above n. 68. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Chambly: see chapter 7 above n. 64. 
79
 per Lord Neuberger MR at para.. 40.  
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demeaning and in breach of Islington’s own ‘Dignity For All’ policy. The fact that an 
accommodation would have impacted on these employees could not, of itself, have 
been a bar to accommodation under the Canadian model.
80
 Renaud has indicated that 
the burden of proving any problem of workforce morale on the employer is high
81
 
with the test being substantial interference with the rights of other employees.
82
 In 
any event, it is debatable whether accommodation would have affected their rights 
whilst at work and, further, it seems unlikely that two would be a sufficient enough 
number of disgruntled workers to establish undue hardship on Islington in meeting 
Ladele’s full request (morale and the rights of the two gay employees had evidently 
not been an barrier to the partial accommodation offers).
83
 In situations such as this 
(and given that the issue for the gay employees was one of dignity rather than 
equality rights at work), Vickers has suggested that homosexual workers could 
pursue harassment claims, assuming that they could establish that accommodation, 
having regard to all the circumstances, could be reasonably considered as having the 
purpose or effect of violating dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, 
humiliating or offensive environment for the victim.
84
 As already implied, the 
criterion of workforce morale in Ladele was strongly shackled to another legitimate 
issue for the employer in dealing with Ladele’s request: specifically the ‘Dignity For 
All’ policy. This is considered in more detail below as a separate undue hardship 
factor.
85
 
 
6.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer86 
 
The CA noted ‘it is pretty clear that, by [fully] accommodating the wishes of the only 
registrar who wanted to avoid all civil partnership functions, Islington would not 
have significantly, if at all, impaired the quality of their registry services, whether in 
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 Renaud: see chapter 7 above n. 74. 
81
 Ibid., n. 76. 
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 Ibid. 
83
 Significantly, under reasonable adjustments in domestic disability discrimination law, it is not 
enough for an employer to point to problematic staff morale as a barrier to accommodation: EHRC 
Code of Practice: Employment, para. 6.35.  
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 Vickers, above n. 42, pp. 296 – 297.  
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6.33. Note the EHRC’s criteria for ‘reasonableness’: see chapter 6, section 3.2.1. 
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the field of civil partnerships or otherwise’.87Whilst Ladele had been offered an 
alternative accommodation (albeit temporary) which she had not accepted (this was 
repeated to her a second time on becoming a direct employee of Islington)
88
 her 
preferred full accommodation may still have been possible. It would have 
undoubtedly entailed some sort of equitable and efficient balancing of duties 
amongst particular employees who, once canvassed,
89
 might have been willing
90
 to 
undertake Ladele’s civil partnership ceremony duties. This would have depended on 
unknown factors such as demand for civil partnerships and how many other 
registrars there were who were able to and available to perform the related functions. 
Assuming other registrars were willing, this would have reduced any undue hardship 
on Islington, particularly if civil partnerships were isolated in their occurrence.
91
 
Following Vickers’ comments in relation to Moore, both Ladele and Islington could 
also have had a more positive dialogue to determine precisely what accommodations 
would have been reasonable after her designation as a civil partnership registrar. This 
would have produced a more interactive discussion between them (for example 
through correspondence or face-to-face meetings) than actually took place.  
 
The practical ease with which Islington might have accommodated Ladele post-
designation is evident once again from their accommodation of the other registrar 
who was moved to another role, although this might not have been an option open to 
Ladele given her different employment status at the time. Of course, once she 
became a direct employee of the Islington in December 2007, the option to move her 
to another role might have been pursued – in the event it was not. However, moving 
Ladele to another role might not have provided a workable solution for her given that 
she seemed to want to stay in her existing role rather than be transferred elsewhere to 
undertake a possibly very different job.  
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 per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 44, quoting from the ET.  
88
 The Canadian position may be that even though a counter-offer is less preferable for an employee a 
rejection of it in favour of attempting to secure full accommodation is more likely to amount to undue 
hardship: see chapter 7, section 4.1.4. 
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 Renaud: see above n. 87. 
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 Note the views of Hambler and Vickers on taking into account other employees’ willingness to 
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6.4 Other undue hardship factors 
 
The Canadian reasonable accommodation scheme might have provided Ladele with a 
full accommodation post-designation. Whilst Islington may have been able to point 
to specific factors from Alberta, each of these could be met with counter-arguments 
based on facts which might have meant that accommodation was still not 
disproportionate or ‘impossible’. However, there are other considerations specific to 
Ladele which merit exploration, particularly as they go to legitimate matters on 
which both Islington and the courts rejected the notion of accommodation.   
 
6.4.1 Internal policies and external public relations 
 
A valid concern for Islington was the fact that by accommodating Ladele it would 
have paradoxically been in breach of its own ‘Dignity For All’ policy. Aside from 
the policy’s link with employee morale there was a broader issue: specifically the 
fact that it affirmed Islington’s public commitment to non-discrimination on, 
amongst other grounds, sexual orientation in the provision of services to the public. 
The CA noted that a rejection of accommodation concerning Ladele’s stance – which 
was based on perceived religious hostility towards same-sex civil partnerships – 
would have been entirely consistent with the ‘Dignity For All’ policy once she was 
designated a civil partnership registrar. Such a policy was an overarching attempt to 
commit not only to the promotion of equality as between Islington’s employees but 
also towards members of the public who were users of their services.
92
 It was said 
that Ladele’s ‘refusal to perform [civil partnerships] involved discriminating against 
gay people in the course of [her] job; she was being asked to perform that task 
because of Islington’s Dignity for All policy, whose laudable aim was to avoid, or at 
least minimise, discrimination both among Islington’s employees, and as between 
Islington (and its employees) and those in the community they served’.93 Moreover, 
in discussing indirect discrimination and the issue of justification the CA, quoting 
from the EAT judgment, found that ‘once it is accepted that the aim of providing the 
[civil partnership] service on a non-discriminatory basis was legitimate – and in truth 
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 per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 45.  
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it was bound to be – then ... it must follow that Islington was entitled to require all 
[designated] registrars to perform the full range of services’.94  
 
To permit Ladele’s full accommodation request would have undermined Islington’s 
own non-discriminatory objectives and, as a result, it was not disproportionate to 
require all such designated civil partnership registrars to perform full civil 
partnership duties
95
 (presumably the partial offer of accommodation made did not 
violate the policy as that offer was temporary). Clearly, to have decided otherwise 
would have placed Islington in the unenviable position of risking not only alienation 
of the two gay colleagues and any other affected colleagues who found Ladele’s 
position homophobic,
96
 but also the transmission of negative signals to the wider 
public about Islington’s attitude towards equality on grounds of sexual orientation. 
Nevertheless, under the Meiorin test, employers have to accommodate unless it is 
impossible for them to do so. Fully accommodating Ladele post-designation, whilst 
inconsistent with the spirit of the ‘Dignity For All’ policy, would not have presented 
an intractable practical problem. The limited nature of the exception could have been 
emphasised given that it only affected one individual in relation to a particular 
religious objection – religion and belief also constituting another protected 
characteristic in the equality balance.  
 
Of course, this pre-supposes that the Meiorin conception of ‘impossible’ is 
effectively limited to practical concerns; it is perfectly conceivable that it may be 
defined more widely to mean ‘impossible’ at the level of policy and public relations. 
This was certainly claimed by Islington who had ‘not disputed that an effective 
service could be provided even if the [appellant] did not carry out the civil 
partnership duties. [Rather] ... part of the commitment to the promotion of equal 
opportunities and fighting discrimination [was] that employees should not be 
permitted to refuse to provide services to the community for discriminatory 
reasons’.97 The legitimacy of taking such a position was also addressed by comments 
on the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) intervention in Ladele 
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 Ibid.. at para. 49.  
95
 Ibid.. at paras.. 50 and 52. 
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 On the homophobic impression conveyed to the two gay colleagues by Ladele’s stance see the 
judgment of Lord Neuberger MR at para. 40.  
97
 per Elias J. at para. 97.  
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and McFarlane v. UK made by the UK FCO. However, here the FCO confusingly 
only seemed to require that the discriminatory practice did not mean that the service 
user(s) had to go elsewhere to obtain the service,
98
 which was not the issue in Ladele 
(it was accepted at all stages of litigation that civil partnership services would still 
have been provided at the same time, in the same place and by the same public 
authority irrespective of accommodating the appellant’s religious views). The FCO 
opined that ‘[d]iscriminatory practices in the provision of goods and services, 
including because of sexual orientation, are, in and of themselves, matters which a 
democratic society is entitled to prohibit irrespective of whether the services in 
question is available elsewhere’.99 It thus remains somewhat unclear what the FCO’s 
position would be on fully accommodating Ladele where this would not have led to 
service users having to go elsewhere to obtain a civil partnership ceremony.
100
  
 
This uncertainty aside, it seems clear that Islington’s position was that Ladele’s 
request would have breached the ‘Dignity For All’ policy on equality. 101 On this 
view, the fact that such a failure to accommodate would also not have respected 
religion or belief is simply indicative of a subordination of religion or belief by the 
policy imperative: this would be an act of indirect discrimination against religion or 
belief, albeit justified as proportionate precisely because of a policy based on public 
relations which required all designated civil partnership registrars to perform their 
full functions.
102
 Sandberg has attacked this subordination, claiming that in Ladele, 
‘the obligations on the employer not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation 
trumped the rights of the employee not to be discriminated against on grounds of 
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 This issue also relates to circumstances where there is a clash between religion and issues of sexual 
orientation in the provision of goods and services. For general discussion of this in domestic cases see 
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services users would not have had to obtain the civil partnership ceremony elsewhere: Ladele and 
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Elias J commented that any negative impression of such a commitment would also ‘send the wrong 
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 This reasoning is supported by both the EAT at para. 98 and the CA at paras. 49 – 50.  
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religion or belief. There seems to be no recognition that equality policy protects 
discrimination on grounds of religion as well as on grounds of sexual orientation’.103 
Nonetheless, it was found that the values inherent in the policy were ‘entirely 
rationally connected’104 with the legitimate aim of requiring all staff to perform their 
jobs in a non-discriminatory fashion. Even if this had not been the essence of 
Islington’s legitimate aim, the FCO highlighted that an alternative legitimate aim 
might have been simply ‘ensuring that there are sufficient employees to provide 
services’105 irrespective of the ‘Dignity For All’ policy. 
 
6.4.2 Legal obligations on the employer
106
 
 
Whilst the ‘Dignity For All’ policy laid the foundations for Islington’s legitimate 
aim, the policy’s guarantee of sexual orientation equality (as towards users of its 
services) was also legally entrenched by the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2007 (SO Regs 2007),
107
 a point fortified in the CA by Lord Neuberger 
MR’s discussion of those regulations taking ‘precedence over any right which a 
person would otherwise have by virtue of his or her religious belief or faith, to 
practice discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation’.108 Moreover, had the 
facts of Ladele been litigated after 1
st
 October 2010 and the implementation of the 
Equality Act 2010, such a policy may also have been viewed as a valid attempt to 
adhere to the new public sector equality duty.
109
  
 
Notwithstanding the Meiorin test of ‘impossibility’, it might be viewed as difficult to 
sustain arguments for accommodation where such treatment would, prima facie, 
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 Sandberg, above n. 53, p. 172.  
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 per Elias J. at para. 100.  
105
 Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom, FCO, at para. 31.  
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 At para. 69.  
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constitute unlawful discrimination. However, proportionality and impossibility can 
still be addressed by contrasting Islington’s mode of self-imposing the ‘Dignity For 
All’ policy with its right to self-impose such a policy. Whilst self-imposition of the 
‘Dignity For All’ policy was Islington’s right and an entirely appropriate and 
legitimate act,
110
 this could become open to challenge under the ‘impossibility’ test 
where the policy disproportionately impacted specific employees, it not having any 
built-in accommodation mechanisms. In such situations, the ‘impossibility’ test may 
require that proportionality be weighed more evenly as between employer and 
employee, particularly as interpretation of the ‘Dignity For All’ policy was left to 
Islington itself. Inevitably, this is open to the objection that to create any pragmatic 
exceptions would have undermined the aims of the policy. However, given that the 
process of not creating exceptions also did not guarantee dignity and respect for 
employees such as Ladele (the policy stated, inter alia, that ‘there should be equality 
and freedom from discrimination ... for all staff)’,111 it may be asked whether the 
proportionality balance as struck between policy and pragmatism post-designation 
was fair. Certainly, strong practical arguments can be made in favour of redressing 
the balance. 
 
Such practical arguments have been proposed by Lafferty in the Canadian context of 
legalised same-sex marriage and whether marriage commissioners who object for 
religious reasons to same-sex marriages should be accommodated from having to 
perform such marriage ceremonies.  She has argued that an employee’s ‘position and 
visibility in relation to the task of solemnization, including the process for same-sex 
couples to attain civil marriage (which may involve obtaining a license, having a 
ceremony, and documenting registration) are factors to consider’112 in determining 
accommodation. This seems particularly relevant in Ladele’s case, and indeed in the 
circumstances of McClintock.
113
 On this view, whether it was possible to provide a 
full accommodation post-designation for Ladele might have depended on the very 
specific parameters of her responsibilities, such as how far she was involved in the 
initial administrative tasks of arranging civil partnerships and whether this involved 
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her as a first point of contact for members of the public. If she was involved in such 
tasks and there was a risk she might have turned away members of the public then a 
full accommodation would still have been impossible (so as to cause undue hardship 
on Islington), unless she had swapped with a colleague which, on the facts, did seem 
practicable.  
 
Critically, this type of swap would not have jeopardised provision of the full service 
in question (as requested by the service user); as a result, it would also have not 
contravened the ‘Dignity For All’ policy or the SO Regs 2007. The obvious need to 
avoid rejection of services to service users has been emphasised in relation to the 
Canadian same-sex marriage debate where it has been said that ‘[s]ame-sex couples 
appearing at a government office requesting marriage services should expect that 
they will not experience rejection by being refused service by a state representative 
whose job it is to serve the public’.114 The fact that, had she been involved at the 
initial stages of civil partnership enquiries, Ladele might have been able to avoid 
such duties by swapping with other employees would mean that the impossibility 
threshold of undue hardship under the Canadian scheme might not have been 
attained: ‘[u]ndue hardship would [only] exist if there were no public officials 
available to meet the public for the purpose of providing a marriage license, 
ceremony or registration to a same-sex couple other than officials who refused to do 
so on religious grounds or if there were so few public officials available that re-
assignment would impose an unreasonable burden on those who had no religious 
objections’.115 Assuming both Ladele and McClintock were not involved as initial 
contacts for their services, and assuming they could have been accommodated behind 
the scenes, it remains unclear how either prospective same-sex civil partners or 
prospective same-sex adopters, respectively, would begin to frame a sexual 
orientation discrimination claim in the provision of goods or services where the 
accommodation of Ladele and McClintock had not thwarted attempts to obtain those 
services (this presupposes that there would have been enough civil partnership 
registrars or JPs to still offer the relevant full service).  
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 Lafferty, p. 311. Lafferty also notes that in some Canadian provinces there are practical 
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The pragmatic arguments advanced above have been recently addressed in the 
Canadian courts. In Re: Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under the Marriage Act 
(Re: Marriage Commissioners)
116
 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered a 
reference question from the Canadian Government as to whether proposed legislation 
allowing public officials to refuse to conduct same-sex marriages would infringe 
access to public services without discrimination. It was held that there should be no 
such accommodation of religious views.
 117
 However, whilst the court cited a legal 
policy of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (similar to Ladele) as 
clearly operative in its reasoning,
118
 comments were made to the effect that if the 
circumstances of a marriage commissioner’s refusal had been presented differently 
then practicality may have been able to supervene over policy. Whilst the court 
determined that ‘[c]ommissioners who were appointed before the Queen’s Bench 
decision recognizing the legality of same-sex marriage in this jurisdiction are in no 
meaningfully different position than those appointed after the decision was 
rendered’,119 it went on to consider factual scenarios that might affect whether an 
accommodation should be permitted. Where marriage commissioners were the first 
point of contact for same-sex couples in arranging a marriage the court was sceptical 
as to whether it could be guaranteed that there would always be fair access to 
marriage services for those couples. Any refusal by a marriage commissioner to a 
gay couple of the services they required would be ‘very significant and genuinely 
offensive’.120 Equally concerning, if a large number of marriage commissioners took 
advantage of such accommodations this might create a situation where same-sex 
marriage services became difficult to obtain – which may have had geographical 
implications.
121
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However, the court also conceived of an alternative solution whereby marriage 
commissioners were not the first port of call for couples seeking to marry,
122
 
meaning that any accommodation could be arranged with commissioners discretely 
and ‘behind the scenes’.123 This would facilitate a system whereby a commissioner’s 
refusal ‘to be involved in a same-sex ceremony would not be apparent to the couple 
proposing to wed and there would be no risk of the couple approaching a 
commissioner and being refused services because of their sexual orientation’.124 It is 
not known on the facts of Ladele (or McClintock) how involved either appellant was 
at the initial contact stage for same-sex couples enquiring about the relevant service. 
However, a pragmatic and complete accommodation may have been permitted which 
still afforded the full provision of the relevant service
125
 when based on the 
proportionality reasoning in Re: Marriage Commissioners.  
 
Notwithstanding these practical solutions, the proportionality balance between 
pragmatism and policy remains awkward even at the Canadian level of 
‘impossibility’. As in McClintock, Ladele was employed in a public job.126 The 
courts reiterated that it did not matter that ‘the civil partnership requirements could 
have been provided perfectly satisfactorily without obliging the [appellant] to 
perform these duties’127 because, for example, ‘there were sufficient registrars to 
perform the service’.128 Despite the reality that, on this approach, no civil partnership 
ceremony services would have been withheld, the mere fact that in principle 
Islington (a public entity) would have been tolerating discriminatory conduct by one 
of their employees would be viewed as enough to prevent an accommodation. This 
followed by virtue of the SO Regs 2007 and could, on a reading of ‘impossible’, have 
presented a justification by way of legal impossibility in Islington’s refusal to 
accommodate Ladele. As contended by the CA, summarising the arguments of 
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Liberty as an intervening party, ‘on the natural meaning of the 2007 Regulations ... a 
refusal to perform civil partnerships, on the part of someone who is quite prepared to 
perform marriages, amounts to discrimination ... [This] involves the “provision to the 
public or a section of the public of ... services”’.129 This was reinforced by the EHRC 
when it stated that ‘[i]t would not be reasonable for an accommodation on religious 
... grounds ... to result in other unlawful discrimination’.130 In Ladele and McFarlane 
v. UK it was reiterated that ‘[i]t will generally be proportionate to refuse to 
accommodate manifestations of discriminatory religious beliefs in the workplace 
whether public or private, but particularly so when the employee serves a public 
function’.131 The EHRC also signalled that Ladele was ‘obliged by equality duties to 
positively advance equality of opportunity and [had] laudably sought to do so 
through equality policies such as the ‘Dignity For All’ policy’.132 Had full 
accommodation thus been precluded then Ladele may have been forced to concede 
that Islington’s partial (and temporary) accommodation offers were the best she 
could expect in the circumstances.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a sense that such an interpretation of the ‘Dignity For All’ 
policy and the SO Regs 2007 obligations is inflexible, particularly where in practice a 
full or partial accommodation might have been available which would not have 
frustrated either the dignity of same-sex service-users or legal provisions proscribing 
sexual orientation discrimination. It is submitted that where a pragmatic solution can 
be found this will be permitted under the Canadian model where the content and 
spirit of the legitimate aim can remain uncompromised by a practical resolution. This 
is a balance which falls outside the imperfect reaches of the domestic indirect 
discrimination proportionality analysis. Where such a balance favours the employee 
it should also be viewed as sidestepping the ‘core job’ rule which has required that 
excusal from undertaking specific tasks on conscientious grounds should not be 
permitted ‘[w]here carrying out the task in question is a significant aspect of the 
job’.133 It is argued that such a rule should not be determinative of the success or 
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otherwise of the proportionality outcome under the Canadian model of reasonable 
accommodation. Consequently, the ‘core job’ rule is not viewed as an undue 
hardship factor in this or other cases considered across chapters nine to eleven: it 
may still be possible to argue for a full or partial practical accommodation (even if it 
does relate to a core function of the employee’s job) where it can be shown that there 
is no danger of compromising the legitimate employer aim(s).   
 
An inescapable corollary of finding a pragmatic accommodation for Ladele would be 
the view that other types of beliefs motivated by religion (for example, sexist or 
racist beliefs
134
) would also have be accommodated, lest policy prohibiting 
discrimination against race and sex be elevated above policy prohibiting 
discrimination against sexual orientation. This point was not addressed in Re: 
Marriage Commissioners. It is a tension which is perhaps irresolvable even by the 
Canadian reasonable accommodation test, although some might point to the fact that 
‘behind the scenes’ accommodation of sexist or racist religious beliefs would be less 
likely to be tolerated by other employees whose cooperation in a practical 
accommodation would be essential.  
 
7. LADELE: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
In relation to the practical versus legal policy conundrum identified above, this also 
presents problems under the US model. It is not proposed to rehearse these issues 
here, suffice it to say that the definition of de minimis undue hardship
135
 as ‘minimal’ 
or ‘trifling’ may extend beyond mere practical difficulties of accommodation and 
impact upon employer policy and public relations considerations in the 
proportionality analysis.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
their hair was disproportionate because it did not relate to a sufficiently ‘core’ enough element of their 
job: per Judge Auerbach at para. 160.  
134
 For example, in the EAT Elias J. noted Liberty’s argument that accommodation of Ladele could 
‘lead to situations which almost everyone would find wholly unacceptable. For example, a racist who 
objected to performing mixed race marriages or Jewish marriages would have to be accommodated in 
similar circumstances’: at para. 106.  
135
 Hardison and Ansonia: see chapter 8, n. 68 and n. 69, respectively. 
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7.1 Economic hardship 
 
It has already been indicated that economic hardship would not have been a likely 
factor in preventing the accommodation of Ladele,
136
 although depending on any 
level of funding required there is the possibility under the US model that such costs 
may have resulted in undue hardship
137
 (assuming evidence was produced
138
). This 
aside, ‘non-economic hardship’ would then form the main focus. 
 
7.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
This raises the issue of accommodation and whether this would have required 
Islington to contravene the SO Regs 2007 post-designation. Again, this would depend 
on the exact parameters of Ladele’s job and whether there was a risk of 
discrimination being perpetrated against same-sex partners who enquired about 
obtaining a civil partnership. Any legal contravention would have precluded 
accommodation.
139
 The fact that, post-designation, there was also a problem with 
contravention of the ‘Dignity For All’ policy should there be any accommodation 
would also have meant that undue hardship would be present given the fact the US 
courts have deferred to employer’s internal policies in the past,140 specifically those 
in the public sector. Indeed, this might be particularly so where such a policy is in 
place to address the public’s perception of impartiality141and, presumably, non-
discrimination.  Significantly, there would have been no bar to excusing Ladele from 
civil partnership ceremonies had she not been designated as a civil partnership 
registrar; such non-designation would have been outside the reach of the SO Regs 
2007, the new EA equality duty and, indeed, the ‘Dignity For All’ policy. The same 
matters regarding non-designation and ‘un-designation’ of Ladele142 would be 
relevant to this discussion.  
                                                     
136
 See above, section 6.1. 
137
 See both EEOC v. Townley Engineering and Manufacturing Company (Townley Engineering) 859 
F.2d 610 (Ninth Circuit, 1988), chapter 8, section 3.1.1 on the validity of economic hardship and 
Protos on the fact that the employer’s resources in meeting this cost should be taken into account: 
chapter 8, section 3.1.2. 
138
 See Tooley, chapter 8 n. 79. 
139
 See United States v. Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia (Philadelphia) 911 
F.2d 882 (Third Circuit, 1990) , chapter 8 n. 88. 
140
 See Webb, chapter 8 n. 92. 
141
 Ibid., n. 91.  
142
 As discussed above: see section 6. 
186 
 
7.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
It appears that the non-designation/‘un-designation’ of Ladele would have been the 
only way under the US model in which she could have been accommodated. Post-
designation, whilst the possibility of accommodating her seems at least open to some 
debate under the Canadian doctrine, such a debate would seem to be closed under the 
US jurisprudence courtesy of Webb. Even if this is incorrect, the presence of real 
hardship either in the form of complaints by other workers or the existence of the 
‘Dignity For All’ policy itself143 would have signalled the existence of undue 
hardship.  
 
The fact that Islington did offer accommodation to Ladele (albeit temporary) which 
was ultimately refused (on two occasions) would probably have been found to 
preclude a requirement that Islington go further in accommodating her requests. Such 
employee refusals coupled with more onerous subsequent employee accommodation 
requests (Ladele responded by repeating her request for full accommodation) have 
often been found to impose more than de minimis hardship on the employer. Indeed, 
the onus on the employee to accept the accommodation offer was interpreted strictly 
in Bruff v. North Mississipi Health Service (Bruff):
144
 no further accommodation 
offer is required even if the original offer was unrealistic, impractical or unhelpful.
145
 
Notably, even where the employee suggests an alternative option there is no 
expectation that the employer must offer the employee their preferred 
accommodation.
146
 This case law appears to go against the decision in Buonanno v. 
AT&T Broadband LLC (Buonanno)
147
 that alternative accommodation suggestions 
by employees should be permitted. Given the totality of all of these considerations it 
appears that the US doctrine of reasonable accommodation provides few, if any, 
ways in which Ladele may have argued for exemption. 
                                                     
143
 Costco: see chapter 8 n. 111. 
144
 244 F.3d 495 (Fifth Circuit, 2001). 
145
 Although Islington must have offered Ladele the alternative accommodation for religious reasons: 
see Proctor, and chapter 8 n. 125 and n. 126. This might have been satisfied given that when Elias J. 
discussed Islington’s counter-offer he did so in comparison with the offer made to the other religious 
employee: at para. 7.   
146
 See Ansonia, Wilson v. US West Communications 58 F. 3d 1337 (Eighth Circuit, 1995) and Breech 
v. Alabama Power 962 F. Supp. 1447 (US District Court, Alabama Southern Division, 1997): outlined 
in chapter 8, section 3.1.5.  
147
 313 F.Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Colorado, 2004). 
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8. McFARLANE v. RELATE AVON LTD. (McFARLANE)
 148
 
 
The appellant (McFarlane) was employed by the respondent (Relate) which was a 
national organisation providing relationship counselling services to its clients. Relate 
were members of the British Association for Sexual and Relationship Therapy (the 
Association) and all counsellors employed by them were required to be members of 
the Association. The Association observed a Code of Ethics containing Principles of 
Practice, paragraphs 18 – 19 of which required counselling services to be offered to 
both mixed-sex and same-sex couples. This requirement was reinforced by Relate’s 
own equal opportunities policy. Consequently, it was inevitable that counsellors 
working for Relate would, at some point in their work, be obliged to have not only 
mixed-sex but also same-sex couples assigned to them for counselling purposes.  
 
McFarlane was a Christian who believed that same-sex sexual activity was sinful. As 
a result, he felt unable to do anything which might endorse, or be seen to endorse, 
such activity. After undertaking training with Relate he took up a paid post with them 
in August 2003, signing up to their equal opportunities policy as required. Initially, 
his work fell within the domain of marital and couples counselling (akin to 
relationship counselling), such counselling covering all manner of relationship issues 
including, albeit not necessarily, sexual issues falling short of specific sexual 
dysfunction or disorder. In December 2005 McFarlane was approached to counsel a 
lesbian couple, a request to which he ultimately acceded notwithstanding his earlier 
reservations which he had outlined to his supervisor. He had felt able to dismiss these 
reservations on the basis that conducting relationship counselling with that particular 
lesbian couple did not involve endorsement of any sexual relationship between the 
couple. Subsequently, he counselled two other lesbian couples. It appears that in 
none of the lesbian counselling cases did he have to specifically address any issues of 
a sexual nature.  
 
                                                     
148
 [2010] EWCA Civ B1. The facts referred to in the section which follows are taken from the 
judgments of Underhill J in the EAT ([2010] IRLR 196), Laws LJ in the CA, the Statement of Facts in 
Ladele and McFarlane v. UK, the EHRC’s submission in Ladele and McFarlane v. UK, the FCO’s 
Comments on the third party interventions in Ladele and McFarlane v. UK, 14 October 2011 and the 
FCO Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom in Ladele and McFarlane v. UK, 14 
October 2011. 
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In September 2006 McFarlane advised Relate of his wish to undertake a diploma 
course in psycho-sexual therapy (PST), a type of therapy necessarily concerned with 
issues of sexual dysfunction between a couple and, by extension, direction to couples 
regarding how to encourage greater sexual satisfaction between partners. As such, it 
was distinct from the character of the work that he had previously performed. Due to 
his religious beliefs, he raised the possibility of being excused from having to work 
with same-sex couples where PST issues were involved.
149
 This request also 
extended to being excused from relationship counselling where sexual issues 
specifically arose in the context of same-sex couples.  
 
Eventually, in December 2007 Relate wrote to him, stating that such 
accommodations would clash with, and undermine, the equal opportunities policy 
which McFarlane had signed when he commenced employment. It also added that 
any exception would reduce his workload and was likely to lead to similar requests 
from other counsellors. There is also evidence to suggest that at this time Relate 
received a letter from other therapists expressing concerns that an anonymous 
counsellor was unwilling, on religious grounds, to work with gay, lesbian and bi-
sexual clients. Relate sought agreement from McFarlane that he undertake PST with 
same-sex couples and continue to offer same-sex relationship counselling where it 
involved sexual matters. McFarlane’s reply was equivocal, stating that he was happy 
to undertake relationship counselling with all types of couples but that he had 
‘evolving’ attitudes towards PST with same-sex couples. This was regarded as a 
refusal to undertake PST with same-sex couples and, as such, a disciplinary matter. 
At a disciplinary meeting in January 2008 McFarlane seemed to reverse his position 
and assured his bosses that he would be happy to undertake both PST and 
relationship counselling with same-sex couples. However, later that month Relate 
formed the view that he was not genuine about this earlier assurance and that 
comments he had made to his supervisor after the disciplinary meeting revealed a 
lack of intent to honour his assurance. Following further disciplinary action he was 
                                                     
149
 The requirement that McFarlane undertake both relationship counselling and PST of same-sex 
couples was not an unexpected or unforeseen change to his role caused by a change in law. In such a 
situation, Vickers’ argument (see chapter 7 n. 84) that employees should be treated less 
sympathetically where they voluntarily assume duties knowing that they will be unable to undertake 
them on religious grounds, would hold against an affirmative accommodation outcome. 
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dismissed and claimed, inter alia, direct and indirect discrimination,
150
 both of which 
were rejected by the ET and EAT
151
 before the CA then refused permission to appeal 
on both grounds.
152
 The CA noted that indirect discrimination had, prima facie, been 
found, but that it was justified.
153
 McFarlane was refused leave to appeal further and 
now applies to the European Court of Human Rights on, amongst other grounds, 
Article 9 both separately and in conjunction with Article 14.
154
 A decision from 
Strasbourg is awaited. 
 
9. McFARLANE: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
9.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
There were no indications in McFarlane that there would have been any monetary 
cost associated with full accommodation. Consequently, there would have been no 
financial undue hardship. Even if there had been costs associated with McFarlane’s 
accommodation then the lack of suggestions by Relate is likely to have meant that it 
would be more proportionate to expect them to foot any financial costs associated 
with a finding that it had to make reasonable accommodation,
155
 particularly where 
accommodation was only needed on an irregular basis.
156
 It is submitted that any 
financial costs would have been negligible – they certainly would not have made 
accommodation impossible.  
 
9.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
There was specific evidence to suggest that accommodating McFarlane’s religious 
beliefs might have received both negative and positive approval from fellow 
employees. The former was arguably evinced by the letter written and sent by 
concerned employees to Relate in December 2007. However, the latter may also be 
                                                     
150
 RB Regs 2003, Regulations 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b), respectively.  
151
 per Underhill J. at para. 21 (in relation to direct discrimination) and para. 32 (in relation to indirect 
discrimination).  
152
 per Laws LJ at para.s. 27 – 28.  
153
 Ibid., at para. 27. 
154
 Ladele and McFarlane v. UK [2011] ECHR 737. 
155
 Chambly: see chapter 7 n. 64(it is clear that evidence would also have been required of any 
financial cost).  
156
 Chambly: see chapter 7 n. 65.  
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claimed in relation to Relate’s view that accommodation would be ‘likely to lead to 
similar requests from other counsellors’,157 implying that there might have been other 
colleagues of the same view as McFarlane. However, it is unlikely that 
accommodating McFarlane would have negatively affected the rights of any 
employees in the workplace. There was no overt evidence that any counsellors were 
gay or that, even if they were, they wished to pursue this matter any further.   
 
9.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer158 
 
It was implied that employee reallocation would be a factor in accommodation. This 
can be seen from the EAT’s observation that agreeing to the request was likely to 
lead to similar requests from other counsellors, the implication being that – were 
other counsellors likely to follow suit and ask for exemptions too – this would place 
a disproportionate burden on Relate to accommodate and consequently amount to 
undue hardship.
159
 This would cause problems with ‘the basic level of coverage of 
work’.160 Moreover, there would be ‘potential fragmentation of the management 
process if too many staff [were] unavailable at different times ... [because of] the 
cumulative effect of too many requests’.161 Even in relation to McFarlane, such a 
burden would present practical and administrative difficulties for Relate whereby ‘it 
would not be possible to filter potential PST clients so that that [McFarlane] ... would 
not have to deal with lesbian, gay or bisexual couples’.162 This might mean that 
under the approach in Moore, notwithstanding the fact that there was no engagement 
with McFarlane’s accommodation request, it could be more likely that to require any 
accommodation would amount to undue hardship given that any chance to achieve a 
                                                     
157
 per Underhill J. at para. 6.  
158
 See the EHRC’s Code of Practice: Employment for similar adjustments in domestic disability 
discrimination. Relate may have enabled McFarlane to have some of his duties allocated to another 
person: para. 6.33. Of course, this is subject to the Relate’s objection that this would have in fact 
presented practical difficulties as it would ‘reduce the amount of work that he would be able to do and 
was likely to lead to similar requests from other counsellors’ (per Underhill J. at para. 6), the 
implication being that such a practical measure would be administratively challenging and therefore 
unrealistic as a solution (see ‘reasonableness’ criteria at para. 6.28).  
159
 It does not appear that, as required in Renaud, any formal employee canvassing was done to 
determine this. Similarly, the facts are vague as to whether any employees would have been willing to 
swap relevant duties with McFarlane: see chapter 7 n. 87. 
160
 Vickers, above n. 4, p. 160.  
161
 Ibid. 
162
 Ladele and McFarlane v. UK. This was also raised in the EAT where was noted that the ET had 
recognised that there could be problems with ‘filtration or separa.tion of clients’ and that it ‘was not 
practicable to operate a system under which a counsellor could withdraw from counselling same-sex 
couples’ (per Underhill J. at para. 26). 
191 
 
realistic, equitable and efficient balance of duties would be seriously compromised. 
Depending on the ease with which workers could be reallocated, a partial 
accommodation by way of semi-regular excusal from same-sex PST/relationship 
counselling might have been possible.  
 
9.4 Other undue hardship factors 
 
There was evidence that a full accommodation would have been challenging for 
Relate to implement; indeed, the impression is that it would have been difficult at a 
practical level due to the inter-changeability of the workforce and the size of Relate’s 
organisation. It is necessary to consider other legitimate issues which are likely to 
have an effect on whether accommodation was possible.  
 
9.4.1 Internal policies and external public relations 
 
Significantly, McFarlane had signed up to provisions which required him not to act 
in discriminatory ways. He was a member of the British Association for Sexual and 
Relationship Therapy and its Code of Ethics which contained Principles of Practice, 
including the need to provide counselling services with due regard to, amongst other 
characteristics, sexual orientation. Moreover, he had also signed Relate’s equal 
opportunities policy which stipulated that, inter alia, no staff, counsellors or clients 
would receive less favourable treatment on the basis of personal or group 
characteristics, including – but not limited to – culture (which may include religion 
or belief) and sexual orientation. The effect of him signing up to these policies would 
be similar to that experienced by McClintock and Ladele who had signed up to 
similar arrangements: any requirement by a court that an employer should 
accommodate in such circumstances would be in direct contravention of those 
policies. This would transmit inconsistent and contradictory signals regarding the 
employer’s commitment to equal opportunities, creating serious public relations 
problems.
163
 This consequently legitimised Relate’s aim to ‘offer its services to 
                                                     
163
 As noted by the FCO – Ladele and McFarlane v. UK: Observations of the Government of the 
United Kingdom, at para. 31 
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same-sex couples in precisely the same way as to heterosexual couples’,164 as applied 
to all staff.  
 
However, such a legitimate aim might well have been disproportionate at the level of 
practice (although it is not known whether a full ‘behind the scenes’ exemption 
would have been possible on the facts). Unfortunately for McFarlane, the personal 
nature of the service offered meant he was perhaps in closer contact with service 
users than McClintock and Ladele meaning there was a greater likelihood of him 
turning same-sex users away directly, violating the policies to which he had signed 
up (this being exactly the sort of scenario the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal sought 
to avoid in Re: Marriage Commissioners).  On this basis the rejection of his 
accommodation request could be argued as proportionate and justified at the level of 
policy: there was no practical way in which full accommodation could be granted 
without seriously compromising Relate’s internal policies. It is not clear whether 
some form of partial accommodation (for example, similar to the temporary 
accommodation offers in Ladele would have been practicable so as to minimise 
compromising the internal policies). Indeed, Relate argued that any accommodations 
‘would be unacceptable as a matter of principle because [they] ran “entirely contrary 
to the ethos of the organisation to accept a situation in which a counsellor could 
decline to deal with particular clients because he disapproved of their conduct”’.165 
Indeed, the FCO commented that Relate was ‘entitled to conclude that it would 
undermine their commitment to equality of access to services if they permitted 
employees, regardless of the sincerity of their religious beliefs, to refuse to provide 
services to individuals because of their sexual orientation’.166  
 
In trying to defeat pragmatism with policy, Relate could have highlighted (as Liberty 
did in Ladele) that the internal policies were also implementing equality on grounds 
of sexual orientation as guaranteed by the SO Regs 2007. The fact that an employer 
who was subject to such laws was accommodating McFarlane’s request would raise 
legal liability issues, undoubtedly signifying that it might have been (legally) 
‘impossible’ for them to accommodate him. 
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 per Underhill J. at para. 3.  
165
 Ibid., at para. 25. 
166
 Ibid., at para. 29. 
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10. McFARLANE: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
10.1 Economic hardship 
 
Economic hardship does not appear to have been an important issue in precluding 
accommodation in McFarlane. If it had then, depending on the cost, this may have 
amounted to undue hardship under the US approach to reasonable accommodation.
167
 
Evidence would be required.
168
 Following consideration of this, focus would shift to 
non-economic factors
169
 and their effects in establishing undue hardship.  
 
10.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
After McFarlane had commenced employment the existence of other relevant 
discrimination laws (the SO Regs 2007) would have had a major impact on whether 
Relate was under an obligation to accommodate exemption requests which conflicted 
with those provisions.
170
 However, these provisions did not arise for consideration 
during proceedings and so the point is hypothetical. Had it been argued then its force 
would have depended on the contours of McFarlane’s responsibilities and how far 
there was a chance he would have directly refused to provide relationship and/or PST 
counselling services to same-sex couples. If there had been such a chance then his 
accommodation request would have been in peril of contravening specific legal 
provisions imposed by the State creating a more than de minimis burden on Relate.
171
 
Unlike Ladele (where the appellant could have been un/re-designated), there would 
have been no way in which McFarlane’s accommodation requests could fall outside 
the reach of both the SO Regs 2007 and Relate’s internal equality policies.172 In order 
to sidestep the duties he wished to avoid he would have had to resign. 
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 Townley Engineering: outlined in chapter 8, section 3.1.1. Regarding employer resources see 
Protos, chapter 8 n. 81 and, generally, section 3.1.2. 
168
 See Tooley, chapter 8 n. 79.   
169
 As provided for by Hardison.  
170
 This might have been the only non-economic factor existing in McFarlane that did not require 
employer engagement. For example, the rule in Webb may have been of dubious application  given 
that Relate was a private entity.  
171
 See Philadelphia, chapter 8 n. 88. 
172
 The latter may have precluded accommodation as per Webb, although as Relate was a private 
organisation it may be argued that the US courts would take a stricter view of accommodation from 
the equality policies of public entities given church and state separa.tion in the US. 
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10.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
The facts of McFarlane certainly highlight that Relate sought to rely on hypothetical 
hardship, particularly in light of the General Manager’s assertions that any 
exemptions ‘would reduce the amount of work that he would be able to do and was 
likely to lead to similar requests from other counsellors’.173 Relate seemed to offer no 
concrete evidence for this meaning that the supposed difficulties would not have 
cleared the de minimis test. 
174
 However, this is a rule which has been eroded in 
Hardison
175
 meaning that, whilst these cases do pre-date Alamo, the position remains 
uncertain regarding hypothetical hardship. In any event, the fact that there was 
evidence in McFarlane that fellow employers had begun to draw Relate’s attention 
to McFarlane’s attitudes points to real hardship should those employees have gone 
on to formally complain about McFarlane’s behaviour. Such evidence can be seen 
from both the letter sent by employees to Relate around December 2007 and the 
views of McFarlane’s supervisor regarding his conduct as made clear in January 
2008. Of course, in any event the existence of internal policies of themselves would 
have satisfied real hardship.
176
  
 
Assuming that the SO Regs 2007 were not argued by Relate, and also taking into 
account the uncertainty over hypothetical hardship and whether Relate could 
establish real hardship, the fact that no counter-offer of partial accommodation was 
made would be significant. Whilst McFarlane’s conduct could be interpreted as a 
refusal to acknowledge diversity in human sexuality (which may be deduced from 
his request to be excused from performing same-sex counselling) this may not 
necessarily have closed off accommodation under the US model. Although such a 
refusal can amount to non-economic hardship
177
 employers still need to engage with 
such a refusal and either look for ways in which an employee can affirm diversity in 
an alternative way or at the least explain why the policy cannot be amended for the 
individual employee. If this is not done then no undue hardship on the employer may 
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 per Underhill J. at para. 6.  
174
 As outlined in Tooley and Alamo: see chapter 8 n. 104 and n. 107, respectively.  
175
 See chapter 8 n. 114.  
176
 Costco: see chapter 8 n. 111. 
177
 Buonanno: see chapter 8, section 3.1.4. 
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be found.
178
 However, whilst no counter-accommodation offers were made by Relate 
there was evidence that a counter-accommodation suggestion was made by other 
employees to them via their letter of December 2007 – this amounting to training and 
supervision of McFarlane in his work.
179
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
178
 Buonanno: see chapter 8 n. 101. 
179
 Ladele and McFarlane v. UK. 
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CHAPTER 10: RELIGION AND EMPLOYER DRESS CODES 
 
1. AZMI v. KIRKLEES METROPOLITAN COUNCIL (Azmi)
1
 
 
The respondent (Kirklees) controlled a junior school at which the appellant (Azmi) 
was a bi-lingual support worker (BSW). Including Azmi, there were eight such 
BSWs working at the school, their role being to work in a team to support pupils’ 
learning and welfare and to assist in the educational activity of children from ethnic 
minority backgrounds. The duties included teaching support, pupil support for 
targeted minority ethnic pupils at risk of under achieving and team activities. Azmi, 
who was a devout Muslim, was employed on a fixed-term contract for one year 
between the 1
st
 September 2005 and the 31
st
 August 2006. When appointed in 
September 2005, she was assigned to support Year 6 classes (10 and 11 year old 
children) due to her wish to work part time (this wish stemming from child care 
commitments) and the fact that part time hours could be accommodated better with 
older children. Year 6 had five classes and five class teachers, two of whom were 
male. 
 
On commencing work at the school, Azmi immediately asked whether she could 
wear a veil covering her head and face (save her eyes) when she was in contact with 
adult males, specifically male teaching staff, or whether arrangements could be made 
so that she would not have to work alongside male staff at all. She had not worn such 
a veil at her interview for the post and at no time during the interview did she 
indicate that her religious beliefs required her to wear a veil. She also did not wear a 
face veil on her training day in advance of the academic year. Her explanation for not 
veiling in these situations was that her husband had advised her to go unveiled. She 
wore her veil whilst teaching and, in mid-September 2005, the school decided it 
could not segregate her from male staff whilst at work, either when in class or 
liaising generally with male staff. To have accommodated any change in her duties 
would have necessitated substantial timetable revisions. Regarding whether, 
alternatively, Azmi should be able to wear the veil at work, the school began to 
conduct enquiries. Subsequently, Kirklees provided advice to schools within its 
                                                     
1
 [2007] IRLR 434. The facts referred to in the section which follows are all taken from the judgment 
of Wilkie J. in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT). 
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jurisdiction in October 2005. The result of this advice, some of which had been 
informed by observations of Azmi’s conduct in classes whilst veiled in September 
2005, was that the desire to express religious identity did not transcend the primary 
requirement for optimal communication between BSWs and children. Following 
observation of Azmi it had become apparent that the pupils she was instructing were 
seeking visual information from her which they could not obtain because they were 
unable to see her facial expressions. It was decided that – in accordance with such 
advice – Azmi should not veil when working directly with children. However, the 
school did confirm that she could wear the veil when walking around open areas of 
the school site.  
 
Azmi rejected this compromise and reiterated her wish to be veiled whenever in 
contact with adult males, including when in class. In response, the school observed 
her again in early November 2005 on two separate occasions, this time both veiled 
when working alongside a male member of staff and unveiled when working 
alongside a female member of staff. It was concluded that when veiled, pupils did 
not engage with her to the same extent as they had done when unveiled; this included 
not reacting to her verbal praise. Once more, she was asked to unveil. In December 
2005, Azmi wrote to the school maintaining that she and the pupils worked well 
together and they had understood her. She challenged the view that the veil was 
hindering her communication with the pupils and, indeed, indicated that she would 
try to use more verbal communication and a louder verbal praise when she was 
veiled. After a period of sick leave, she returned to work in February 2006 and was 
informed once again that the school required her to be unveiled when in class. She 
was unwilling to comply with this instruction and so was asked, on a temporary 
basis, to support year 3 classes where most or all of the class teachers were female – 
meaning she could be unveiled. The option of being veiled when walking around the 
school remained open to her. Azmi was happy working unveiled with female 
colleagues in year 3 classes but, when she was advised that the management 
instruction remained that she should not be veiled in the classroom, she restated her 
intention to wear a veil if required to work with male staff. At this stage Azmi was 
suspended and she commenced proceedings against Kirklees alleging, inter alia, 
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direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of religion or belief,
2
 both of which 
failed in the Employment Tribunal (ET). Direct discrimination also failed in the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT)
3
 whilst indirect discrimination failed in the 
EAT on grounds of justification.
4
 
 
2. AZMI: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
2.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
There was no evidence that there would have been any financial costs associated 
with accommodating Azmi’s requests. As such, Kirklees would have failed under 
this heading to establish undue hardship. If there had been a financial cost directly 
arising from Azmi’s requested full accommodation (for example, the hiring of more 
female teachers) then, on the basis that the school had made alternative 
accommodation offers already, it would have been proportionate to expect some or 
most of the cost of complete accommodation to have been borne by Azmi herself.
5
 
These costs would have to be worked out on the basis that Azmi worked part-time 
and would only have needed to have worked alongside female colleagues for half the 
week.  
 
2.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
There was also no evidence that Azmi’s full accommodation would have affected the 
morale of the other school employees by interfering with their rights at work. This is 
unsurprising given that a particular colleague’s interpretation of their religious dress 
obligations is unlikely to be a matter on which other colleagues have strong views. 
One way in which morale could have been a more credible factor is if full or partial 
accommodation were not made for other Muslim staff so as to create resentment. 
However, any discontent amongst other staff because of this would need to be 
                                                     
2
RB Regs 2003, Regulations 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b), respectively.  
3
 per Wilkie J. at paras. 56 – 57.  
4
 Ibid., at para. 74. 
5
 Ontario Human Rights Commission (O’Malley) v. Simpson Sears (O’Malley) [1985] 2 SCR 536: see 
chapter 7 n. 68. 
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substantial
6
 so that accommodation was ‘impossible’. This was not apparent on the 
facts. 
 
2.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer7 
 
There was evidence that the ability to reasonably accommodate Azmi would have 
been affected by the school’s size and available workforce. It had been argued that it 
was not possible to isolate her from male staff in the classroom.
8
 However, this 
might not have amounted to impossibility under the test in British Columbia (Public 
Service Employee Relations Comm) v. BCGEU (the ‘Meiorin’ case)9. For example, 
she may have been moved to another year group’s classes where there were 
exclusively female teachers, although she had been deliberately placed with year 6 
classes due to this being the best way in which to accommodate her request to work 
part-time. Alternatively, the male year 6 staff could have swapped with female staff 
in other year groups although this may have been frustrated by a lack of other 
teachers’ ability to swap duties across the timetable. Under Central Okanagan 
School District Number 23 v. Renaud (Renaud) the school should have at least 
canvassed this possibility.
10
 There was also no evidence that other staff members 
were opposed to swapping with Azmi.  
 
Whilst impossibility in relation to swapping duties remains undetermined, the school 
did attempt to take other steps to accommodate the appellant. Engagement with her 
demands was manifested by numerous investigations into the feasibility of both her 
                                                     
6
 Central Okanagan School District Number 23 v. Renaud (Renaud) [1992] 2 SCR 970: see chapter 7 
n. 76. 
7
 Under the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) Equality Act 2010: Code of Practice 
(Employment) (Code of Practice: Employment) for reasonable adjustments in disability discrimination 
(para. 6.33), Azmi may have switched with another colleague assuming both that there were year 
groups where there were all-female teachers and that this did not necessarily leave her with a reduced 
workload and the same job title and benefits. As a corollary of this, she may have had hours of work 
altered which may neither have suited her care responsibilities nor – as appeared on the facts – the 
respondent’s school. Of course, this would have had to pass the EHRC’s criteria for ‘reasonableness’ 
contained in paras. 6.28 (including practicability, disruption and cost) and 6.35 (cooperation of other 
workers). Reasonableness is assessed objectively: para. 6.29. The Code of Practice: Employment is 
available at: 
 <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/EqualityAct/employercode.pdf>, accessed 24
th
 
August 2012.  
8
 per Wilkie J. at para. 9.  
9
 [1999] 3 SCR 3. 
10
 See chapter 7 n. 87. 
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request to be veiled when supporting male staff
11
 and her need to be veiled outside 
classrooms in case of contact with male staff when in communal areas.
12
 This may 
have satisfied the threshold in Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Social 
Services) (Moore)
13
 where – in a case that also concerned whether other workers 
could have been reassigned – it was decided that only a total failure to take any steps 
would not satisfy undue hardship in Canadian reasonable accommodation. In any 
event, it may have been open to Azmi to avoid making the accommodation requests 
in the first place,
 14
 for example by advising the school of her need to be separated 
from male staff at the earliest available opportunity, such as at interview, on 
acceptance of the post or at her training day. This would have promoted earlier 
awareness of her need to be veiled in public. She was clearly aware of her religious 
beliefs at these material times, notwithstanding that she had been advised by her 
husband to be unveiled on these occasions.
15
  
 
2.4 Other undue hardship factors  
 
Whilst the factors in sections 2.1 and 2.2 would not have established undue hardship 
on Kirklees this is not the case with the matters posed in section 2.3. Meanwhile, 
another pressing matter was the argument advanced by the school in defence of 
requiring teachers to be unveiled when in class: this concerned the issue of 
communication. 
 
2.4.1 The veil and communication 
 
The main factor in rejecting Azmi’s indirect discrimination claim was the advice 
from Kirklees which stated that when communicating with pupils it was imperative 
that all school staff reinforced the spoken word with facial expressions as a form of 
body language. The evidence was clear that any obscuring of the face by a veil 
would reduce communication signals. It was said that, ‘the desire to express religious 
                                                     
11
 Such investigations comprised, for example, the observation of her teaching whilst unveiled on 21
st
 
September and further observations of her teaching two different classes on 7
th
 November where she 
was veiled in one lesson and unveiled in the other.  
12
 per Wilkie J. at para. 14.  
13
 (1992) 17 CHRR D/426. 
14
 An issue Vickers has suggested considering: see chapter 7 n. 84. 
15
 At para. 8 of Wilkie J’s judgment it is unclear whether Azmi’s husband encouraged her to be 
unveiled for just her training day or, additionally, her interview as well. 
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identity does not overcome the primary requirement for optimal communication 
between adults and children’.16 The EAT was clearly persuaded that this was a 
legitimate aim
17
 in the education of children based on, in particular, evidence of a 
clear and well-supported policy that ‘the requirements of her job were such that the 
wearing of the veil was incompatible with them’.18 Azmi had been deliberately 
recruited to provide support to pupils: such communication would be hindered by the 
wearing of a veil. Consequently, the legitimate aim was achieved proportionately 
through the rule that she refrain from veiling when teaching. Indeed, ‘in relation to 
education, communicating with pupils adequately is an essential aspect of a teaching 
assistant’s ability to do the job’.19 It would have ‘impact[ed] on the ability to fulfil 
the job function’.20  
 
It is significant that the EAT made reference to the observation notes made on 
Azmi’s conduct when veiled. Aside from the question of whether she had been 
observed for a long enough period of time (this amounted to two separate 
observations across one and then two lessons, respectively), it had been noted 
whether there was a ‘possibility of ... [her] raising her voice and using more verbal 
communication’.21 Under an ‘impossibility’ test, it was presumably not beyond the 
capabilities of the school to observe Azmi for a longer period to determine whether 
an emphasis on more concerted verbal communication would have sufficed for 
teaching purposes – or, indeed, a greater attempt to use hand and body gestures. 
From Wilkie J’s judgment,22 it is apparent that this latter option was suggested by the 
school. Likewise, other suggestions by the school included Azmi using a screen in 
lessons to separate her from male colleagues, sitting with her back to such colleagues 
or removing the target pupil group from the classroom.
23
Such suggestions would 
have facilitated a more religiously sensitive approach to proportionality given that 
‘compensation for veil-wearing [could] be found in other areas such a use of voice, 
                                                     
16
 per Wilkie J. at paras. 10 – 11.  
17
 Ibid., at para. 64.  
18
 G. Calder and S. Smith, ‘Differential Treatment and Employability: A UK case-study of veil-
wearing in schools’, in G. Calder and E. Ceva (eds.), Diversity in Europe: dilemmas of differential 
treatment in theory and practice (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 158. 
19
 Ibid., p. 161.  
20
 A. McColgan, ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law 
Journal 1, p. 13. 
21
 per Wilkie J. at para. 69.  
22
 Ibid., at para. 73.  
23
 Ibid. 
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ability to listen, hand gestures etc. Indeed, it may be argued that a person wearing a 
veil might potentially be a better communicator overall than someone who does not, 
precisely because of these compensations’.24 However, given that such suggestions 
were made to Azmi, all of which appear to have been rejected, it might seem that – 
short of fully accommodating her (which would have compromised the legitimate 
aim of effective communication) – Kirklees had effectively done everything they 
could in their attempts to provide a solution
25
 without undermining the legitimate 
aim of good communication which was instrumental in ‘raising the educational 
achievements of the pupils’.26 
 
3. AZMI: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
3.1 Economic hardship 
 
There was no evidence that any economic hardship would have been encountered by 
the school in accommodating Azmi. If evidence
27
 had been available, this would 
have needed to detail the financial circumstances of the school.
28
 Such hardship 
aside, focus would turn to non-economic forms of hardship.  
 
3.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
In trying to establish automatic non-economic hardship, it seems that Webb v. City of 
Philadelphia (Webb)
29
 may be unhelpful given that Kirklees and the school had no 
dress code policy for staff: Azmi was simply asked to refrain from wearing the veil. 
                                                     
24
 Calder and Smith, in Calder and Ceva, above n. 18, p. 165. 
25
 This would satisfy the threshold in Noah v. Desrosiers t/a Wedge (Noah) [2008] ET 2201867/07 
where it was said that, absent accommodation, dress code policies ‘may (and very likely will) not be 
justified if there are in fact alternative ways of achieving, or mostly achieving, the employer’s 
legitimate aim that have a lesser, or no, discriminatory impact’: per Judge Auerbach in Noah at para. 
149. In the case of Kirklees, a public authority, the alternative accommodations offered show a public 
sector employer attempting to engage as best it could with religious liberty. Vickers notes that the 
public sector has not always been viewed as an appropriate environment in which to tolerate displays 
of individual religiosity given that this may infringe upon state neutrality and religion: L. Vickers, 
Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Oxford: Hart, 2008), pp. 163 – 164. 
See also comments by Vickers referred to in chapter 9 n. 42. 
26
 E. Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the wearing of religious 
symbols in education (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 120.  
27
 Suggested as a necessity in Protos v. Volkswagen of America Inc. (Protos) 797 F.2d 129 (Third 
Circuit, 1986): for discussion see chapter 8, section 3.1.2.  
28
 Tooley v. Martin—Marietta Corp.(Tooley) 648 F.2d 1239 (Ninth Circuit, 1981): see chapter 8 n. 79. 
29
 562 F.3d 256 (Third Circuit, 2009). 
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Other bases on which the US courts have automatically found that undue hardship 
will be established (such as legal infringement and health and safety) were not 
present on the facts. 
 
3.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
The United States (US) courts have found that legitimate types of non-economic 
hardship which require employer engagement include refusal to do duties
30
 and work 
timetable issues,
31
 all factors which affected the accommodation request of Azmi. 
However, the conduct of the school in attempting to engage with her requests and 
offer accommodation suggestions means that its actions did not fall foul of EEOC v. 
Ithaca Industries (Ithaca Industries)
32
 (as confirmed in Buonanno v. AT&T 
Broadband LLC (Buonanno)
33
), where it was determined that any potential undue 
hardship on the employer will automatically be ruled out where absolutely no 
accommodation engagement is made. The US model would view strictly Azmi’s 
obligation to accept partial alternative offers of accommodation. The existence of 
employer counter-suggestions and accompanying employee rejections would usually 
indicate that undue hardship had been placed on the employer even where such 
solutions were unrealistically or impractically difficult for the employee.
34
 Notably, 
there was no evidence that Azmi would have had any difficulty in agreeing to any of 
the accommodation suggestions made; indeed, the school attempts to accommodate 
appear almost exhaustively reasonable.  
 
It is significant that Azmi made no alternative accommodation suggestions; it is 
probable that she was determined to secure full accommodation. However, if she had 
been willing to compromise (although it is difficult to envisage how many more 
compromises remained given the lengths to which the school went in suggesting 
alternative options), there is US authority to the effect that employers will sometimes 
                                                     
30
 Shelton v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (Shelton) 223 F.3d 220 (Third 
Circuit, 2000). Peterson v. Hewlett Packard (Peterson) 358 F.3d 599 (Ninth Circuit, 2004) and Wilson 
v. US West Communications 58 F. 3d 1337 (Wilson) (Eighth Circuit, 1995): outlined in chapter 8, 
section 3.1.5. 
31
 EEOC v. Ithaca Industries (Ithaca Industries) 849 F.2d 403 (Ninth Circuit, 1978). 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 313 F.Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Colorado, 2004). 
34
 For example, see discussion of Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Service (Bruff) 244 F.3d 495 (Fifth 
Circuit, 2001), chapter 8, section 3.1.5. 
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be obliged to accept employee suggestions where these are sensible and measured.
35
 
Of course, there would have been no guarantee that she would have been awarded 
her preferred accommodation.
36
 Vickers reinforces this interpretation of the US 
position: ‘[t]he fact that Azmi could identify alternative accommodations that she 
would have preferred did not change matters. In effect, the EAT took the same 
approach as the US Supreme Court [in Ansonia] on accommodating religious claims, 
where the employer is under no obligation to offer the employee the least 
disadvantageous accommodation available’.37  
 
4. HARRIS v. NKL AUTOMOTIVE LTD (Harris)
38
 
 
The appellant (Harris) was a Rastafarian who worked for the respondent (NKL) as an 
executive driver between April 2004 and February 2006. In order to manifest his 
Rastafari religious beliefs he kept his hair in dreadlocks. NKL was unaware that 
Harris was a Rastafarian or that he kept his hair in dreadlocks – indeed, whilst it had 
been clear during his job interview that his hair was long it had been tied back.  
During the course of Harris’ employment, his hair became increasingly unkempt, 
matted and untidy. NKL objected to this and made its concerns known to him 
between October 2005 and February 2006: it believed that – in violation of its dress 
code – his hair had become unacceptably untidy and that such an appearance poorly 
represented their company. However, it indicated that it did not object to long hair 
per se; to this extent it pointed to other drivers whose hair was long, albeit tidy. 
Further, it reasoned that drivers could wear caps if they wished to conceal their hair 
temporarily whilst at work, a solution not written into its dress code but, rather, 
arranged with drivers after discussion. Notwithstanding these compromises, it 
reiterated that it required employees’ hair to be tidy. Harris was upset and angered by 
these references to his hair and a representative of NKL was made available to visit 
his home to discuss the matter further. However, Harris did not accept this offer and, 
ultimately, terminated his employment. He alleged, inter alia, both direct 
                                                     
35
 Buonanno, see chapter 8 n. 138. 
36
 Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook (Ansonia) 479 US 60 (1986): see chapter 8 n. 140. 
37
 L. Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: an emerging hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280, p. 288. 
38
 [2007] UKEAT 0134_07_0310. The facts referred to in the section which follows are all taken from 
the judgment of Elias J. in the EAT. 
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discrimination,
39
 which was unsuccessful before the ET and not argued before the 
EAT, and indirect discrimination.
40
 The latter claim was unsuccessful before the ET 
and similarly unsuccessful before the EAT on the grounds that Harris had not 
identified a relevant provision, criterion or practice (PCP) that had been applied to 
him and, consequently, could not have been disadvantaged.
41
 The lack of a relevant 
PCP was explained on the basis that at no time had NKL imposed a rule against 
dreadlocks; instead, it had merely applied a requirement of tidy hair.
42
 Whether this 
particular requirement disadvantaged Rastafari because all dreadlocked hair is 
necessarily untidy was not explored; this argument had not been pursued in earlier 
proceedings before the ET or in advance of the EAT hearing. Even if it had, it would 
have become necessary to investigate further whether dreadlocks were completely 
incompatible with maintaining tidy hair.
43
  
 
5. HARRIS: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
5.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
There was no evidence that accommodating Harris’ full request would have been 
financially costly. Indeed, as accommodation would have cost NKL nothing they 
would have been unable to establish undue hardship under this criterion. If there had 
somehow been a direct financial cost then, as NKL had already made alternative 
accommodation offers, it would have been fair (according to Ontario Human Rights 
Commission (O’Malley) v. Simpson Sears (O’Malley)44) to expect some of the cost of 
complete accommodation to have been met by Harris. Had there been a negative 
image of NKL conveyed to its customers or the public by it being seen to employ an 
individual who had untidy hair, and had this led to NKL losing business due to poor 
company image, then accommodation may have had indirect financial implications. 
Such a scenario is considered below.
45
 
 
                                                     
39
 RB Regs 2003, Regulation 3(1)(a). 
40
 Ibid., Regulation 3(1)(b). 
41
 per Elias J. at para. 25.  
42
 Ibid., at para. 19. 
43
 Ibid., at paras. 20 – 22.  
44
 See chapter 7 n. 68.  
45
 See below, section 5.4. 
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5.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
It is improbable that accommodating Harris’ hair style would have affected the 
morale of NKL’s other workers by interfering with their rights as employees. It is 
doubtful that the state of his hair was an issue on which other colleagues had 
particularly strong views. Consequently, this factor would also have presented a 
barrier to NKL establishing undue hardship. There were other employees who had 
long hair and were required to keep it tidy;
46
 had Harris’ untidy hair been permitted, 
it is possible that those other employees may have subsequently complained that 
such accommodation was unfair in that it imposed a greater burden on them to 
appear tidy. However, this would not have ‘substantially’47 affected any discernible 
right they possessed.  If some or all of those other employees were religious then it is 
possible Harris’ accommodation could also be extended to other religious employees.  
 
5.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer 
 
In Harris, there was no evidence that NKL’s ability to reasonably accommodate 
would have been affected by its size and workforce. His desired accommodation 
would have had no conceivable bearing on these issues or any other nature of their 
organisation. Moreover, whilst Harris was aware of his religious need to wear 
dreadlocked hair, NKL did not challenge him on this for over a year after his 
employment started – even though his hair was becoming noticeably more untidy. 
Consequently, he may not necessarily have been able to foresee problems arising 
from the way he kept his hair. This would negate Vickers’ argument in relation to 
workforce inter-changeability, namely that employees should sometimes be expected 
not to undertake work they are aware they will be unable to perform on religious 
grounds. Notably, the rule of general application from Moore, namely that a total 
lack of employer engagement will lead to a finding of no undue hardship, would be 
of no use to Harris given that some accommodation attempts had been made.  
 
 
                                                     
46
 per Elias J. at para. 12.  
47
 ‘Substantial’ being the threshold required before undue hardship can be assessed: Renaud. See 
chapter 7 n. 76.  
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5.4 Other undue hardship factors 
 
The factors in sections 5.1 to 5.3 above would have posed no accommodation 
barriers for Harris. However, there remains an important issue which underlined 
NKL’s refusal to accommodate, notably their company image and the related matter 
of employee tidiness (as required by their dress code). This now requires further 
exploration. 
 
5.4.1 Employer’s image48 and employee’s dress 
 
Requiring NKL to have accommodated Harris would have created image problems 
for their company: to that extent, the refusal of full accommodation served a 
legitimate purpose. It is not difficult to envisage that any perception by its customers 
or the public that it allowed employees to be untidy in appearance could affect 
reputation and, ultimately, business. This was a point which did not escape the 
EAT’s attention when it stated that, ‘the Company expressed concerns that ... his hair 
was untidy and that he did not represent the company well’.49 Specific evidence from 
NKL was lacking to demonstrate that Harris’ wearing of his hair in an untidy manner 
would adversely affect their business, although it may be said this link was self-
evidently clear. In reinforcing the legitimacy of their commercial interests as a block 
on full accommodation, NKL might also have relied on the fact that employees 
generally are under an implied contractual duty not to disrupt an employer’s business 
undertaking. This principle was outlined in British Telecommunications Plc v. 
Ticehurst (Ticehurst):
50
 here it was said that employees should not make their 
employer’s businesses ‘unmanageable’51 through any intentional actions and that 
they should serve their employer faithfully within the requirements of the agreed 
contract.
52
 Nevertheless, Ticehurst could be distinguished given that in that case the 
employee’s obligation not to act against her employer’s interests stemmed from the 
fact that she was a manager in charge of other employees and who was entrusted in 
                                                     
48
 Under the EHRC’s Code of Practice: Employment this might have been a reasonableness factor 
under ‘financial and other costs’ precluding full accommodation: para. 6.28.  
49
 per Elias J. at para. 5.  
50
 [1992] ICR 383.  
51
 per Ralph Gibson LJ at p. 399.  
52
 Ibid., at p. 398. 
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giving instructions to others and in supervising their work. Harris was in a different 
position.  
 
Assuming NKL’s reasons did constitute a legitimate aim, it would seem that full 
accommodation was not possible: this would have compromised the tidiness 
requirement too far. This distinguishes Harris from G v. St. Gregory’s Catholic 
Science College (G)
53
 in which the High Court held that a school ban on the 
‘cornrows’ hairstyle for male pupils was indirect race discrimination. Such a ban 
could not be justified as proportionate even when considering the policy reasons 
underlying it (for example, discipline and in particular a fear of male gang culture 
and violence).
54
 This was because deeply held cultural and religious grounds for an 
exception had been established and conformity with the ban was regarded as 
impossible.
55
 Seemingly, Harris also had deeply held cultural and religious grounds 
for requiring accommodation, although a distinction could be drawn between the 
legitimate aims in Harris and G. Further, the ban in G was of a particular type of hair 
style and not merely untidy hair of any style as in Harris; the rule in G was therefore 
likely to be more pernicious and less easily justifiable. 
 
Given the problems associated with full accommodation, it is significant that NKL 
had already made concerted efforts to engage with Harris’ request by offering him 
the opportunity of wearing a cap to conceal his long hair
56
 or, alternatively, allowing 
him to wear his hair long provided it was presented tidily.
57
 In addition, it had 
offered him the chance to meet with an employer representative to discuss the 
situation further
58
 – presenting another occasion on which a mutually workable 
outcome could have been determined. On any interpretation, given that he rejected 
all of these compromises, it is difficult to see how else NKL could have done more 
given that to have accommodated outright might have been interpreted as impossible 
at the level of policy.  
 
 
                                                     
53
 [2011] EWHC 1452. 
54
 per Collins J. at paras. 22 – 23.  
55
 Ibid., at paras 48 – 51. 
56
 Ibid., at para. 12.  
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid., at para. 9. 
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6. HARRIS: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
6.1 Economic hardship 
 
In the event there had been a direct financial cost associated with Harris’ 
accommodation request (for example, loss of business), this may have prevented 
such a request from being successful given that economic hardship can surmount the 
level of undue hardship above which an employer is not required to accommodate.
59
  
 
6.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
In the case of non-economic hardship, there was evidence in Harris of a driver dress 
code meaning that the set rule in Webb against accommodation where there exists 
such a policy would act against full accommodation. It would surmount the de 
minimis threshold because of the identified business need. The US courts have held 
that in limited circumstances, certain prescribed non-economic factors (these being 
dress policy or a religious neutrality policy, legal infringement and health and safety) 
can automatically preclude any attempt at accommodation. However, there is a 
possibility that the decision in Webb may be restricted to public organisations given 
that the employer in that case was a public entity. Nevertheless, the broader issue of 
public perception remains live in Harris and it is possible that the US courts could 
use this common factor with Webb to find against Harris’ need for accommodation.  
 
6.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
Even if the US courts were not to follow the spirit of Webb, it is probable that the 
actions of NKL would still have satisfied the de minimis test for undue hardship 
meaning that no accommodation would have been necessary. This is evident from 
the attempts they made to engage with Harris’ request. However, they did not 
provide specific evidence that Harris’ untidy wearing of his hair would necessarily 
lead to a problem with their business. This might be viewed as a form of hypothetical 
                                                     
59
 EEOC v. Townley Engineering and Manufacturing Company (Townley Engineering) 859 F.2d 610 
(Ninth Circuit, 1988): see discussion in chapter 8, section 3.1.1. An assessment of NKL’s finances 
would be required (Tooley: see chapter 8 n. 79) along with evidence of any economic hardship: Protos 
(discussed in chapter 8, section 3.1.2).  
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hardship which has generally been shunned by the US courts in attempting to 
establish undue hardship.
60
 However, in light of Cloutier v. Costco (Costco)
61
 it 
would need to be determined whether the requirement that all workers’ appearance 
be tidy amounted to a designated formal policy (in which case hardship would be 
present) or whether this was a more informal rule which was not officially recorded 
as company policy (in which case it would not satisfy Costco
62
). However, either 
way, after Trans World Airlines v. Hardison (Hardison)
63
 it is possible this rule will 
be relaxed in future.  
 
In any event, the attempts by NKL at accommodation may be likely to have shown 
enough of an attempt to accommodate up to the de minimis standard. Indeed, from 
Bruff and Shelton it seems that the employee is obliged to accept such alternatives – 
if they are rejected no other duty to reasonably accommodate will be found. The only 
way in which Harris could have shown that undue hardship was not present would be 
if he could demonstrate that NKL’s counter-offers had not been made on a religious 
basis. Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways
64
 establishes that accommodation 
attempts for religious employees specifically have to be religiously motivated.
65
 It is 
possible that the suggestions made by NKL to Harris were those repeated to all 
workers with untidy hair irrespective of the reason for any untidiness.  
 
7. EWEIDA v. BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC (Eweida)
66
 
 
The appellant (Eweida) was a devout practising Christian who had worked as a 
member of flight check-in staff for the respondent (British Airways) since 1999. She 
was required her to wear a uniform given that her job involved contact with the 
public. Eweida was happy to wear her uniform but, between May and September 
                                                     
60
 See both Tooley, chapter 8 n. 104 and EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car (Alamo) 432 F.Supp. 2d 1006 
(D. Arizona, 2006): see chapter 8 n. 106. 
61
 390  F.3d 126 (First Circuit, 2004): see chapter 8 n. 111. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 432 US 63 (1977). 
64
 795 F.2d 1472 (Ninth Circuit, 1986). 
65
 See chapter 8 n. 127. 
66
 [2010] EWCA Civ 80. The facts referred to in the section which follows are taken from the 
judgments of Elias J. in the EAT ([2009] IRLR 78), Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal (CA), the 
Statement of Facts in Eweida and Chaplin v. UK [2011] ECHR 738, the EHRC’s submission in 
Eweida and Chaplin v. UK, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) Comments on the third 
party interventions in Eweida and Chaplin v. UK, 14
th
 October 2011 and the FCO Observations of the 
Government of the United Kingdom in Eweida and Chaplin v. UK, 14
th
 October 2011. 
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2006, began arriving for work wearing a plain silver cross (not a crucifix) that was 
between one and two inches high and which was visible over her uniform. Until this 
point she had worn the cross under her uniform. She claimed that she regarded the 
visible wearing of such an item as a central aspect of her own personal faith, even 
though she accepted that it was not a specifically religious requirement of her faith. 
That she was religious, a Christian, and had chosen to manifest her religion through a 
legitimate personal expression was not in dispute at any stage during proceedings. 
 
British Airways strictly prohibited employees from wearing any items visibly above 
their uniforms; items could only be worn under uniforms. They had a practice of 
exempting some religious items from this policy, provided the wearing of such items 
was a mandatory scriptural requirement. They also required that the item only be 
worn above the uniform if it could not physically be concealed below clothing. 
Moreover, even if both these conditions were satisfied management approval had to 
be sought before such an accommodation would be allowed.  
 
British Airways refused to allow Eweida to wear the cross over her uniform, 
although Eweida chose to ignore this refusal. Having made its uniform policy clear 
to her, British Airways sent her home from work in September 2006 for contravening 
the staff dress policy. In October 2006, they attempted to accommodate Eweida by 
offering her administrative work that did not involve contact with customers and, 
consequently, no wearing of a uniform – she would be free to wear the cross on top 
of her clothes. Such a move would have entailed no loss of pay; however, she 
rejected the offer. Following a decision in February 2007 to amend its uniform policy 
(after a period of staff consultation which had begun in November 2006), British 
Airways later permitted all staff to display faith symbols over their uniforms subject 
to a detailed application procedure. The cross, amongst other religious symbols, was 
immediately approved for this purpose.  
 
In being banned from wearing the cross above her uniform Eweida claimed, inter 
alia, both direct and indirect discrimination
67
 before the ET. She was unsuccessful in 
both claims and, after dropping the former, appealed the latter to the EAT where she 
                                                     
67
 RB Regs 2003, Regulations 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b), respectively. 
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was also unsuccessful.
68
 She further appealed this ground to the Court of Appeal 
(CA) and was similarly unsuccessful.
69
 It was notable that in all the decisions 
concerning indirect discrimination it was found that there had been no disadvantage 
suffered,
70
 although, if there had been, the question of whether it would have been 
justified split the courts.
71
 On being refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court she 
made an application to the European Court of Human Rights under Article 9 both 
separately and in conjunction with Article 14.
72
 Given that British Airways is a 
private organisation, Eweida also seeks to determine whether, in the event there was 
an interference with her freedom of religion, there was a breach of the state’s positive 
obligation to protect her religious rights under Article 9.
73
 A decision from 
Strasbourg is currently awaited.  
 
8. EWEIDA: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
8.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
There would have been no financial implications to British Airways of simply 
allowing Eweida to wear her cross over the top of her uniform. If there had somehow 
been a direct financial cost then, given British Airways had made an effort to 
accommodate her prior to its change in uniform policy, it may have been appropriate 
for Eweida to have borne an appropriate proportion of this.
74
  
 
8.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
It is highly unlikely that permission for Eweida’s desired accommodation would 
have impacted negatively on the rights and morale of other employees in the 
workplace, religious or otherwise. There was no evidence to suggest that the request 
                                                     
68
 per Elias J. at para. 64. 
69
 per Sedley LJ at para. 39. 
70
 per Elias J. in the EAT at para. 31 and per Sedley LJ in the CA at para. 28.   
71
 According to Elias J. in the EAT, the ET believed that such disadvantage would not have been 
justified: paras. 18 – 19. Indeed, Elias J. concurred with this reasoning: paras. 72 – 76. In contrast, 
Sedley LJ in the CA was of the view that, had there been disadvantage suffered, such indirect 
discrimination would have been justified: paras. 34 and 37 – 39.  
72
 Eweida and Chaplin v. UK [2011] ECHR 738. 
73
 Eweida and Chaplin v. UK: Statement of Facts.  
74
 O’Malley: see chapter 7 n. 68. 
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would have had this effect. It was mentioned in the EAT that ‘there was ... no basis 
for saying that there was any evidence that other Christians felt disadvantaged 
because they could not openly wear the cross’,75 although even if this had been the 
case any morale issues that may have arisen from providing the accommodation 
solely for Eweida could have been, and in the end were, dealt with by allowing all 
religious employees to wear religious insignia above their uniforms (subject to 
approval). Indeed, the lack of evidence available concerning employee morale 
suggests that this did not present a problem. Certainly, the Meiorin test of 
‘impossibility’ would not be satisfied. 
 
Interestingly, there was evidence that Eweida had acted insensitively at times 
towards colleagues and displayed a lack of empathy for those without a religious 
focus in their lives.
76
 Whilst this might have affected their empathy for her, it would 
not have affected their rights at work in relation to morale. 
 
8.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer 
 
There was no evidence that British Airway’s ability to reasonably accommodate 
Eweida would have been affected by these two linked criteria. However, the 
argument advanced by Vickers that employees may sometimes be expected not to 
undertake work they are unable to perform on religious grounds might have been 
useful to British Airways. It is unlikely that Eweida did not know about the ban on 
the wearing of items above employees’ uniforms in advance of her decision to wear 
the cross over her tunic; before this she had been in post for at least six years – 
during this time she had ample opportunity to approach her bosses about the type of 
work she could limit herself to where there was no need to wear a uniform. Such a 
delay could certainly be regarded as anathema to her claim for reasonable 
accommodation, the delay itself being remarked upon by Sedley LJ in the CA who 
commented that he was having to adjudicate the effect of a rule ‘which for some 7 
years had apparently caused [Eweida], along with the rest of [British Airways’] staff, 
no known problem’.77 British Airways’ counter-offer of an alternative role without 
                                                     
75
 per Elias J. at para. 58.  
76
 per Sedley LJ in the CA, at para. 3.  
77
 Ibid., at para. 33.  
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customer contact and any corresponding need to wear a uniform
78
 reveals that, had 
she made enquiries earlier, a conflict might have been avoided.  
 
Nevertheless, the possibility of Eweida having developed her personal faith (in such 
a way as to have decided only in September 2006 that she needed to wear the cross 
above her uniform) must not be discounted. More evidence of this would be needed, 
although if successfully claimed it would rebut Vickers’ argument on this point. In 
such circumstances, the fact that a counter-offer was made might not mean that 
undue hardship would be found given Sedley LJ’s comments that the counter-offer 
was made, ‘not perhaps as speedily as it might have been’.79 This was echoed in the 
EAT where it was said that ‘the issue of visibly wearing the cross had not been 
considered until November 2006, only after it had been raised as an issue by 
[Eweida]. Moreover, once it had been raised, the policy was still applied to the 
detriment of [Eweida]’.80  
 
On the assumption that Eweida was aware at an earlier juncture than September 2006 
of her personal desire to wear the cross over her uniform, she should arguably have 
been on strong notice as to the more problematic nature of her accommodation 
request. Significantly, the rule from Moore that a total lack of employer engagement 
will lead to the finding of a duty to reasonably accommodate would be of no use 
given that an accommodation attempt had been made. 
 
8.4 Other undue hardship factors 
 
Whilst the matters debated in sections 8.1 and 8.2 above would have posed no 
barriers to excusing Eweida from the uniform rule, it is suggested that Vickers’ 
argument in relation to Moore under section 8.3 is persuasive, notwithstanding the 
possibility that Eweida could have had legitimate faith reasons for delaying her 
request. There is a further undue hardship issue to contemplate in Eweida, 
significantly the matter of company image and the related issue of employee dress as 
required by British Airways’ uniform code.  
                                                     
78
 As explained in the EAT by Elias J. at para. 3, in the CA by Sedley LJ at para. 33 and in Eweida 
and Chaplin v. UK: Statement of Facts.  
79
 per Sedley LJ para. 33. 
80
 per Elias J. at para. 75. 
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8.4.1 Employer’s image and employee’s dress 
 
This was the predominant factor
81
 in blocking Eweida’s request. The uniform policy 
had been implemented to create an appropriate company brand and image. In the 
EAT it was observed that the uniform policy enhanced ‘brand uniformity’82 and gave 
British Airways ‘a consistent, professional and reassuring image world wide’.83 
Furthermore, ‘the wearing of a uniform played an important role in maintaining a 
professional image and in strengthening recognition of the [respondent’s] brand’.84  
 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether a duty to reasonably accommodate could 
still be identified via a more detailed assessment of the circumstances. Noah v. 
Desrosiers t/a Wedge (Noah) has signalled that where there is ambiguity, employers 
might be required to cite specific evidence of actual impact on their company if 
accommodation were required by the law: there was not much evidence of this in 
Eweida although the ET referred to the ‘business need’85 and the ‘business case’,86 
signifying that an attempt may have been made by British Airways to justify the 
policy. Nonetheless, even if British Airways could point to specific evidence of 
business interest it seems difficult to envisage that this would be credibly threatened 
by an employee wearing a discrete and innocuous religious symbol such as the cross 
over her uniform. However, in dismissing this possibility British Airways had tried 
to partially accommodate her believing that this would be the best way to satisfy both 
Eweida’s request and its own legitimate business aim.  They offered her the option of 
undertaking an administrative role without customer contact and the consequent need 
for a uniform. This revealed an attempt to accommodate Eweida from what had been 
a ‘previously unobjectionable rule’87 in a flexible way.88  
                                                     
81
 per Elias J. in the EAT who upheld the ET’s finding on proportionality (at para. 75) which included 
the fact that ‘the uniform policy was desgined to achieve a legitimate aim’ (at para. 17), notably one 
which ‘served an important purpose’ (at para. 17). Sedley LJ in the CA also found that the aim was 
legitimate: see para. 37.  
82
 per Elias J. at para. 17.  
83
 Ibid. 
84
 Eweida and Chaplin v. UK: Submission of the EHRC at para. 29. 
85
 per Elias J. at para. 18.  
86
 Ibid. 
87
 per Sedley LJ in the CA at para. 37. The FCO was clearly also of this view: Eweida and Chaplin v. 
UK: Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom, FCO, at para. 40. 
88
 Sedley LJ seemed of the view that this counter-offer was generous given that it was an 
‘accommodating offer’ to move her ‘without loss of pay’: see para. 33.  
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However, under the Meiorin test it would still need to be asked whether to 
accommodate fully would have been ‘impossible’? On this, the circumstances of 
Eweida are very significant. The ET was of the opinion that, had British Airways not 
completely accommodated, such a refusal would have been disproportionate.
89
 The 
EAT reported that the ET did ‘not consider that the blanket ban on everything 
classified as “jewellery” struck the correct balance between corporate consistency, 
individual need and accommodation of diversity’.90 The EAT supported this view, 
lauding the eventual decision to completely accommodate Eweida by highlighting 
that ‘[o]nce the issue arose [British Airways] dealt with it relatively expeditiously 
and amended the policy’.91 Ultimately, British Airways’ volte face reveals that full 
accommodation and their legitimate business needs could co-exist harmoniously. 
Whilst the domestic courts indicated that, had disadvantage been found, they would 
have been split on justification and proportionality,
92
 full accommodation would 
undoubtedly have been the outcome under the undue hardship test in Canadian 
reasonable accommodation.  
 
9. EWEIDA: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
9.1 Economic hardship 
 
Given that there was no evidence in Eweida of any prospect of economic hardship 
being suffered by British Airways, this would not have presented accommodation 
difficulties. If there had then this would have been a valid ground on which British 
Airways could have claimed undue hardship.
93
  
 
9.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
Of more relevance was British Airways’ dress code policy: this clearly could have 
amounted to non-economic hardship in not even requiring them to engage with 
                                                     
89
 The ET quoted in the EAT by Elias J. at para. 19. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 per Elias J. at para. 71.  
92
 See above n. 71. 
93
 Townley Engineering: see chapter 8, section 3.1.1. A claim of economic hardship would have 
required the usual enquiries into not only company finances (Tooley: see chapter 8 n. 79) but also 
evidence for that hardship (Protos: see chapter 8, section 3.1.2).   
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Eweida’s accommodation request. Once again, Webb94 would be applicable on the 
issue of dress codes meaning British Airways would have a particularly 
unchallenging de minimis threshold to cross. Nevertheless, given the public nature of 
the employer’s work in Webb it is not obvious that under the US system it would be 
the case that such a precedent would extend to private employers.  
 
9.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
Even if the US courts were not to follow the tenor of Webb, it is likely that the 
conduct of British Airways would still have surmounted the de minimis hurdle for 
undue hardship. The fact they did engage with Eweida’s request by making an 
alternative offer increases the likelihood of a finding that there was no duty to 
reasonably accommodate: particularly in situations where the employee has refused 
that alternative accommodation.
95
  Of course, if British Airways had made no 
engagement at all the de minimis level of undue hardship would not have been 
satisfied.
96
 Notably, they provided little supporting evidence of business hardship, 
although on the basis of Costco
97
 all that would have been needed to establish 
hardship would be the existence of the formal uniform policy itself. In any event, the 
approach in Hardison
98
 might have meant that a lack of evidence regarding 
assertions of hardship would still be permitted. Significantly, even if Eweida had 
found the counter-offer of accommodation unhelpful because, for example, she only 
wished to work in a role with customer contact, the fact that British Airways had 
made the alternative offer would be important: Eweida would have been obliged to 
accept it, lest she otherwise receive no accommodation at all.
99
 In the CA, Sedley LJ 
noted the rather truculent attitude of Eweida towards her bosses remarking on her 
‘incomprehension of the conflicting demands which professional management seeks 
to address and resolve on a near daily basis’.100 Had she been more pro-active in 
proposing her own alternative accommodation suggestions then – were these to have 
been ignored by British Airways – it may have been possible under the US model to 
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 See chapter 8, section  3.1.3. 
95
 See Bruff and Shelton, chapter 8, section 3.1.5. 
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 See Ithaca Industries and Buonanno, chapter 8 n. 95 and n. 99, respectively. 
97
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identify a failure to reasonably accommodate. It is noteworthy that the undue 
hardship threshold under the Canadian model would have required British Airways 
to fully accommodate (the eventual result), whereas the much higher threshold in the 
US test would have not required accommodation to that extent.  
 
10. CHAPLIN v. ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER HOSPITAL NHS FOUNDATION 
TRUST (Chaplin)
101
 
 
The appellant (Chaplin) was a devout practising Christian who had worked for the 
respondent (the NHS Trust) since 1989. During the period to which her claim related 
she was a Ward Sister charged with clinical nursing in a geriatric ward. As a sincere 
personal form of religious manifestation, she had always worn a crucifix on a chain 
around her neck, including at work when undertaking clinical duties. The cross was 
always visible above clothing. Indeed, this had been the case since she began 
working for the NHS Trust in April 1989. However, in June 2007 the NHS Trust 
implemented a new uniform policy which for the first time introduced a ‘V-neck’ 
collarless tunic that Chaplin was required to wear. This accompanied a change in 
jewellery policy at that time which also forbade the wearing of any jewellery for 
whatever purpose, religious or otherwise, although exceptions in some circumstances 
were still permitted, subject to approval. Despite the June 2007 policy changes, 
Chaplin continued to wear her cross over her clothes as she had done under previous 
uniform and jewellery policies. In the past this had neither attracted comments from 
her supervisors nor caused any injury either to herself or a patient. Nonetheless, the 
ET noted
102
 that a distinguishing feature between this and Eweida was that the 2007 
jewellery rule in Chaplin was motivated by health and safety concerns stemming 
from guidance from the Department of Health. The guidance which influenced the 
Department of Health had, in turn, been informed by research into hospital health 
and safety conducted by Thames Valley University. Such concerns comprised the 
risk of contamination should the cross and chain come into contact with open 
                                                     
101
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wounds (when, for example, Chaplin was dressing a wound), damage of injury to the 
thin and frail skin of elderly patients and danger of injury to Chaplin herself should a 
patient seize the necklace and pull at it.  
 
In June 2009, Chaplin was asked to remove her crucifix and chain: she refused. It 
was noted that one of her Christian colleagues had similarly been required to remove 
her crucifix for health and safety reasons following the uniform amendment; this 
colleague had complied with that order. Other religious employees were also asked 
to modify their appearances: for example, one was advised that he could not wear the 
Kara bracelet around his wrist, one was told he could not wear the Kirpan ceremonial 
dagger and two were told they were only permitted to wear the Hijab if it was a 
close-fitting sports Hijab. These requirements caused no further problems. Given 
Chaplin’s refusal, the NHS Trust embarked on a number of discussions with her 
along with two individuals acting as her representatives: the first being a member of 
the Royal College of Nursing, the other being Chaplin’s local Pastor. These meetings 
aimed to identify alternative accommodation suggestions. One such suggestion 
included her returning to work wearing her previous uniform. However, this was 
rejected by the NHS Trust who commented that the new uniforms corresponded to 
different job roles and presented a necessary professional image that set a good 
example to junior staff. Chaplin suggested that she wear a crew-neck t-shirt 
underneath her V-neck tunic so that the cross could be worn underneath that, 
although it later transpired that she would not have been prepared to stick to this 
suggestion. The NHS Trust also rejected this on the basis that the chain holding the 
cross would still be visible at the back of her neck and therefore liable to being 
pulled by an elderly patient. Chaplin’s Pastor asked whether she could secure her 
crucifix on its chain by using a magnetic catch as opposed to a clip, meaning that if it 
were seized by a patient it would instantly be released from her neck. The NHS Trust 
believed this was an improved suggestion, although the crucifix would still be 
suspended so as to be a source of potential injury or contamination. 
 
The NHS Trust also proposed several alternatives, all of which were rejected by 
Chaplin. These included her wearing a turtle-neck t-shirt underneath her V-neck 
tunic under which the crucifix could be worn on its chain. Such a t-shirt would not 
allow the chain to be visible at the back of the neck. Chaplin maintained, contrary to 
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her earlier accommodation suggestion, that she required the wearing of the cross to 
be visible. It was further suggested by the NHS Trust that she wear the crucifix and 
chain pinned to the inside of her tunic or inside a pocket – for the same reason, this 
was refused by Chaplin. A similar suggestion was that she could wear the cross and 
chain visibly attached to her identity badge; this was also rejected by Chaplin 
because it was sometimes required that identity badges be removed when 
undertaking close-contact clinical duties. A final suggestion was for Chaplin to be 
redeployed from her clinical setting to a non-clinical role where she was allowed to 
wear her cross and chain visibly. She reluctantly accepted this position, although it 
ceased to exist from July 2010 after which she claimed direct and indirect 
discrimination,
103
 both of which were unsuccessful in the ET
104
 with the majority 
finding that the indirect discrimination claim failed because there was no 
disadvantage.
105
 Even if there had been disadvantage, the majority felt that this 
would have been justified
106
  although Mr Parkhouse for the minority believed this 
would not have been justified.
107
 On being advised that, in light of the CA’s decision 
in Eweida, an appeal to the EAT would be futile
108
 she applied to the European Court 
of Human Rights on the basis of Article 9 both separately and in conjunction with 
Article 14.
109
 A decision from Strasbourg is currently awaited. 
 
11. CHAPLIN: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
11.1 Financial cost to the employer 
 
There would have been no direct financial cost to the NHS Trust of permitting 
Chaplin to wear her cross and chain over the top of her uniform. If there was a cost 
somehow associated with this, then O’Malley110 would be determinative: Chaplin 
would be expected to meet some, if not a significant proportion, of the costs given 
the great extent that was gone to in suggesting alternative accommodations. Whilst 
the NHS Trust’s image was alluded to during the ET’s consideration of the case, 
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given the nature of its activities (publicly funded provision of healthcare) it seems 
improbable that reasonable accommodation would have had any possible indirect 
financial implications stemming from this factor. The issue of the NHS Trust’s image 
is considered more fully below.
111
  
 
11.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
There was scant evidence that employee rights and morale would have been a 
problem for other members of staff, religious or otherwise, had Chaplin been fully 
accommodated. Regarding religious staff, there was no indication that other 
Christian employees felt so strongly about wearing the cross that they were prepared 
to contravene the uniform and jewellery codes. It is possible that the other Christian 
nurse who had been content to remove her cross would have complained about 
specialist treatment for Chaplin, although this could have been met by 
accommodating her on the same footing. Likewise, other religious non-Christian 
staff members could have been accommodated via this exception so as to avoid 
morale issues. Chaplin herself asserted that employee rights and morale would not 
have been a problem, stating that her wearing of the cross and chain ‘had never 
caused any difficulty, comment, query or objection from any of her supervisors’.112 
Of course, complete accommodation of her wishes violated health and safety 
provisions, a matter that is considered separately.
113
 
 
11.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer 
 
Even if the accommodation request had involved the swapping of duties, undue 
hardship may have been difficult to establish due to the fact the NHS Trust  was able 
(albeit temporarily) to transfer the Chaplin to a different role in a different 
location.
114
 Any future swaps would of course have required that the NHS Trust 
canvass the convenience of this with other staff
115
 although, based on the availability 
of swaps in the past, this does not appear to have been an obstacle.  
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Vickers’ argument regarding knowledge of religious beliefs on commencing 
employment would have been unhelpful to the NHS Trust. When Chaplin 
commenced her job she was aware of both her faith and her desire to manifest it by 
visibly wearing the cross (and chain). Indeed, having been confirmed in 1971 she had 
always visibly worn a cross on a chain and had always done so during the course of 
her clinical duties.
116
 From 1989 until 2007 she had been permitted to visibly wear 
her cross on a chain at work, indicating that both she and her employers should have 
been aware of her religious needs.  On this basis, Chaplin was not on notice as to the 
likely problematic nature of her religious manifestation until the uniform policy 
suddenly changed (whereupon she communicated her accommodation request). The 
rule that a total lack of employer engagement will require an accommodation
117
 
would not apply in Chaplin given the extent to which the NHS Trust attempted to 
offer other suitable accommodations.  
 
11.4 Workplace health and safety118 
 
The NHS Trust’s concerns about the health and safety implications of 
accommodating Chaplin were very clear for the ET to see. It was noted that, had she 
been allowed to wear her crucifix on its chain, there would be risks of contamination 
with open wounds,
119
 liability of injuring the thin and frail skin of elderly patients
120
 
and danger of injury to the appellant should a patient seize the necklace and pull at 
it.
121
 Unsurprisingly, it was entirely appropriate to take such real and identifiable 
health and safety concerns into account when determining how to respond to 
Chaplin’s request, the ET deciding that this was ‘by far the most important aspect’122 
of the case, there being a ‘unanimous view [that it] would be a legitimate aim’.123 In 
support of this aim, the NHS Trust was able to point to third party research 
conducted by Thames Valley University which had been the basis for its change in 
                                                     
116
 Ibid.  
117
 Moore: see chapter 7 n. 79. 
118
 Other recent ET cases concerning religious discrimination and employer dress codes have also 
raised health and safety matters in hospitals, notably Adewole v. Barking, Havering and Redbridge 
University Hospitals NHS Trust [2011] ET (unreported). Adewole, a Muslim midwife, lost her claim 
that being required to wear scrub trousers as opposed to a scrub dress was indirect discrimination.  
119
 per Judge Hollow at para. 19. 
120
 Ibid., at para. 13.  
121
 Ibid., at para. 18.  
122
 Ibid., at para. 29. 
123
 Ibid. 
223 
 
uniform and jewellery policies.
124
 Depending on the form of this research (for 
example, whether it was of an empirical nature), this may have provided more up-to-
date concrete examples of situations, real or hypothetical, when health and safety had 
been compromised in hospitals when staff were permitted to wear items of jewellery 
on chains around their neck. However, if such evidence was superficially vague or 
assertive on the likelihood of the risk of injury, it has been suggested that 
accommodation should be required ‘in the absence of statistical evidence of 
disproportionate rates of serious injuries’.125  
 
Under the Canadian impossibility test it still needs to be asked whether the health 
and safety policy which constituted the legitimate aim could have been fully or 
partially accommodated without prejudicing the policy’s effect. Certainly, the 
prospect of full accommodation seems remote given the many ways in which the 
NHS Trust was able to justify the problems inherent in a nurse wearing a cross and 
chain when dealing with patients. Even on the basis of the generous Canadian 
scheme, the myriad health and safety pitfalls of accommodating fully would have 
made it impossible at the level of policy to accommodate Chaplin. This is supported 
by Canadian jurisprudence such as Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway
126
 where 
it was said by the majority that health and safety concerns were a legitimate bona 
fide aim which transcended the religious accommodation request.
127
 The minority 
view, specifically that the employee’s request would have had no health and safety 
implications for anyone else other than the employee himself, is clearly not 
applicable in the context of nursing care. It may also be said that Multani v. 
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,
128
 a freedom of religion claim, is 
distinguishable given that the schoolboy’s kirpan was to be securely sealed within 
the lining of his clothes
129
 – Chaplin rejected any such attempt to conceal her cross 
and chain.  
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It seems inevitable that partial accommodation via a compromise would be more 
appropriate. This accords with the outcome in R (on the application of Watkins-
Singh) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School130 which concerned a 
school ban on a Sikh pupil’s wish to wear the Kara bracelet as part of her uniform. 
The ban was held to be indirect religious discrimination even taking into account 
situations such as physical education lessons where ‘health and safety might be an 
issue’.131 However, the school pupil was prepared to remove or cover the Kara when 
placed in circumstances where health and safety may have been endangered.
132
 To 
that extent, it is submitted that accommodation in Chaplin would not necessarily 
have frustrated the health and safety rule: there could have been partial 
accommodation along the lines of the many suggestions made to Chaplin. 
 
11.5 Other undue hardship factors 
 
Chaplin raises the supplementary issue of image and employee dress. This represents 
a further legitimate aim cited by the NHS Trust as additional evidence precluding 
Chaplin’s accommodation request.  
 
11.5.1 Employer’s image and employee’s dress 
 
The NHS Trust attempted to argue that a function of the 2007 policy changes was ‘to 
present a corporate and professional image’.133 Further, this was to be enhanced by it 
‘setting an example [to junior staff] of the observance of the uniform policy’.134 It 
was declared that these matters amounted to identified legitimate aims,
135
 although it 
was contestable as to whether Chaplin’s bosses had specifically adduced evidence to 
establish that these aims would have been compromised by affording the desired 
accommodation.
136
 Nevertheless, even if such evidence had been present, the 
maintenance and enhancement of brand and image (whilst clearly a legitimate aim) 
would clearly not have been an impossible block on either partial accommodation (as 
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the various concessions of the NHS Trust show) or, potentially, full accommodation. 
It is submitted that Eweida is useful in establishing that image and dress policy, 
whilst legitimate aims, are unlikely to be incompatible with a block on full 
accommodation given that where the religious manifestation is appropriate it will not 
sufficiently undermine that policy objective. On this basis, full accommodation in 
Chaplin would not have led to undue hardship. 
  
12. CHAPLIN: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
12.1 Economic hardship 
 
It is unlikely that there was any prospect of economic hardship being suffered by the 
NHS Trust had they accommodated Chaplin. If there had been, it would seemingly 
have placed a possible automatic bar on accommodation of any sort given that the de 
minimis threshold in US can be crossed when an employer has to contribute 
financially to an accommodation
137
 and there is evidence of this,
138
 particularly in 
relation to the employer’s financial resources.139  
 
12.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
Chaplin concerned two forms of non-economic hardship which have been found to 
automatically block any accommodation engagement. Firstly, Chaplin was subject to 
a dress code: her contravention of this may – of itself – have placed undue hardship 
on her bosses to the de minimis standard. This has been seen in Webb.
140
 Moreover, 
given that Chaplin worked in the public sector for an employer whose uniform policy 
sought to create a public perception of professionalism, it may be said that this 
accords with Webb even further. Secondly, contravention of health and safety 
matters
141
 was also a legitimate reason for blocking full accommodation. Given the 
presence of these key forms of non-economic hardship in Chaplin – and considering 
the low de minimis level at which undue hardship will be found to exist – it seems 
                                                     
137
 Townley Engineering: see chapter 8, section 3.1.1 
138
 Tooley: see chapter 8 n. 79. 
139
 Protos: see chapter 8, section 3.1.2. 
140
 See chapter 8, section 3.1.3. 
141
 EEOC v. Kelly Services Inc. (Kelly Services Inc.) 598 F.3d 1022 (Eighth Circuit, 2010): see chapter 
8, n. 89. 
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very probable that these, of themselves, would have been enough to frustrate 
Chaplin’s claim for special treatment.  
 
12.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
In the unlikely event that the US courts were not to follow either Webb or EEOC v. 
Kelly Services Inc. (Kelly Services Inc.),
142
 it is likely that full accommodation would 
still have amounted to undue hardship. The extensive attempts at accommodation 
engagement
143
by the NHS Trust are testament to this. Indeed, numerous 
accommodation offers were made all of which were rejected by Chaplin. In any case, 
the NHS Trust’s references to health and safety were based on policy. Costco144 has 
decided that where an employer policy exists this will be sufficient of itself to 
establish undue hardship at a de minimis level where there is a subsequent 
accommodation request. The fact that third party university research existed to 
support the NHS Trust’s position on health and safety is analogous to the expert 
evidence in Kalsi v. New York City Transit Authority:
145
 this demonstrated real 
hardship. In any event, elsewhere in the US jurisprudence
146
 it is clear that 
hypothetical difficulties as cited by employers have been found to cross the de 
minimis threshold; this would be of more relevance to the issue of staff appearance 
which was a less formalised requirement than the health and safety measure.  
 
If further evidence were needed under the US model that full accommodation was 
unrealistic, there were other factors that could have been used against Chaplin too. 
For example, where an employee rejects accommodation offers made by the 
employer it has been determined that no further duty to fully accommodate exists.
147
 
This is the case even where the employer has made impractical, unhelpful or 
unrealistic alternative offers,
148
 although on the facts of Chaplin the accommodation 
solutions made would certainly have been ones which were helpful in the 
circumstances. For example, given that Chaplin had indicated she might be prepared 
                                                     
142
 See chapter 8, section 3.1.3. 
143
 Buonanno and Ithaca Industries: see chapter 8 n. 99 and n. 95, respectively. 
144
 See chapter 8 n. 111. 
145
 62 F.Supp.2d 745 (1998). 
146
 See Hardison: chapter 8 n. 114.  
147
 See Bruff and Shelton: chapter 8, section 3.1.5. 
148
 Ibid.  
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to wear the crucifix and chain under her clothes (despite the fact she later reversed 
this position) it was entirely reasonable that the NHS Trust suggested the wearing of 
a turtle-neck t-shirt under her v-neck tunic so that the cross and chain would not be 
visible.
149
  Moreover, whilst it is also true to say that Chaplin’s bosses did find fault 
with all of her own accommodation suggestions, it is clear from the US jurisprudence 
that where accommodations have been offered by the employer there is no obligation 
to accept the counter-suggestions most preferable to the employee
150
 – the evidence 
on the facts of Chaplin being that the employee did make numerous counter-
suggestions herself.
151
  
                                                     
149
 The circumstances of this offer were detailed by Judge Hollow at paras. 18 and 20.  
150
 See Ansonia, Wilson  and Breech: chapter 8, section 3.1.5. 
151
 per Judge Hollow at para 18.  
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CHAPTER 11: RELIGION AND WORK SCHEDULES 
 
1. CHERFI v. G4S SECURITY SERVICES (Cherfi)
1
 
 
The appellant (Cherfi) was a practising Muslim who began working for the 
respondent (G4S) in May 2001. He was employed as a security guard and worked 
nights until 2003; at this point he was moved permanently to another site where he 
worked days. This arrangement continued until June 2005. Whilst working days he 
began leaving work at lunchtime every Friday to attend prayers at his local mosque. 
When G4S’ contract at that site ended in June 2005, Cherfi became a ‘floating 
guard’,2 undertaking other duties at various locations although predominately at a 
Job Centre Plus site. Here, there was a relaxed atmosphere about guards vacating the 
premises at lunchtimes and Cherfi habitually left on Friday lunchtimes to attend his 
mosque. His supervisor noted that Cherfi’s Friday lunch absences could last up to an 
hour and a quarter; however, this did not pose a problem as other guards also took 
similar time off for their lunch breaks. Moreover, the supervisor was aware as to why 
Cherfi left the site. It appears there was a prayer room available at the Job Centre 
Plus location although Cherfi did not make use of this facility.  
 
In October 2007, Cherfi’s supervisor informed the line manager at the Job Centre 
Plus site of the Friday lunchtime arrangement. The line manager considered that this 
constituted an unauthorised absence and Cherfi was suspended. There followed an 
investigation, disciplinary procedure and, ultimately, an oral warning. Cherfi later 
returned to work and was subsequently informed by the line manager that he could in 
fact attend his mosque on Friday lunchtimes.  
 
By October 2008, Cherfi had developed further unrelated grievances and a meeting 
was arranged with his head of operations. At that meeting, in addition to discussion 
of these separate complaints, he was notified that he would no longer be able to 
attend Friday lunchtime prayers at his mosque because G4S’ client required, as part 
of their contract, that a specific number of security guards be assigned to the Job 
                                                     
1
 [2011] EqLR 825. The facts referred to in the section which follows are all taken from the judgment 
of HHJ Reid QC in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT).   
2
 The language of the EAT, per HHJ Reid QC at para. 8. 
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Centre Plus site for a set number of hours each day. This amounted to a stipulation 
that all guards be present for the full duration of their duty including at lunchtime – 
for which they were paid. If this stipulation was breached it would not only entail 
G4S incurring a financial penalty but also risk jeopardising the contract between 
them and their client. As such, it had become a requirement of G4S’ agreement with 
its client that security guards, whether temporary or permanent, work shifts of at least 
eight hours. This meant that Cherfi’s contract could not be formally adjusted to allow 
him to have Friday lunchtimes off work.  
 
This new position was confirmed to other workers in a memorandum in late October 
2008. At the same time, the head of operations for the Job Centre Plus site wrote to 
Cherfi to appraise him of the new position. In this letter he indicated that he was 
prepared to amend Cherfi’s contract of employment so that he work Monday to 
Thursday with the option of working a fifth day on either a Saturday or Sunday. 
Cherfi rejected this alternative offer as he was not prepared to work at weekends; he 
decided to take all Fridays off work either as sick leave, authorised annual leave or 
authorised unpaid leave. In March 2009, he was advised by letter from his head of 
operations that this could not continue. As a result, in May 2009 he claimed against 
G4S in the Employment Tribunal (ET) for both direct and indirect discrimination.
3
 
As noted in the judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT),
4
 his clam for 
direct discrimination in the ET was unsuccessful in relation to the main issue of his 
absence on Friday lunchtimes. His claim for indirect discrimination in the ET was 
also unsuccessful because any discrimination flowing from the requirement he work 
Fridays had been justified as proportionate:
5
 this formed part of his appeal to the 
EAT on the grounds that the ET had failed to balance the discriminatory impact of 
this requirement on Cherfi with the needs of G4S.
6
 His appeal on this matter was 
unsuccessful for the same reasons as in the ET.
7
    
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/1660 (RB Regs 2003), 
Regulations 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b), respectively. 
4
 per HHJ Reid QC at paras. 2 and 11.  
5
 Ibid., at para 4.  
6
 Ibid., at para 5.  
7
 Ibid., at paras 45 – 46.  
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2. CHERFI: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
2.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
There were clear tangible costs associated with accommodating Cherfi. The EAT 
was persuaded that avoidance of these was a legitimate aim in precluding 
accommodation, the specific matter to which the aim related being the contract 
between G4S and its client which required Cherfi to be on site during his whole shift. 
This legitimate aim was referred to as ‘the operational needs [of the business] which 
[G4S] had in complying with its contract’,8 the EAT noting that this aim had to be 
legitimate because of evidence pointing towards not only the real ‘financial penalties 
involved ... but also the danger of losing the contract altogether if there was 
continued and persistent breach of the contract’.9 The EAT was satisfied that there 
existed real evidence of likely loss of revenue from any breach of contractual 
obligation: it was commented that ‘[G4S] would suffer financial penalties if breaches 
of the [contractual] provisions occurred, but more importantly it is apparent that 
breaches would put the continuation of the contract at risk’.10 Moreover, the EAT 
reported that the ET had ‘specifically found as a fact that [G4S] could only run its 
business properly and on a sound financial basis by engaging security guards 
working shifts of at least eight hours whether on a permanent or temporary basis’.11 
This aim is fortified by the general principle from British Telecommunications Plc v. 
Ticehurst
12
 that employees should not conduct themselves in such a way as to 
endanger their employer’s business interests.  
 
Having determined that the aim in relation to the financial costs and breach of 
contractual obligations was legitimate, and that specific proof of this may have been 
present,
13
 it becomes necessary to assess proportionality
14
 and undue hardship. 
                                                     
8
 Ibid., at para. 45. 
9
 Ibid., at para. 44. 
10
 Ibid., at para. 17.  
11
 Ibid., at para. 19 (emphasis added).  
12
 [1992] ICR 383. 
13
 Proof is required. See Chambly (Commission Scolaire Regionale) v. Bergevin (Chambly) [1994] 2 
SCR 525: see chapter 7 n. 64. 
14
 Such legitimate business aims have been found to be justified as proportionate in rejecting 
employee accommodation requests. In particular, see recent cases where employees have sought 
specific days off from work for religious reasons and unsuccessfully claimed, inter alia, indirect 
religious discrimination: Mba v. Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Merton (Mba) [2012] 
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Despite the fact it had become a requirement of Cherfi’s work agreement that he be 
at the Job Centre Plus site at all times, including lunchtimes,
15
 both full and partial 
accommodations were possible up to the point of impossibility
16
 so as to not frustrate 
the contractual obligation G4S had with its client. It was noted by Liberty in Ladele 
v. London Borough of Islington when it intervened at the EAT level
17
 that in relation 
to employees ‘taking time off for religious worship ... the manifestation of belief 
ought if possible to be accommodated, unless to allow time off would 
disproportionately prejudice the running of the business’.18 In Cherfi, full 
accommodation could have been provided by G4S: this could have been met by 
employing Cherfi on a part-shift basis on Fridays and asking or recruiting another 
security guard to cover his lunch hour.
19
 However, this possibility was rejected due 
to the ‘financial impracticability’20 of it given that the replacement guard would have 
to be paid for the whole shift – not just the lunchtime period. Of course, had G4S 
been required to employ another security guard then they would have not been 
expected to bear the full cost of this – under Ontario Human Rights Commission 
(O’Malley) v. Simpson Sears (O’Malley)21 Cherfi would have been required to 
contribute to the expense of recruiting a replacement guard. This would have been 
particularly appropriate given that the absence request would have been regular.
22
  
 
Alternative partial accommodations were also available. G4S had offered Cherfi 
either the opportunity to work at weekends
23
 or the use of the on-site pray room 
during Friday lunchtimes.
24
 Given the ‘impossibility’ threshold, these partial 
                                                                                                                                                      
EqLR 526 (per Judge Williams QC at paras. 79 – 89); Patrick v. IH Sterile Services Ltd (Patrick) 
[2012] EqLR 91 (per Judge Smail at para. 33); and Moise v. Strettons Ltd (Moise) [2012] EqLR 91 
(here it was found that there had been no indirect discrimination as there was no identifiable 
disadvantage – however, if there had been disadvantage the legitimate aim would have been justified: 
per Judge Ferris at para. 66). In relation to indirect discrimination the first and third cases were heard 
under the RB Regs 2003, Regulation 3(1)(b); the second case was heard under the Equality Act 2010, 
s. 19.  
15
 This could be inferred from the fact this seemed to be the position in relation to all members of staff 
at the appellant’s site: per HHJ Reid QC at para. 16.  
16
 This being the test for undue hardship in Canada: British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
Relations Comm) v. BCGEU (the ‘Meiorin’ case) [1999] 3 SCR 3: see chapter 7 n. 54.  
17
 [2009] IRLR 154. 
18
 At para. 103.  
19
 per HHJ Reid QC at para. 44.  
20
 Ibid.  
21
 [1985] 2 SCR 536. 
22
 O’Malley: see chapter 7 n. 66. 
23
 per HHJ Reid QC at para. 15. 
24
 Ibid., at paras. 34 and 43. 
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accommodations would have been necessary for G4S to offer before it could be said 
accommodation would have reached the point of undue hardship. As Cherfi rejected 
all compromises this point was probably reached.  
 
2.2 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
The impact on employee rights and morale in the face of accommodation is not one 
which seems to have been particularly pressing.
25
 However, the fact that G4S did 
employ other religious Muslims was observed by the EAT
26
 meaning that, had only 
Cherfi been accommodated, the other Muslim employees may have had legitimate 
grounds for accommodation.
27
 Inevitably, any financial costs of accommodating 
Cherfi would be exacerbated by allowing other Muslim workers time off on Friday 
lunchtimes, this being in terms of any cost covered by G4S and the extra work 
involved in arranging appointment of any extra security guards. This may have 
reached the ‘impossibility’ threshold in relation to Cherfi and all other Muslim 
employees. Of course, the likelihood of employee morale being a factor seems low 
given that at no stage in the proceedings did G4S seek to show hardship of this 
variety.  
 
2.3 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer28 
 
Even if cost and employee morale had not been relevant factors, accommodation 
would still not have been particularly practicable for G4S. There was no obvious 
evidence that other guards would have been able to swap duties with Cherfi, 
especially on a regular arrangement. However, G4S would have needed to show that 
                                                     
25
 Employee morale as related to this issue was raised in Mba per Judge Williams QC at para. 78. 
26
 per HHJ Reid QC at paras. 25 and 34.  
27
 There was also evidence that other, possibly non-Muslim, employees liked to take long lunch 
breaks (per HHJ Reid QC at paras. 9 and 10) – although in their case, any effect on morale would be 
irrelevant given that they would not have required a religious accommodation along the same lines as 
the appellant.  
28
 Under the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) Equality Act 2010: Code of Practice 
(Employment) (Code of Practice: Employment) for reasonable adjustments in disability discrimination 
law, Cherfi may have been the beneficiary of flexible working as a potential adjustment: para. 6.33. 
Of course, this would have had to pass the EHRC’s criteria for ‘reasonableness’ contained in paras. 
6.28 – it is submitted financial cost would have been a major factor militating against this, particularly 
as reasonableness is assessed objectively: para. 6.29. The Code of Practice: Employment is available 
at: <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/EqualityAct/employercode.pdf>, accessed 
24
th
 August 2012. 
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other guards would not have been able to cooperate with Cherfi’s accommodation 
request following a canvassing exercise.
29
 Following on from Moore v. British 
Columbia (Ministry of Social Services) (Moore)
30
, it might be questioned as to 
whether – following Vickers’ argument – Cherfi should have advised G4S when he 
commenced day shifts in 2003 that he would be unable to undertake guard duties on 
Friday lunchtimes for religious reasons. This may have further assisted G4S in 
blocking the accommodation request because Cherfi, as a practising Muslim, would 
presumably have known in advance of his commitment to Friday prayers and that 
this would have clashed with his work. Clearly, the rule from Moore, specifically 
that a total lack of employer engagement will lead to a finding of no undue hardship 
and corresponding duty to reasonably accommodate, would have been of no use to 
the Cherfi given that accommodation attempts had been made.  
 
3. CHERFI: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
3.1 Economic hardship 
 
As noted, there was potential in Cherfi for significant economic hardship to be 
suffered by G4S had it been forced to fully accommodate. This could have related to 
the financial penalties they would have incurred from their client had the contract 
between them had been breached and subsequently terminated, or the additional 
costs of hiring another guard (so as to avoid breaching the contract). Such costs 
would usually be enough under the United States (US) approach to negate any 
accommodation expectation on the employer. Indeed, in EEOC v. Townley 
Engineering (Townley Engineering) it was specifically declared that economic 
hardship was a form of hardship.
31
 Presumably, the degree of economic hardship 
likely to be experienced (concerning either associated costs of breach of contract or 
those linked to hiring a replacement for Cherfi) would have cleared the de minimis 
threshold.
32
 Given the fact that G4S was able to point to specific financial hardship in 
                                                     
29
 Central Okanagan School District Number 23 v. Renaud (Renaud): see chapter 7 n. 87. 
30
 (1992) 17 CHRR D/426. 
31
 859 F.2d 610 (Ninth Circuit, 1988): see chapter 8, section 3.1.1. 
32
 Tooley v. Martin—Marietta Corp. 648 F.2d 1239 (Tooley) (Ninth Circuit, 1981): see chapter 8 n. 
79. 
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fully accommodating Cherfi, this would have satisfied the need for evidence of 
financial hardship.
33
  
 
3.2 Automatic non-economic hardship 
 
Cherfi’s possible breach of contract might have constituted an automatic non-
economic form of hardship, the presence of which would not have required any 
accommodation efforts
34
 by G4S. 
 
3.3 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
In the unlikely event that other workers had been able to swap duties with Cherfi, 
other considerations under the US model would become important. Significantly, 
G4S made attempts to accommodate Cherfi, such attempts usually signalling that the 
employee is required to accept such alternative offers. They made concerted efforts 
to accommodate him by allowing him to either work Saturdays or Sundays instead of 
Fridays, or work Fridays and make use of the on-site prayer room. These were all 
refused, this being sufficient to cross into the zone of undue hardship.
35
 Indeed, ‘[i]f 
the facility to swap shifts exists, the employer will have met the obligation to 
accommodate’.36 The US courts have also held that where a religious employee 
makes an unrealistic or unworkable accommodation suggestion this may be refused 
too,
37
 such a scenario potentially being present depending on whether the suggestion 
of getting a replacement guard came from Cherfi himself during the course of 
discussions. This ties into the general narrative of the US jurisprudence that, ‘the 
courts are clear that the duty of accommodation carries with it a responsibility on 
employees to attempt to accommodate their religious needs through the means 
                                                     
33
 Protos v. Volkswagen of America Inc. 797 F.2d 129 (Protos) (Third Circuit, 1986): see discussion in 
chapter 8, section 3.1.2. 
34
 On legal infringement constituting an automatic non-economic hardship see United States v. Board 
of Education for the School District of Philadelphia (Philadelphia) 911 F.2d 882 (Third Circuit, 
1990): chapter 8 n. 88. 
35
 See Shelton v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (Shelton) 223 F.3d 220 (Third 
Circuit, 2000) and Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Service (Bruff)244 F.3d 495 (2001): chapter 8, 
section 3.1.5. 
36
 L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 
p. 188.  
37
 As in Peterson v. Hewlett Packard (Peterson) 358 F.3d 599 (Ninth Circuit, 2004) and Virts v. 
Consolidated Freightways (Virts) 285 F.3d 508 (Sixth Circuit, 2002): see chapter 8 n. 132 and n. 133, 
respectively. 
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offered by the employer’.38 Finally, under the US scheme the quality of evidence 
submitted by G4S relating to hardship would need to be checked. Presuming they 
were able to relate Cherfi’s absence on Friday lunchtimes with their legitimate 
concerns relating to cost and breach of contract, it should have been possible to argue 
this as prospective real hardship, this capable of amounting to undue hardship for de 
minimis purposes.
39
 Even if this evidence was more speculative than real, the 
decision from Trans World Airlines v. Hardison (Hardison)
40
 still indicates that 
hypothetical hardship has not yet been dismissed as capable of constituting undue 
hardship.   
 
4. COPSEY v. WWB DEVON CLAYS LTD (Copsey)
41
 
 
The appellant (Copsey) was a practising Christian who began working for the 
respondent (WWB) in March 1988. WWB operated clay quarries and Copsey 
worked at one of these sites, his shift patters arranged across Monday to Friday with 
opportunities for overtime on Saturdays and occasionally Sundays.  
 
In later 1999 and early 2000, WWB was awarded a new contract which substantially 
increased the amount of sand they needed to produce. The only way to meet this 
extra demand was to extend the operating hours of employees. In February 2000, the 
employees’ union accepted a proposal by WWB to introduce a system of seven day 
working, 24 hours a day, on the basis of 12 hour shifts via a rotating shift pattern. 
This would inevitably include Sunday working. Copsey and four other employees 
complained about the Sunday working and they were subsequently permitted a 
special arrangement to work six days a week. Whilst the other three were prepared to 
work Sundays if required, Copsey was not; he accordingly received a reduction in 
pay. At no point did he make it clear that his refusal was based on his religious 
beliefs regarding Sunday working.  
 
                                                     
38
 Vickers, above n. 36, p. 188.  
39
 Tooley and EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car (Alamo): see chapter 8 n. 104 and n. 107, respectively. 
40
 432 US 63 (1977). 
41
 [2005] EWCA Civ 932. The facts referred to in the section which follows are all taken from the 
judgments of Mummery, Rix and Neuberger LJJ in the Court of Appeal (CA).  
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In early 2002, WWB secured yet another order at the site where Copsey worked, 
necessitating a further increase in output. This placed additional pressure on the 
workforce at the site, particularly those who were working on the seven day shift 
arrangement. Consequently, in March 2002 WWB attempted to include in that shift 
pattern the four workers, including Copsey, who were only working six days a week. 
This was met with opposition and as a result WWB advised that if the four workers 
did not agree to working on Sundays they could consider taking a redundancy 
package on generous terms. Two of the workers declined the redundancy offer and 
switched to the seven day working pattern; the other two, including Copsey, 
considered their positions. At a subsequent meeting, Copsey made it clear that, whilst 
he understood the reasons for Sunday working, he would resist any attempt to make 
him work on a Sunday. He was offered the chance of working at a different site 
where there was a five day shift pattern. He refused and there followed 
correspondence between him and WWB in which, for the first time, he indicated that 
his refusal to work on Sundays was due to religious reasons.  
 
In April 2002, he was told that he would be dismissed at the end of May 2002 unless 
he agreed to working on Sundays. He was given the option of signing a compromise 
agreement on ‘favourable terms’,42 although these terms are not known. He later 
applied for work at another plant in July 2002, although further information on this is 
unavailable. He was also given several chances to transfer to other positions within 
the company, these being supplementary to the offer to move to the other plant where 
shifts were five days a week. For example, he was offered the chance of switching to 
a position in the loading yard: this was rejected when it became clear that WWB 
could not guarantee that he would not be required to also work on Sundays in that 
post. Copsey advised WWB that he was only prepared to work on Sundays if there 
was a genuine and unavoidable emergency; this did not include production demands. 
He also applied for the position of laboratory assistant but later said he was unwilling 
to accept the salary attached to the post which was lower than his own. 
 
Copsey was subsequently dismissed at the end of July 2002. It was not possible to 
claim either direct and/or indirect discrimination on grounds of religion or belief as 
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 The language of the CA, per Mummery LJ at para. 14.  
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the RB Regs 2003 came into force after the relevant events had occurred,
43
 although, 
in any event, there was little evidence that WWB had dismissed him directly because 
he was a Christian, or that he was disadvantaged. Even if disadvantage had been 
found, it may well have been justified (these conclusions would have been informed 
by the fact he had not made his religious stance clear from the start
44
). Copsey 
elected to claim unfair dismissal,
45
 although this was unsuccessful in both the ET
46
 
and EAT
47
 on the ground that his religion or belief had played no part in the 
dismissal and, rather, the business needs of WWB constituted ‘some other substantial 
reason’ which justified his dismissal.48 He appealed to the Court of Appeal (CA) on 
the basis that Article 9 had an impact on the unfair dismissal claim: the requirement 
to work Sundays and the overall circumstances of the dismissal were an unjustified 
interference with his freedom of religion. The CA found that WWB’s actions had not 
breached Article 9 as there was no interference with the right to freedom of religion: 
Copsey had a right to resign.
49
 Even if there had been interference, it would have 
been justified due to WWB’s economic concerns.50  
 
5. COPSEY: APPLYING THE CANADIAN MODEL 
 
5.1 Financial cost to the employer / size of the employer 
 
There were financial implications for WWB in accommodation Copsey. The CA was 
persuaded that the likely harm to WWB’s output was a legitimate aim within the 
context of Article 9 that could justify blocking full accommodation. It was said that 
                                                     
43
 per Mummery LJ at para. 8(3).  
44
 Similar to the position in McClintock v. Department for Constitutional Affairs [2008] IRLR 29: see 
chapter 9, section 2. 
45
 This was claimed under s. 94(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 which provides that an 
employee has ‘the right not to be unfairly dismissed’. The test for unfair dismissal is contained in ss. 
98(1) – (4). 
46
 per Mummery LJ at para. 17. 
47
 Ibid., at para. 19.  
48
 Ibid., paras. 17 – 19.  
49
 Ibid., at paras. 30 – 39, although in his leading judgment Mummery LJ said that in the absence of 
the specific situation jurisprudence of Strasbourg he would have found interference with Article 9. Rix 
LJ preferred the view that where an employer changes the terms of a religious employee’s 
employment contract so as to materially interfere with their freedom of religion that potentially 
engages Article 9 unless reasonable accommodation is offered and accepted. If not accepted then there 
may be no interference, although where there is doubt there should be reference to Article 9(2): at 
para. 69. This is different to the situations discussed in chapter 9 where amendments to employee 
duties were brought about by changes in the law.  
50
 per Mummery LJ at para. 41.  
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requiring Copsey to work on Sundays, ‘was a sound business reason, an economic 
necessity for them’.51Moreover, this necessity was borne out of ‘compelling 
economic reasons’52 that were linked to ‘[t]he required increase in production 
requirements’.53 On this basis, the court seemed satisfied that there was evidence that 
accommodation would pose specific harm to WWB’s financial interests by causing a 
diminution in output so as to create difficulty in meeting its orders.
54
 This evidence 
would be supported by the rule in Ticehurst.  
 
Having established that the economic and business imperative must have been the 
main legitimate aim, it becomes necessary to assess proportionality and undue 
hardship up to the point of impossibility (on the assumption Copsey had made his 
religious objections clear from the start). In particular, it may be asked whether 
Copsey could have been fully accommodated without WWB’s business interests 
being frustrated. In all likelihood this would have been challenging: quite apart from 
issues that would have existed with getting him to swap duties with fellow 
colleagues,
55
 allowing him to take all Sundays off would have risked a reduction in 
output which, in turn, would have been injurious to its interests as a business. The 
only remaining option for full accommodation would have been the hiring of a 
replacement worker to fill Copsey’s Sunday duties at extra cost to WWB. Such a cost 
may have been particularly disproportionate given the seven day working policy 
which presumably would also have applied to any replacement worker. Nevertheless, 
it would have to be asked whether this would have been ‘impossible’. Presumably, it 
would have been impossible at the level of practicability and administration, 
although WWB would have needed to adduce evidence of this. Moreover, financial 
impracticability would also be a block, although O’Malley makes it clear that it can 
be fair to expect employees to contribute to any costs associated with their full 
accommodation. It is not clear how much this might have been. However, given the 
wide-ranging ways in which WWB had attempted to accommodate, combined with 
                                                     
51
 per Mummery LJ at para. 17.  
52
 Ibid., at para. 41.  
53
 Ibid., at para. 27.  
54
 Evidence of financial cost would be required: Chambly, see chapter 7 n. 64. 
55
 See below, section 5.4. 
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the fact Copsey’s absences would have been regular,56 it may well have been that 
much of the cost of hiring a replacement would have been borne by Copsey.  
 
In light of the alternative modes of partial accommodation which had been offered, 
WWB would have been viewed as attempting to accommodate up to the point of 
undue hardship. Copsey was offered a special arrangement in February 2000 to only 
work six days a week (although this was only temporary).
57
 He had also been 
offered, in lieu of working on Sundays, a generous redundancy package.
58
 He was 
further offered a permanent accommodation working on a five day shift pattern 
elsewhere in a different plant at the same location which was turned down.
59
 
Additional accommodations included a compromise agreement (the terms of which 
were not explained on the facts),
60
 opportunities to transfer to a position in the 
loading yard which was ultimately refused due to WWB’s inability to guarantee that 
he would not on occasions work on Sundays,
61
 and the chance to work as a 
laboratory assistant which he rejected as it was a less well-paid job.
62
 These attempts 
may well have satisfied the ‘impossibility standard of Canadian undue hardship – 
indeed the court made reference to the doctrine of Canadian reasonable 
accommodation and noted that WWB had ‘done everything that they could to 
accommodate [Copsey’s] wish not to work on Sundays’.63 It was stated that, in 
relation to Article 9 claims, ‘[a]n employer who had sought to find a reasonable 
accommodation for his employee would have nothing to fear. Provided his solution 
was one which a reasonable employer could require, in that it lay within the range of 
reasonable responses to the problem, it would not be for an Employment Tribunal to 
second-guess the employer’.64  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
56
 O’Malley: see chapter 7 n. 66. 
57
 per Mummery LJ  at para. 12.  
58
 Ibid., at para .13.  
59
 Ibid., at para. 14.  
60
 Ibid., at para. 15.  
61
 Ibid., para. 16 
62
 Ibid., para. 16 and per Neuberger LJ at para. 95. 
63
 per Mummery LJ at para 41. 
64
 per Rix LJ at para. 71.  
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5.2 Disruption of a collective agreement 
 
The employees’ union had been consulted about the accommodation request and 
formed the view that ‘it was necessary to require [Copsey] to switch to a 7 day shift 
pattern’,65 a shift pattern that it had accepted.66 However, Canadian reasonable 
accommodation has, characteristically, taken a more employee-friendly approach. 
For example, in Renaud it was said that collective agreements per se cannot 
automatically block necessary accommodations, although this will depend on how 
far accommodation would depart from all other conditions and terms of employment 
in any collective agreement.
67
    
 
5.3 Problems of morale for other employees 
 
There was reasonably firm evidence that employee morale would have been affected 
by full accommodation. The CA noted that the ET had ‘taken soundings from 
[Copsey’s] colleagues, who would be disadvantaged if he was made a special case. 
His colleagues were found to have little sympathy with his position’.68 The well-
being of the other employees was reiterated elsewhere,
69
 along with their 
‘dissatisfaction’70 at any prospective long-term accommodation of Copsey as an 
‘isolated’71 case. However, it is difficult to see how morale would be legitimately 
affected by accommodation given that, unless such colleagues were also religious 
and required Sundays off, no workplace rights would have been affected. In relation 
to employees’ availability and their general views regarding Copsey’s 
accommodation request, these are considered below in section 5.4. 
 
 
 
                                                     
65
 per Mummery LJ at para. 17.  
66
 Ibid., para. 11.  
67
 Renaud: see chapter 7 n. 73. 
68
 per Mummery LJ at para. 16.  
69
 Ibid., at para. 27.  
70
 per Neuberger LJ at para. 95.  
71
 per Mummery LJ at para. 17.  
241 
 
5.4 Inter-changeability of the workforce / size of the employer
72
 
 
It would have been very difficult to accommodate Copsey with regards to his 
colleagues as all employees were required to work the seven day shift arrangement 
meaning there would have been a lack of room for shift flexibility. It is known that 
other employees felt negatively about Copsey’s request, although assuming they 
were free to swap with him it is not immediately obvious why this should be taken 
into account in the canvassing exercise.
73
 Whilst Copsey raised his objections to 
Sunday working immediately, these objections were not on the basis of his religion 
or belief. As per Moore,
74
 the fact of alternative accommodations might mean that 
under the Canadian model he had no automatic right to expect a swap in duties away 
from Sunday working.    
 
6. COPSEY: APPLYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
 
6.1 Economic hardship 
 
The facts of Copsey demonstrate that economic hardship would certainly have been a 
problem for WWB in acceding to the accommodation request. This related to 
business necessity and the increased rate of orders received from clients. Such 
economic factors will be enough under the US model to cross the de minimis 
threshold for undue hardship and justify a rejection of accommodation.
75
 As usual, 
some evidence of this business necessity would have to be adduced as in Protos
76
 
where there was no discernible economic loss occasioned when a worker was absent 
on Saturdays.
77
 Presumably, WWB would be able to show such economic loss in 
relation to business efficiency and production.   
 
                                                     
72
 Under reasonable adjustments in disability discrimination law, Copsey may have been 
accommodated by the imposition of flexible working (as in Cherfi). However, this would have been 
subject to the same issue of financial cost: see above n. 28.  
73
 See the views of Hambler and Vickers: chapter 7 n. 89 and n. 90, respectively. Note that under 
reasonable adjustments in domestic disability discrimination law, it is not enough for an employer to 
point to negative staff attitudes as a barrier to accommodation: EHRC Code of Practice: Employment, 
para. 6.35. 
74
 See chapter 7, section 4.1.4. 
75
 Townley Engineering: see chapter 8, section 3.1.1. 
76
 See chapter 8, section 3.1.2. 
77
 See chapter 8 n. 81. 
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6.2 Factors refuting or suggesting non-economic hardship? 
 
If economic hardship was not present due to inadequacy of evidence then, absent any 
of the automatic non-economic hardship factors, the next stage in the US analysis 
would be to assess the employer response to the accommodation request. WWB 
made formidable efforts to accommodate all of which failed to find favour with 
Copsey. The rejection of these would have been sufficient to surmount the US de 
minimis hurdle of undue hardship.
78
 Copsey did not make his own suggestions as to 
how he might be accommodated; he also did not counter WWB’s alternative offers 
with other ideas.  
 
It has already been mentioned that some sort of evidential link between economic 
hardship and non-accommodation must have been present before the CA. On that 
basis, it may be that real hardship
79
 would be satisfied, although even if not, the 
possibility of hypothetical hardship also clearing the de minimis hurdle still exists 
due to the continuing effect of Hardison. The fact there existed evidence of other 
workers resenting any accommodation of Copsey would also count as real hardship 
under the rule in Tooley and Alamo.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
78
 See Bruff and Shelton: chapter 8, section 3.1.5. 
79
 This will clear the de minimis hurdle: see Tooley and Alamo, see chapter 8 n. 104 and n. 107, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION  
 
1. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS  
 
During this thesis a particular perspective on religious liberty protection in the 
United Kingdom (UK) has been developed. This has investigated the extension of 
religious liberty through the use of religious exceptions in limited circumstances. It 
has been acknowledged that this enhanced protection must be orientated around an 
idea that sometimes religion should be accorded further special protection by 
allowing it to avoid legal censure. Protection of religion has been predicated on a 
theoretical platform that accepts the concept of human dignity (incorporating the 
ideas of autonomy and equality) as a prevailing justification for that protection.   
 
At a more detailed level, research has been focused on the practical implications of 
these exceptions to determine what contributions they make to our conceptualisation 
of religious liberty in the United Kingdom. Attention has been centred on religious 
exceptions in anti-discrimination law and this case-study has revealed the useful, if 
limited, practical ways in which religious bodies have been permitted to contravene 
the state’s legitimate aim in proscribing discrimination. The narrowness of the 
exceptions is necessary given the concession the state makes in creating them, 
although as relatively minor features of religion law their role in privileging religion 
is nonetheless significant. The emphasis on exceptions recognising the rights of 
religions as institutions receives lukewarm approval from Rivers who notes that 
religious exceptions ‘may be more or less adequate in preserving the group’s right to 
maintain its identify’,1 although he advocates a more collective dimension to 
religious rights as rooted in constitutional principle.
2
 He believes this is more apt to 
achieve religious liberty in the long term because ‘it requires institutional anchoring 
in the recognition of a quintessentially religious domain ... which is important 
enough to be immune from state interference. It requires religions and the state to be 
                                                     
1
 J. Rivers, The Law of Organised Religions: between establishment and secularism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 322.  
2
 Ibid., see discussion at pp. 318 – 322.  
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thought of, in some sense, as coequal in law’.3 This better entrenches religion’s 
position in UK society; it also permits individual rights to flow from it.
4
  
 
However, recent jurisprudence concerning religious discrimination has shown that 
the courts have often relegated religion in the face of other legitimate aims. This 
affects the interests of religious individuals whose specific circumstances fall outside 
those covered by the religious exceptions. Rivers argues that this relegation amounts 
to a ‘“recreationalisation” of religion: ‘[t]he effect is to turn religion into another 
hobby ... the law need make no space for the idea that there might actually be a God, 
who might really be calling people into relationship with himself, who might make 
real demands on his worshippers. Religion thus acquires all the moral weight of 
stamp-collecting or train-spotting’.5 Consequently, this thesis has argued for careful 
attention to be paid to reasonable accommodation as another way in which the 
special protection afforded by religious exceptions could be extended to religious 
individuals. It has justified this call in a distinctive way by applying comparative 
models of reasonable accommodation to domestic cases so as to better demonstrate 
how religious interests and competing legitimate aims can co-exist. Should any 
domestic attempt be made to replicate these models of reasonable accommodation, it 
is submitted that this would help redraw the imbalance in the recent religious 
discrimination case law.  
 
2. RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUALS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
It is important to situate the doctrine of reasonable accommodation in the UK’s legal 
framework. A focus on individualised religious liberty immediately clashes with 
organised religion’s role in the constitution providing the starting point for religious 
liberty, as supported by Rivers. In this sense the doctrine of reasonable 
accommodation is vulnerable to a charge that, far from augmenting religious 
interests, it actually diminishes them. This is because a concentration on the 
individual dimension of religious liberty is less likely to foster respect for religion at 
                                                     
3
 J. Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 371, 
p. 399. 
4
 This position will be revisited below in comments on reasonable accommodation: see section 2. 
5
 Rivers, above n. 3, p. 398. 
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a more global and collective level so as to percolate down to the individual. It is 
caused by a ‘new secularism’ emerging in the UK constitution that trivialises 
religion,
6
 exemplified by trends identified in the recent jurisprudence. Rivers is 
forthright in his attack on this: ‘[t]he confidence of the new secularism in the 
superficial and unreasoned nature of religion renders it ultimately less able to tolerate 
the growing diversity of British society. For, as a solution to the fundamental 
problem of settling the terms of peaceful and fair coexistence in a society of 
competing rationalities, the new secularisation of the British constitution is deeply 
implausible’.7 The view is that provisions orientated around the individual (such as 
reasonable accommodation) are fundamentally unable to facilitate broader 
constitutional respect for religion, which is imperative in realising longer-term 
religious liberty goals. As with any individualised legal construct, reasonable 
accommodation is part of the problem and not the solution to ensuring stronger 
religious liberty. Collective religious interests may be eclipsed unnecessarily by more 
narrow individual notions of religious rights which then lead to inferior protection 
for religion as an entity.  
 
However, reasonable accommodation and recognition of collective rights are not 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, individual and group rights have, and indeed 
continue, to co-exist. In any event, Vickers contests the idea that group rights should 
be the default basis for religious interests, arguing that the more modern approach is 
to conceive of them at the individual level. She has reasoned that ‘collective rights 
are an important aspect of individual rights, but they derive their value from 
individual interests ... collective rights gain their validity and value from the 
individuals who make up the collective’.8 Even if this is not accepted, before modes 
of religious liberty protection are rejected there should be further debate ‘to explain 
why religion is protected at all in modern times’.9 Indeed, given that there are 
ongoing ‘extensive debate[s] over whether religious interests should be understood 
as individual or collective rights’,10 the idea that reasonable accommodation be 
                                                     
6
 Ibid., pp. 396 – 399.  
7
 Ibid., p. 399.  
8
 L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 
p. 42. 
9
 L. Vickers, ‘Twin Approaches to Secularism: organised religion and society’ (2012) 32 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 197, p. 202. 
10
 Ibid., p. 201.  
246 
 
 
 
dismissed as a possible solution to recent marginalisation of religion seems 
premature.  Certainly, reasonable accommodation – with its ability to elevate the 
religious individual’s interests as better balanced against another’s legitimate aim – 
has a proven ability to raise the profile of religion across various participatory 
elements of society, for example the workplace.  
 
This thesis has not sought to pinpoint where a reasonable accommodation duty 
would be located in domestic law. However, in the event that the Canadian or United 
States (US) models were adopted,
11
 some commentators have argued for a sui 
generis classification of reasonable accommodation. Rather than forming part of 
indirect discrimination (or being interconnected with something akin to indirect 
discrimination
12
), it should constitute a wholly independent free-standing claim. 
Waddington and Hendriks support this: ‘the right to an effective accommodation 
does not entirely fit within the prevailing distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination.’13 In light of the comments made in chapter six on the differing ways 
in which indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation aim for equality of 
opportunity (for example there is the absence of a comparator in reasonable 
accommodation), this certainly seems sensible. This is supported by Schiek et al who 
comment that ‘reasonable accommodation discrimination typically emerges in 
response to the failure to make an adaptation to ensure equal opportunities and 
commonly does not follow from differentiation on a forbidden or seemingly neutral 
ground’.14 However, perspectives on this are not unanimous, with others such as 
Howard drawing attention to similarities between indirect discrimination and 
reasonable accommodation. These include use of a proportionality analysis which 
may suggest that ‘the justification of indirect discrimination can be interpreted as 
including a duty to make reasonable accommodation’.15 This signals that another 
option is an in-built reasonable accommodation duty within indirect discrimination. 
                                                     
11
 A preference as to which model be replicated in domestic law is outlined below, sections 3.3.1 and 
3.3.2 
12
 For example, see reasonable adjustments for disability at the domestic level: chapter 6, section 
3.2.1. 
13
 L. Waddington and A. Hendriks, ‘The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: from direct and indirect discrimination to reasonable accommodation discrimination’ (2002) 
18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 403, p. 427. 
14
 D. Schiek, L. Waddington and M. Bell, Cases, Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and 
International Non-Discrimination Law (Oxford: Hart, 2007), p. 745. 
15
 E. Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the wearing of religious 
symbols in education (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 139. 
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Indeed, if one of the comparative models were to be adopted this presents flexibility 
as to how that duty would be drafted.
16
 However, given the alternative burdens of 
proof inherent in both claim routes it may be wiser to create a separate duty for 
reasonable accommodation so as to keep the duty distinct. In reasonable 
accommodation, the burden is on the defendant to establish that an accommodation 
would create undue hardship; in indirect discrimination the initial burden is on the 
claimant. Vickers alludes to this distinction as a reason for maintaining reasonable 
accommodation as a distinct duty;
17
 similarly, so do Waddington and Hendriks.
18
  
 
Having addressed some obstacles to the introduction of a domestic reasonable 
accommodation duty, the rest of this closing chapter will focus on assimilating the 
theoretical, conceptual, practical and policy elements of the reasonable 
accommodation investigation tracked across Parts III and IV. These consolidate the 
case for the doctrine’s domestic introduction for religion and are considered below in 
sections 3.1 to 3.4.  
 
3. THE CASE FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION  
 
3.1 Theoretical imperatives 
 
A theme of this thesis has been the postulation of human dignity (together with 
autonomy and equality) as an established normative basis for the protection of 
religious interests at the legal level, consistent with proponents such as Vickers and 
McCrudden.
19
 Not all scholars agree on this as the foundation of religious liberty and 
indeed the concept of dignity, what it means and whether it can be relied upon as a 
theoretical basis in law are contested. However, it may certainly be conceived of as a 
positive reason for the protection of, amongst other interests, religion. Without more, 
this attraction may seem simplistically intuitive; however, it is embodied in the 
notion that ‘[i]f we accept that all humans are equal, we need to give equal concern 
                                                     
16
 It is imagined this might be in the Equality Act 2010 although the aim here is not to draft a 
definitive reasonable accommodation amendment to existing legislation; it is to advance the debate in 
favour of reasonable accommodation of religion at the domestic level. 
17
 Vickers, above n. 8, p. 224.  
18
 Waddington and Hendriks, above n. 13, p. 427. 
19
 See discussion in chapter 2, section 2. 
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and respect to the different world views that they develop’.20 Further, it links with the 
inherently individualistic spirit of reasonable accommodation as supported by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in its submission that ‘recognition 
of the principles of dignity and autonomy requires an approach to the definition of 
manifestation that focuses primarily on the conviction of the adherent’.21 Moreover, 
its positivity as a justification for validating religious interests sits in contrast to other 
more impersonal justifications for protecting religious liberty. For example, Biedefelt 
grounds the guaranteeing of religious interests in the idea of state neutrality, although 
he ultimately concludes that neutrality could be attacked for its idealistic futility.
22
 
As a result, he declares support for reasonable accommodation in spite of neutrality:  
 
members of minorities should have the possibility to demand, to a certain 
degree, personal adjustments when general legal provisions collide with their 
conscientious convictions. Such measures of ‘reasonable accommodation’, 
which often have been criticized as allegedly privileging minorities, in fact 
should be seen as an attempt to rectify situations of indirect discrimination … 
even in liberal democracies that are devoted to the principle of neutrality in 
questions of religion.
23
 
 
The attraction of human dignity above other justifications can also be made in 
relation to toleration, Sandberg contending that religious exceptions and special 
treatment of religion indicate that protection of religious interests has moved beyond 
mere toleration.
24
 
 
3.2 Conceptual imperatives 
 
If human dignity exists as a prominent normative basis for a duty of reasonable 
accommodation, then equality as a sub-strand of this theory clearly positions that 
duty in the sphere of anti-discrimination law. This was explored in chapter six where 
it was said that equality of opportunity unites reasonable accommodation with 
indirect discrimination. However, one notable difference in this regard was 
reasonable accommodation’s strident individualised focus, an approach which has 
                                                     
20
 Vickers, above n. 8, p. 40. 
21
 EHRC submission in Eweida and Chaplin v. UK, at para. 16.  
22
 See chapter 2, section 4. 
23
 H. Bielefeldt, ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief – a human right under pressure’ (2012) 1 Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 15, pp. 24 – 25.  
24
 R. Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 37. 
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not been without criticism for its assimilationist impact. Schneiderman has attacked 
the concept of accommodation for being a ‘formalistic standard of review, 
assimilationist in its objectives, and largely oblivious to the presence of 
domination’.25 This is echoed elsewhere. Waddington and Hendriks repeat the idea 
of accommodation leading to domination of the group to which the accommodated 
individual belongs, contending that ‘[i]n most instances, an individual 
accommodation leaves unchallenged and unaffected the underlying discriminatory 
policy which resulted in the initial exclusion’.26 This does nothing to improve the 
standing of religion in society, perhaps also impacting disproportionately on minority 
religions, supporting Rivers’ argument that the individual arena is ill-suited to 
securing religious interests in the long term. Beaman, writing from a more socio-
legal perspective, reinforces this position by rebuking reasonable accommodation for 
tolerating structural inequality and condemning those who use the language of 
‘accommodation’ in ignorance of the fact that ‘[r]eligious [groups] in this framework 
are relegated to a “less-than” status in which the official response appears as 
benevolent generosity rather than as a recognition of equality as right or equality of 
position’.27 This invokes a colonial privilege that ‘“we” will tolerate “you”’.28  
 
It cannot be denied that these arguments reveal conceptual weaknesses in the 
protection claims of reasonable accommodation. Critics of the duty claim that instead 
of adjusting individual imbalances, the religious liberty emphasis instead should be 
on ameliorating disadvantage, exclusion and alienation which exist on a much larger 
scale. Of course, the doctrine of reasonable accommodation, at least as it is 
conceived in Canada and the US, is not a panacea for addressing all the ills suffered 
by religion in society. Indeed, it does not claim to be. Instead, it has been argued that 
the theory of human dignity represents a useful theoretical underpinning for 
reasonable accommodation, with the benevolence inherent in this theory useful in 
distancing the doctrine from the conceptual denunciations above. In any case, such 
denunciations may overstate the ease with which religion as a collective entity can 
                                                     
25
 D. Schneiderman, ‘Associational Rights, Religion and the Charter’, in R. Moon (ed.) Law and 
Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), p. 67.  
26
 Waddington and Hendriks, above n. 13, pp. 414 – 415.  
27
 L. G. Beaman, ‘“It Was All Slightly Unreal”: what’s wrong with tolerance and accommodation in 
the adjudication of religious freedom?’ (2011) 23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 442, p. 
447. 
28
 Ibid., p. 443.  
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bargain for more power at a greater level in seeking to command more favour and 
respect. This is not to deter ambition of religious liberty on a grander scale; rather it 
is to acknowledge that reasonable accommodation as a device is plainly ill-equipped 
to challenge deep-rooted societal problems concerning religion. Its attraction lies 
elsewhere in the concentration on individual matters and associated respect for 
dignity; this will be shown through discussion of the practical focus the doctrine 
brings to adjudication of disputes. That focus allows a religious individual more 
latitude to achieve a full or partial accommodation alongside another’s legitimate 
aim. Significantly, the ability of reasonable accommodation to search for optimum 
equitable co-existence between practical accommodation and a legitimate aim, 
particularly where there is a clash of protected characteristics, may not only provide 
an individual solution; it may also catalyse a process whereby legal and societal 
institutions begin to take cognisance of religious interests.  
 
3.3 Practical imperatives 
 
3.3.1 The benefits of proportionality 
 
The practical elegance of reasonable accommodation is provided by its 
proportionality analysis. This is especially the case with the Canadian model which, 
as seen in Part IV, possesses a great ability to consider arguments for religious liberty 
from its more nuanced, intricate and forensic analysis of the facts in an individual’s 
situation. This enables it to better discover accommodation leeway than the current 
justification test in indirect discrimination. The latter may appear to require judges to 
balance a religious individual’s interests against a competing legitimate aim; 
however, the domestic case law resoundingly establishes that the quality of judicial 
reasoning this test encourages can sometimes be superficial and unnecessarily 
inimical to religious interests. Instead the Canadian model’s schematic outline of 
prescribed factors (as set out in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human 
Rights Commission)
29
 (Alberta)) demands a more complete consideration of matters 
(along with any other relevant issues) which may reveal how a full or partial 
accommodation could actually be provided without troubling the defendant’s 
                                                     
29
 [1990] 2 SCR 489. 
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legitimate aim. In Canada, this exploration is further facilitated by an undue hardship 
standard (‘impossibility’, as stipulated in British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
Relations Comm) v. BCGEU
30
) which obliges exhaustive examination of the facts to 
verify the possibility of an accommodation. Whilst this approach favours the 
religious claimant it is not at the expense of undermining or diluting the defendant’s 
legitimate aim: it is clear that this must remain unaffected in the accommodation 
equation. Special treatment of religion in this way so as to reverse the effects of 
recent case law does not have to be problematic, as Vickers highlights: ‘different 
grounds of discrimination may fit better with different understandings of equality ... 
Assuming that it is acceptable to treat different grounds of discrimination differently, 
then it is unnecessary to provide for interchangeable interpretation of similar terms 
used in relation to the different grounds of discrimination’.31  
 
If adopted, this level of analysis would address many commentators’ concerns with 
judicial reasoning at the justification stages of indirect discrimination claims. Whilst 
Sandberg argues that ‘focusing properly on the question of justification by looking at 
the facts, risks and contexts of the particular case would have the same result as 
applying the question of reasonable accommodation’,32 it is submitted in this thesis 
that only the application of reasonable accommodation (along the Canadian lines) 
would achieve this. Sandberg seems to concede this point when he states that if 
reasonable accommodation were to put an extra gloss on the legal provisions which 
was ‘necessary to ensure that the focus is upon justification ... then the concept [of 
reasonable accommodation] would be helpful’.33 Canadian reasonable 
accommodation would address his concerns that justification should ‘allow for 
nuanced fact-specific conclusions which do not constrain subsequent cases’.34 
Moreover, it would address Stychin’s contention that ‘balancing and accommodation 
demands some form of contextual analysis, which engages with the competing 
interests on the particular facts ... Only a factual analysis can answer [the question of 
                                                     
30
 [1999] 3 SCR 3. 
31
 Vickers, above n. 8, pp. 228 – 229.  
32
 R. Sandberg, ‘Submission to the Consultation on Legal Intervention on Religion or Belief Rights’ 
(EHRC Submission), September 2011: available at, 
<http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/research/Russell%20Sandberg%20%28Cardiff%20University%29%20S
ubmission%20to%20the%20Consultation%20on%20Legal%20Intervention%20on%20Religion%20o
r%20Belief%20Rights.pdf >, accessed 28
th
 August 2012, p. 6 (emphasis added). 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Sandberg, above n. 24, p. 130. 
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reasonable accommodation]’.35 The exercise conducted in Part IV directly targets a 
particular lament of Stychin’s, namely that in the arena of reasonable 
accommodation of religion ‘there is rarely any consideration of how this balancing 
would actually be undertaken in hard cases’.36  
 
Whilst there is a view that reasonable accommodation might signify ‘the triumph of 
pragmatism over principle’37 its attraction remains undimmed given that it provides 
an alternative, context-dependent and – therefore – meaningful way in which to deal 
with awkward balancing of competing claims. This is reinforced by McGoldrick 
who, in relation to the workplace, argues that ‘[s]ensitive and intelligent employment 
practices may resolve many practical problems but some may require weighing of 
claims that have at least an appearance of equal weight ... [C]onflicts ... can 
sometimes be resolved by common sense, good practice and a sense of 
proportionality. However, sometimes a hard choice has to be made and one principle 
or right is given preference over another’.38 McColgan reinforces this perspective 
when she comments that reasonable accommodation is ‘a pragmatic response to the 
fact that religious belief is an important organising feature of many people’s lives 
and ... present arrangements are not even-handed in the extent to which they enable 
people to manage the competing demands upon them’.39  
 
3.3.2 The problem with certainty 
 
The arguments for group immunity (based on exceptions) advanced above by Rivers, 
and envisaged in Esau’s ‘islands of exclusivity’,40appear to have an advantage over 
reasonable accommodation and its focus on proportionality. That advantage is 
certainty. Indeed, it is an advantage enjoyed by religious bodies at the domestic level 
                                                     
35
 C. Stychin, ‘Faith in the Future: sexuality, religion and the public sphere’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 729, pp. 749 – 750.  
36
 Ibid., p. 749 (original emphasis). 
37
 Ibid., p. 753. 
38
 D. McGoldrick, ‘Accommodating Muslims in Europe: from adopting Sharia law to religiously 
based opt outs from generally applicable laws’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 603, pp. 625 – 
626 (emphasis added). 
39
 A. McColgan, ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law 
Journal 1, p. 25. 
40
 See chapter 4, section 6. 
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in the exceptions for them in employment and goods and services provision.
41
 The 
view is that a proportionality analysis weakens any guarantee of reasonable 
accommodation for religious adherents. There is no statutory ‘immunity’; rather, 
there exists a claim route which is subject to a proportionality assessment, the result 
of which determines the outcome. This is noted by those who comment that in 
reasonable accommodation, ‘the approach is fact-dependent and therefore cannot 
lead to the development of clear and simple precedent’.42 There is also the charge 
that the fact-sensitive nature of proportionality means that it is open to a degree of 
subjective interpretation by judges so as to exacerbate uncertainty and lead to 
inconsistency. However, it is possible to construct a defence to the charge of 
uncertainty. Vickers has argued that the appeal of proportionality is precisely that it 
does not lead to rigid certainty. Ironically, the call for more immunity ‘instead of 
relying on the fact-sensitive proportionality test, would result in less protection for 
religion and belief.
43
 Indeed, ‘the range of rights created by such a process would be 
very restricted’.44 Rather, emphasis on a detailed proportionality test would provide 
‘clear procedural safeguards to ensure that restrictions on religions [liberty] ... are 
only imposed after proper consideration of the varied interests at stake’.45 It is thus 
proportionality which provides the best protection for religious interests due to its 
ability to encourage meticulous assessment of the facts. This is demonstrated by the 
results in some of the cases detailed below in section 3.3.3.  
 
Where Vickers may undermine her argument in favour of proportionality is her 
support for the US model of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.
46
 
Understandably, she bases this on the fact the de minimis test is able to ‘reduce[s] the 
potentially onerous nature of a duty of accommodation’ which may be needed lest 
reasonable accommodation end up ‘provid[ing] too much protection for religious 
interests’47. Whilst this concern is legitimate, it is submitted the US model is too 
                                                     
41
 See chapters 4 and 5, respectively. These are ‘certain’ in the sense they are identifiable in advance 
as reliable indicators of immunity in specific instances. However, they do not go as far as full 
immunity given that proportionality tests are incorporated into them. 
42
 Vickers, above n. 8, p. 229.  
43
 L. Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: an emerging hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280, p. 299.  
44
 Vickers, above n. 8, p. 231.  
45
 Ibid., p. 232.  
46
 Ibid., p. 222.  
47
 Ibid (emphasis added).  
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haphazard to be a reliable judge of accommodation. This is evident in its application 
in Part IV. In particular, the low level at which de miminis is set often negates the 
need for the courts to engage with the criteria for undue hardship as set out in the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines.
48
 It renders the doctrine of 
reasonable accommodation somewhat impotent. The preference should be for a 
model based on that in Canada with an undue hardship standard set appropriately 
high. This elevated standard is not to give undue recognition to religious rights; it is 
to force courts to engage with all the relevant issues in the case so as to resolve 
whether, and if so how far, an accommodation should have been made. Of course, 
there is the added element of church and state separation in the US which may 
explain why the de minimis standard is unsuited to the domestic sphere. Indeed, 
when discussing the appropriate standard for undue hardship in the Canadian case of 
Central Okanagan School District Number 23 v. Renaud 
49
 it was said that ‘there is 
good reason not to adopt the “de minimis” test ... [this] was argued on the basis of 
the establishment clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and its 
prohibition against the establishment of religion.  This ... was thus decided within an 
entirely different legal context.  The case law of this Court has approached the issue 
of accommodation in a more purposive manner’.50 
 
3.3.3 The impact of Canadian reasonable accommodation in the cases in Part IV 
 
In relation to employment Sandberg comments that an enhanced justification test 
would take ‘into account the demands of the specific jobs and the cultures of the 
particular workplaces’. 51 Indeed, in the employment cases considered in Part IV the 
evidence shows that Canadian reasonable accommodation would have perhaps 
enabled full accommodations to have been reached in McClintock v. Department for 
Constitutional Affairs,
52
 Ladele v. London Borough of Islington
53
  and Eweida v. 
British Airways PLC
54
 (had British Airways not acceded to the request after legal 
                                                     
48
 See chapter 8, section 3.1. 
49
 [1992] 2 SCR 970. 
50
 per Sopinka J at p. 983. 
51
 R. Sandberg, ‘A Uniform Approach to Religious Discrimination? The Position of Teachers and 
Other School Staff in the UK’, in M. Hunter-Henin (ed.) Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in 
Europe (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 342. 
52
 [2008] IRLR 29. 
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proceedings commenced). It also reveals more fully the extent to which the 
employers in the remaining cases offered perfectly fair partial accommodations 
(indeed, as far as their legitimate aims would allow) which were unwisely rejected 
by the religious employees. 
55
 
 
These results demonstrate the value of the Canadian model: in particular, they show 
how it might have resolved previous intractable clashes between religion and issues 
of sexual orientation in employment which the courts had hitherto failed to reconcile. 
However, the Canadian approach to proportionality (balancing policy versus 
practicality) would probably not have been able to assist the religious individuals or 
groups in the goods and services cases of Hall and Preddy v. Bull and Bull (Bull),
56
 
R (Johns) v. Derby City Council (Johns)
57
 or Catholic Care v. Charity Commission 
for England and Wales (Catholic Care).
58
 If it had, such groups and individuals 
would have been refusing provision of services on the basis of sexual orientation, the 
statutory prohibition of which was a factor across all three cases in curtailing 
religious liberty.
59
 Further, it would have been impossible to accommodate the 
various religious interests ‘behind the scenes’ because refusal of services might have 
been directly communicated to the services users, a contravention of the relevant 
statutory prohibitions. Even if behind the scenes accommodation had been possible, 
there would still have been a barrier to realising religious interests. Such 
accommodation would have either altered the nature of the service so that the full 
requested service was no longer available (for example, in Hall refusing a double 
room to a gay couple but offering them a twin room or two singles as alternatives) or, 
worse, closed off the service altogether (for example, refusing all services in Hall but 
advising the service users to use an alternative bed and breakfast, rejecting gay 
children for fostering in Johns but suggesting a different foster family and turning 
                                                     
55
 The exception is McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd. [2010] EWCA Civ B1 in which both full and 
partial accommodations would have been difficult to implement. 
56
 [2012] EWCA Civ 83. On 5
th
 July 2012 the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal this judgment. 
57
 [2011] EWHC 375 (Admin). 
58
 [2011] UKFTT B1 (General Regulatory Chamber).  
59
 In Bull, see Judge Rutherford in the Bristol County Court ([2011] EW Misc 2 (CC)) at paras. 23 – 
25 and Rafferty LJ in the Court of Appeal at paras 7 – 9; in Johns, see Munby LJ at para. 26; in 
Catholic Care see Judge McKenna at paras. 3 – 4. As a religious group linked to a public authority 
Catholic Care would have especially been under a duty to provide its services without discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation (EqA 2010, Schedule 23, para. 2(10)(a)), whilst the couples in Bull 
and Johns would not have been able to claim a religious exception given that they were not an 
organisation relating to religion or belief.  
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down adoption services to same-sex couples in Catholic Care but providing direction 
as to other adoption services
60
).  
 
These cases may be distinguished from Scott Brockie and Imaging Excellence Inc v. 
Ray Brillinger (No. 2) (Brockie)
61
 which was a freedom of religion claim and not one 
where the Canadian approach to reasonable accommodation (assuming this can be 
used by service providers as opposed to service users) was applied. Given comments 
in Re: Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under the Marriage Act
62
 on the need for 
reasonable accommodation not to compromise the full service offered it seems that 
Brockie may no longer be good law. These arguments possibly address Sandberg’s 
query
63
 as to why the Bristol County Court decision in Hall did not elaborate on 
ways in which indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation could ever be 
justified (the Court of Appeal did not rule on indirect discrimination in Hall). That 
accommodation in the cases concerning issues of sexual orientation would have had 
to take place alongside provision of the full service should assuage concerns from 
trade unions and LGBT stakeholders that reasonable accommodation could ‘act as a 
vehicle for religious people to discriminate and thereby threaten the rights of LGB 
and T people’.64 The United States does not have a reasonable accommodation test in 
relation to goods and service provision, although in chapter eight its increasingly 
flexible jurisprudence on free exercise of religion claims was noted as providing a 
very tentative template for future courts when addressing the de minimis test in 
reasonable accommodation claims. 
 
If Canadian reasonable accommodation was unable to provide a solution in the above 
goods and services cases then other solutions have emerged. Chief amongst these is 
Sandberg’s ‘religious situation’ rule which reverses the ‘specific situation’ rule: 
 
                                                     
60
 As was temporarily allowed under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, (SI 
2007/1263), Regulation 15(3). 
61
 (2002) 43 CHRR D/90.  
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[t]his would cover the situation where a non-believer voluntarily submits to a 
religious situation. If a non-believer enters a place of worship, faith school or 
religious bookstore, then surely their voluntary submission should be an 
answer to any claim that the religious setting breaches their Article 9 [or 
equality] rights. The ... rule would help ... underlin[e] the autonomy of 
religious groups by asserting that when someone voluntarily enters the 
religious realm they cannot automatically insist on secular standards.
65
 
 
  
Whilst this is an interesting proposition it seems reminiscent of Rivers’ idea of 
religious immunity and Esau’s vision of ‘islands of exclusivity’. Even if such an 
exception could be negotiated, its terms would no doubt be narrowly drawn meaning 
that, whilst it would achieve certainty of protection, that level of protection may be 
set quite high so as to include recognised religious groups such as that in Catholic 
Care but not mere religious individuals as in Johns.  
 
3.4 Institutional and stakeholder imperatives 
 
It is important to step back from legal issues of proportionality to gauge how 
adoption of Canadian reasonable accommodation might operate at a wider level. 
Certainly, proportionality as an open-textured device is liable to address issues of 
equilibrium concerning religion and other interests in anti-discrimination law. In 
applying proportionality Vickers comments that ‘the courts seem happier to allow a 
broader territory to be permeated by religious interests’.66 This definitely seems the 
experience in Canada (and to a much lesser extent the US). It is more liable to foster 
religious liberty given not only its greater ability to discern routes through which 
interests can co-exist in individual cases but also its spirit of inclusion and respect 
which may percolate through to pockets of society, be they workplaces or other 
communities. Whilst this wider policy benefit should not be overplayed it is telling 
that introduction of reasonable accommodation to domestic law has received support 
from a range of sectors.  
 
In particular, it is possible to identify judicial enthusiasm for a model of reasonable 
accommodation for religion. At the UK level the classic example is Rix LJ’s allusion 
                                                     
65
 Sandberg, above n. 24, pp. 199 – 200.  
66
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to the doctrine in Copsey v. WWB Devon Clays
67
 where he talked of an employer 
‘acting unfairly if he makes no attempt to accommodate his employee’s needs’.68 
This has been matched by similar calls. For example, the Council of Europe’s 
Commissioner for Human Rights has commented that ‘[a]s part of the further 
development of this new generation of [national equality] legislation, consideration 
needs to be given to extending the provisions on reasonable accommodation to the 
other grounds covered by the legislation ... Reasonable accommodation could be 
further developed’.69 The Commissioner also confirms that ‘[a]ll organisations 
should be required to make reasonable accommodation for the practical implications 
of diversity across all grounds covered by the [national] legislation’.70 As if in 
recognition of this, two recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
have tantalisingly aligned the Article 9(2) proportionality test closer to one of undue 
hardship. In Jakόbski v. Poland 71 the applicant’s freedom of religion was violated 
because he was not provided with a meat-free diet in prison. The court sign-posted a 
number of factors (similar to those in Alberta) which influenced its decision, for 
example: financial costs, inmate morale and disruption to the management of the 
prison.
72
 The same approach was taken in another recent Article 9 case
73
 concerning 
a prisoner’s right to practise fundamental rituals of his religion in jail. Whilst the case 
was ultimately found to be manifestly ill-founded
74
 the court discussed Article 9(2) 
and listed, once again, financial implications.
75
 
 
At the national level, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has 
argued for reasonable accommodation in cases of religion or belief,
76
 presenting a 
change in direction from the previous government’s declaration that ‘[w]e are not 
persuaded that reasonable adjustments should be extended [from disability] ... We 
consider that it would be unduly burdensome and reduce clarity of employers and 
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 March 2011, p. 5. 
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 Ibid., p. 9.  
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 See online announcement from 11
th
 July 2011: 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/news/2011/july/commission-proposes-reasonable-
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th
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service providers were required to respond to extensive new duties in this way’.77 
This was the view notwithstanding Home Office commissioned research in 2001 
which considered the role of reasonable accommodation in religious 
discrimination.
78
 The EHRC commented that ‘[j]udges have interpreted the law too 
narrowly in religion or belief discrimination claims’;79 it now directly supports the 
introduction of a reasonable accommodation test, contending that ‘[t]he Commission 
thinks there is a need for clearer legal principles to help the courts consider what is 
and what is not justifiable in religion and belief cases, which will help resolve 
differences without resorting to legal action. The Commission will propose the idea 
of ‘reasonable accommodation’ that will help employers and others manage how 
they allow people to manifest their religion or belief’.80 To this end, and as already 
seen, it is intervening in the jointly heard appeals to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in both Ladele and McFarlane v. UK
81
 (arguing that these cases 
were correctly decided)
82
 and Eweida and Chaplin v. UK
83
 (arguing that these cases 
were wrongly decided),
84
 although in September 2011 it was announced that research 
into reasonable accommodation would now not form part of its intervention in these 
cases before Strasbourg. Notably, the UK government has also submitted 
representations to the ECtHR in all four cases albeit supporting the most recent 
domestic decisions which protected the employers in those cases.  
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 Discrimination Law Review – A Framework for Fairness: proposals for a single Equality Bill for 
Great Britain (London: Crown, 2007), p. 73. 
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More recently, and in response to consultation feedback,
85
 the EHRC has reiterated 
its commitment to pursuing and potentially developing a concept of reasonable 
accommodation in cases concerning religion in order to ‘help inform [its] early 
thinking in this area’.86 It also announced that it ‘intend[ed] to continue the dialogue 
with a range of interested stakeholders to explore this idea further’.87 Consultation 
responses also indicated that the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland ‘is 
recommending the introduction of an ‘anticipatory duty’ to make reasonable 
accommodations across all equality law protected characteristics’.88  
 
The momentum behind the introduction of a doctrine of reasonable accommodation 
was further invigorated by a recent Parliamentary report entitled ‘Clearing The 
Ground’,89 prepared by the ‘Christians in Parliament’. This extended the debate to 
the stakeholder sphere, the report arguing, inter alia, for work to be undertaken 
regarding the utility of reasonable accommodation for religion to ‘ensure that the 
rights of Christians and those of other faiths to manifest their belief were not unduly 
restricted,’90 although it also acknowledged that care would need to be taken in not 
excessively regulating ‘reasonableness’.91An evolving process of knowledge 
exchange has encouraged stakeholders elsewhere to warm to the advantages of 
reasonable accommodation, particularly in light of the more prescriptive approach it 
affords regarding proportionality factors. Recently, the ability of reasonable 
accommodation to lead to more religiously plural environments such as the 
workplace have been welcomed by such stakeholders who have debated that useful 
reasonable accommodation factors would include cost, health and safety and impact 
on colleagues.
92
 These bear obvious resemblance to those factors outlined in Alberta.   
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4. FINAL REMARKS 
 
Adoption of Canadian reasonable accommodation in domestic anti-discrimination 
law would help facilitate better judicial engagement with individual religious 
interests as balanced with competing factors. This would certainly occur at the level 
of employment; until there is more case law generated it is unclear how useful it 
would be in the provision of goods and services.  Nevertheless, when applied it has 
the potential – via an innovative proportionality analysis – to address individual 
grievances to a greater level of analysis than the current test of justification in 
indirect discrimination. This is likely to result in a more equitable balancing of 
religious claims as against others. At a philosophical and theoretical level it would 
also be founded upon similar principles to those which justify other forms of special 
protection for religion, in particular religious exceptions.  
 
Moreover, it is potentially able to make a contribution to ways in which individual 
believers and stakeholders can signal to society at large that religion or belief is not 
only an individual characteristic that can be protected more equally in law, but also 
something which has more fundamental meaning in the realisation of religious 
liberty and group identity as a whole. Even if this latter contribution is modest, it 
highlights the role that reasonable accommodation could play in securing a more 
even footing for religious liberty in the courts and wider society. When considered 
against the backdrop of religious liberty evolution in the UK, reasonable 
accommodation may present a fresh perspective in the legal acknowledgement of 
religious interests.  
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